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Summary 
 
This thesis investigates UK-US relations with regard to the South Asian Crisis of 1971. Through a 
focus on an understudied point of disagreement within the relationship between Prime Minister 
Edward Heath and President Richard Nixon, the thesis sheds further light on Anglo-American 
relations in the early 1970s. Through analysis of archival documents on both sides of the Atlantic, 
this thesis contributes to the growing revisionist literature that has moved away from a focus upon 
Heath’s pro-Europeanism as the cause of problems in the Anglo-American relationship at the time. 
Rather, a more nuanced approach that also investigates the impact of the secretive foreign 
policymaking style of the Nixon White House is taken into account. The thesis reveals the issues in 
communication and differences of interests that, in December 1971, led the UK and US delegations 
at the UN Security Council to tacitly advocate for opposite sides of a hot war in South Asia. The 
thesis assesses the effect that these heated disagreements had upon the Anglo-American 
relationship going into 1972 and 1973.  
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Introduction 
 
US President Richard Nixon was thrilled when Conservative leader Edward Heath won a surprise 
victory in the UK general election of June 1970. He was so excited that he called his Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, four times whilst Kissinger was in Mexico City attending 
the World Cup.1 However, scholarship written prior to the availability of archival documents, on both 
sides of the Atlantic in the early 2000s, tended to interpret the Heath-Nixon period as a low point for 
the Anglo-American relationship.2 The major cause cited was that of Heath’s desire to develop a 
closer relationship with the UK’s European all ies. The Heath-Nixon years from 1970-1974 received 
relatively little scholarly attention within the extensive corpus of literature that has assessed the 
Anglo-American relationship. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the scholarly reappraisal of the 
early 1970s that has occurred since the late 2000s- a literature that has widened its scope of analysis 
away from simply Heath’s pro-Europeanism.3 This thesis is the first detailed analysis within this 
growing literature of UK-US relations in the South Asian region in 1971, a time when the 
subcontinent endured war and the subsequent birth of a new sovereign state, Bangladesh. It will 
provide an analysis of the knock-on effects that Nixon’s alteration of traditional US policy toward 
Communist China had upon the Anglo-American relationship, with particular regard to South Asia; 
provide new insights into the manner in which differences in policy toward events in South Asia had 
an impact upon the Anglo-American relationship; and analyse the reasons behind and the impact on 
the UK-US relationship of the Heath Government and Nixon’s Administration’s public disagreements 
at the UN Security Council, as India and Pakistan went to war in December 1971. 
 
                                                                 
1
 Kissinger, HA (1979) The White House Years Weidenfeld and Nicolson; London p932. 
2
 Examples of this include Ovendale, R (1998) Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century. Macmillan; 
London p137; Bartlett, CJ (1992) The Special Relationship: A Political History. Longman; New York p127; 
Hathaway, R (1981) Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II. Twayne 
Publishers; Boston pp95-96. Arnold, G (2014) America and Britain: Was there ever a Special Relationship? 
C.Hurst and Co; London p83. 
3
 These texts include Scott, A (2011) Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Special Relationship  Palgrave 
Macmillan: New York; Hynes, C (2009) The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and the Year 
of Europe University College Dublin Press: Dublin Introduction; Spelling, A (2009) “Edward Heath and Anglo-
American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal” Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol 20 No 4 pp638-658; Rossbach, NH 
(2009) Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-74 Palgrave 
MacMillan; New York. 
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1. Scholarship on the UK-US relationship 
There have been many attempts at assessing what, if anything, is “special” about the Angl o-
American relationship. One approach has been to look at the Anglo-American relationship from a 
comparative perspective, asking what marks it out as “special” when compared to other bilateral 
relationships between states. Alex Danchev, in his 1996 essay “On Specialness” cited a leaked State 
Department document that in 1993 listed the US’ top ten bilateral relationships in terms of 
importance- the UK was third behind Germany and France. He also pointed out that the US has 
degrees of “specialness” in relations with other states, claiming that Japan has claimed 
“specialness”, Israel was born “special” and that the relationship with Russia was “special” in spite of 
itself.45 Danchev concluded that a bilateral relationship can therefore be important, but not spe cial, 
and that the idea of having a “special relationship” is not the Anglo-Saxon preserve that elites on 
both sides of the Atlantic believed it to be. Danchev has faced criticism for his lack of clarity in 
positing ten possible criteria with which to ascertain the “specialness” of any given relationship. 6 
However, his highlighting of “mythicality” as, along with “transparency” as the two most important 
factors in determining the “specialness” of a bilateral relationship, emphasises the importance of 
intangible factors such as a shared language, history and cultural cross-fertilisation. 
Another way of assessing the “special relationship” has been from a theoretical perspective within 
the field of International relations. In a 1966 article entitled “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-
American Alliance” Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance argued that the Anglo -American 
relationship could not be explained by Alliance Theory.7 Their contention was that although the 
alliance during the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War can be explained in terms of 
shared interests, the manner in which the Anglo-American relationship developed post-1949 
cannot.8 They argued that the maintenance of the Anglo-American alliance became an end in itself, 
and cite the Suez crisis of 1956 as a point where, according to alliance theory, divergent interests 
should have brought about a fragmentation of the relationship, when in reality the Anglo-American 
Alliance strengthened in the late 1950s.9 Dawson and Rosecrance concluded that “between friends 
the balance of power does not mean very much…History, tradition and affinity have been crucial to 
                                                                 
4
 Danchev, A (1996) “On Specialness” International Affairs Vol 72 No 4 p743. 
5
 Danchev, “On Specialness” p743. 
6
 Dobson, AP and Marsh, S (2013) “Introduction” in Dobson, AP  and Marsh S (eds) Anglo-American Relations: 
Contemporary Perspectives Routledge: Oxon p12. 
7
 Dawson, R and Rosecrance, R (1966) “Theory and Reality in the Anglo -American Alliance” World Politics Vol 
19 No 1 p21. 
8
 Dawson and Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality” p48. 
9
 Dawson and Rosecrance p51. 
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the [Anglo-American+ alliance rather than peripheral”.10 Although he conceded that intangibles such 
as tradition, language and history cannot be dismissed, John Baylis, took issue with part of Dawson 
and Rosecrance’s analysis. He argued that Dawson and Rosecrance overstated the extent to which 
the Anglo-American relationship posed a challenge to IR theory. In terms of the Suez crisis, Baylis 
argued that it did, for a time, undermine the relationship and that the reaffirmation of the 
relationship was in both the UK and US’ interests amid the Soviet Union’s demonstrable ability to 
launch inter-continental missiles after the launch of Sputnik in 1957.11 For Baylis, interest trumped 
sentiment when trying to explain the Anglo-American partnership.12  
Many scholars have turned their attention to the question of, if the Anglo-American relationship is 
“special”, what is it that makes it so? David Reynolds, identified three aspects that have made it a 
unique bilateral relationship for both parties.13 They are cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons; 
the pooling of intelligence capabilities; and ease of diplomatic consultation. 14 Chapter One of this 
thesis covers the difficulties caused by the 1946 signing of the McMahon Act that prevented the US 
government from sharing atomic information with any foreign government. However, after a crisis 
over the cancellation of the US supply of the nuclear air to surface Skybolt programme to the UK in 
the late 1950s, in 1962 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was able to secure from President John F. 
Kennedy the Polaris submarine-based nuclear missile system, as Britain was assured of its status as a 
nuclear power through the use of American technology.15 
John Dickie has referred to the UK-US intelligence relationship as “by far the most important aspect 
of cooperation” between the UK and the US.16 Along with possession of nuclear weapons, 
membership of the UN Security Council  and a high level of military spending, David Watt also 
identified intelligence cooperation as one of the factors that ensured that the UK remained a more 
important ally to the US than its size and wealth may have dictated. 17 The UKUSA treaty signed 
secretly in 1947 allowed the newly set up Central Intelligence Agency to work closely with the British 
                                                                 
10
 Dawson and Rosecrance “Theory and Reality” p51. 
11
 Baylis, J (1985) “Anglo-American Relations and Alliance Theory” International Relations Vol 8 No 4 p377. 
12
 Baylis, “Anglo-American Relations” p378. 
13
 Reynolds, D (1986) “’A Special Relationship’? America, Britain, and the International Order Since the Second 
World War” International Affairs Vol 62 No 1 p10. 
14
 Reynolds, “’A Special Relationship’” p10. 
15
 Reynolds, p13. 
16
 Dickie, R (1994) “Special” No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality Wiedenfeld and 
Nicholson; London. p259. 
17
 Watt, D (1986) “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship” in Roger Louis, WM  and Bull, H (eds) The 
Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 Oxford University Press; Oxford p4. 
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Secret Intelligence Agency.18 The agreement allowed the two countries to establish a vast network of 
Signals intelligence that helped the UK and the US coordinate surveillance operations against the 
Soviet Union.19 Even at times of stress within the relationship, such as the Suez crisis, the value of 
Intelligence cooperation ensured that warmth remained within this aspect of the Anglo-American 
relationship.20 
Diplomatic consultation, the focus for this thesis, is the aspect of the “special relationship” that 
Reynolds cites as “the most fundamental”.21 Chapter One of this thesis assesses the major post-
World War Two (WW2) fluctuations in the Anglo-American relationship and demonstrates the 
notion that close consultation has not always meant that the two allies agreed, and that breakdowns 
in communication could lead to major crises.22 Chapter One also demonstrates that, with particular 
regard to relations over China and the Middle East, substantial disagreements between the two 
allies could be successfully managed.23 Reynolds argues that the building of networks, both formal 
and informal, as well as the facility of a common language and the knowledge of what counterparts 
were doing in London and Washington helped diplomats not only keep abreast of policy, but to also 
understand the background behind internal debates.24 Historian Michael Howard has commented 
upon the similarly “remarkable degree of friendly intimacy that  deve loped between officials on both 
sides of the Atlantic during the Second World War, that lasted well into the post-war period.25 He 
asserts that wartime experience had created a generation of officials for whom Anglo-American 
amity and cooperation was second nature.26  
Building upon ideas of an Anglo-American amity that has complemented shared global interests, 
other scholars have looked to explain the longevity of the “special relationship” and, it’s “Lazarus -
like” ability to recover from a number of crises that may have seen its demise since the end of the 
Second World War.27 Jérôme Élie has argued that although British support for US policies, as well as 
                                                                 
18
 Dickie Special No More p260. 
19
 Dickie p260. 
20
 Dickie p260. 
21
 Reynolds “A Special Relationship?” p10. 
22
 Reynolds, p10. 
23
 Reynolds, p10. 
24
 Reynolds, p10. 
25
 Howard, M (1986) “Afterword: The ‘Special Relationship’” in Roger Louis, WM  and Bull, H (eds) (1986) The 
Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 Oxford University Press; Oxford.  p389. 
26
 Howard p389. 
27
 Marsh, S and Baylis, J (2006) “The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International 
Relations” Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol 17 No 1 
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nuclear and intelligence cooperation have provided value for the US in maintaining the alliance, the 
British have gained more from the “special relationship” than the Americans. These benefits have 
come particularly in terms of having a route to global influence via a close relationship with the US 
and the benefit of having been supplied with US-made nuclear weapons at a heavily discounted 
rate.28 Therefore, he argues that the British have developed a “preservation mechanism” to ensure 
that the “special relationship” remains in place.29 Élie puts forward two broad hypotheses to explain 
such a phenomena. The first is that the British have made constant efforts to cement the 
permanence of the relationship through nuclear and intelligence cooperation, through allowing the 
US to have bases on UK soil and the forming of “quasi -institutional” links between military and 
diplomatic personnel.30 The second hypothesis is that there exists a commonality of interests 
between the two peoples that stems from a shared culture and commitment to democratic 
institutions.31 Élie notes that it is here where the notion of the Anglo-American relationship as a 
British-constructed “’metaphysical entity’ rejoins the conception of the special relationship as a 
‘stratagem of British diplomacy”.32 
In a similar vein, Steve Marsh and John Baylis have looked to explain what has caused the “Lazarus 
effect” within the Anglo-American relationship. They make the argument that the longevity of the 
relationship has been a result of four key continuities, those of; a determination for Britain to remain 
a global actor; the continuing reality of American power; a calculation that a position close to, but 
independent of the US would best serve British interest; and an assumption that British wisdom 
would allow London to steer the “naïve”, yet predominant US. 33 From these factors flow other 
continuities that ensured the preservation of the relationship such as the continuing memory of joint 
commands during the Second World War, the willingness of the UK to “pay the price” in blood and 
treasure to remain close to the US, and the employment of a number of British strategies de signed 
to reinforce the relationship and guard against American desertion.34 Marsh and Baylis conclude that 
the willingness of the British to “pay the price” has retained American interest in the “special 
                                                                 
28
 Él ie, J (2005) “Many times doomed but stil l  alive: An attempt to understand the continuity of the spec ial 
relationship” Journal of Transatlantic Studies Vol 3 No 1 p68. 
29
 Élie, p73. 
30
 Élie, p74. 
31
 Élie, p74. 
32
 Élie, p75. 
33
 Marsh and Baylis “Lazarus” p174. 
34
 Marsh and Baylis, p174 
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relationship” in a manner that complements Élie’s notion of a British “preservation” mechanism that 
has helped maintain the longevity of a strong Anglo-American alliance. 
In the introduction to their edited volume Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives, 
Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh distinguish between schools of “sentiment” and of “interest” in 
literature on the special relationship. Yet they also tentatively identify a school of “ambiguity” within 
which Élie and others such as Robert Hathaway can be placed.35 According to Dobson and Marsh 
“these authors are…concerned with trying to capture the character and content of the relationship, 
and in so doing highlight its uncertain nature because of differing values and expectations placed on 
it by each side at different times”.36 This description goes some way to explaining where this thesis 
fits within literature conceptualising the “special relationship”. It assesses relations over a specific 
region, South Asia, at a specific point in time, 1971, when the character and content of the 
relationship had, in the mid to late 1960s seen a period of rapid change. The aim of this study is not 
to define specialness nor measure how special the relationship was in 1971, but it is appropriate to 
have placed this thesis within the extant literature on the subject. This thesis is focused upon the 
different interpretations of British and American interests with regard to South Asia in 1971, yet it 
does not reject the notion that the history or “tradition” of close consultation within the post -war 
Anglo-American relationship shaped the nature in which the two allies responded to the differences 
that emerged between the two governments. 
 
2. Methodology 
Broadly speaking, there are two perspectives with which to conduct the historical study of 
international politics, and by extension, this thesis. The first is a theoretical approach grounded in 
the field of International relations, this is also known as the “outside” method of accounting for the 
behaviour of leaders and the states that they represent.37 In this field scholars share many practices 
with social scientists, production of hypotheses, collecting and analysing empirical data and often 
applying their theory to their results.38 On the other hand, the “inside” method is one grounded in 
the tradition of Diplomatic History, one that values the meticulous collection and analysis of archival 
data. Stephen Haber et al have described the two approaches as “Brothers under the skin” in the 
                                                                 
35
 Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction” p11. 
36
 Dobson and Marsh, p11. 
37
 Dobson and Marsh p6; Hollis, M and Smith, S (1991) Explaining and Understanding International Relations 
Clarendon Press: Oxford p3. 
38
 Haber, S et al (1997) “Brothers under the skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations” International 
Security Vol 22 No 1 p43. 
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sense that, although they differ methodologically, they share an epistemological commitment to the 
evaluation of evidence as a means to reaching a conclusion.39 The two approaches to the study often 
complement one another, the “inside” work of Diplomatic Historians is often crucial to the 
formation of wider theories of international relations.40 In this vein, Elman and Elman have 
suggested that whilst International Relations theorists tend to focus upon classes of events and 
multiple case studies at one time, Diplomatic Historians look to explain specific events.41 The work of 
Diplomatic Historians can contribute greatly to the development of IR theory through identifying 
boundaries and limitations of various hypotheses.42 
It is within this context that this thesis takes the “inside” approach to assessing UK-US relations and 
the South Asian Crisis of 1971. Tension had built up on the subcontinent in the nine months from 
March 1971, after Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan, had moved to suppress a nationalist movement 
in East Pakistan- the region known since December 1971 as Bangladesh. The subsequent civil unrest 
in Pakistan led to millions of refugees crossing the border into India and a subsequent Indian 
invasion of East Pakistan in November 1971. Throughout the crisis, the British and American 
governments had different outlooks. The British prioritised their relationship with India as a result of 
its relative financial and strategic importance when compared to Pakistan. Conversely the US 
government, and specifically the White House, favoured Pakistan in order to protect wider 
geopolitical concerns. At the UN Security Council in December 1971, the two governments found 
themselves tacitly advocating for opposite sides of a hot war in South Asia.  
This thesis tracks the policies and interactions of the UK and US governments and bureaucracies 
throughout the crisis and explains the misunderstandings that led to public dissent between the two 
governments.  Adopting the “inside approach” characteristic of Diplomatic History, the work is 
grounded in substantial archival sources drawn from both the UK and the US. In the UK, referenced 
material is housed at the UK National Archives (UKNA) in Kew, London. The principal series used are 
the Office of the Prime Minister (PREM), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F CO) and the 
Cabinet Office (CAB). In the US, documents were accessed at the National Archives and Record 
Administration’s facility at College Park, Maryland (USNA) and at the Richard Nixon Presidential 
Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California (NPL). At College Park, the majority of material 
accessed was that of the State Department’s Record Group 59, Central Files 1970-1973, with a small 
                                                                 
39
 Haber et al “Brothers under the Skin” p38. 
40
 Haber et al p35. 
41
 Elman, C and Elman, MF (1997) “Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting 
Difference and Crossing Boundaries” International Security Vol 22 No 1 p10. 
42
 Elman and Elman “Diplomatic History” p15. 
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amount of material from the State Department’s Bureau for Middle Eastern Affairs. At the Nixon 
Presidential Library, material accessed is from Nixon’s National Security Files (NSC) and the Telcons 
of Henry Kissinger (HAK). Other primary sources of US material include the Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS) Series 1969-1976 Volumes XI and E-7, which both relate to South Asia and the 
US National Security Archive’s Briefing Book No.79 The Tilt: US Foreign Policy and the South Asian 
Crisis of 1971. It should be noted that the thesis remains true to the archival record in terms of the 
names of places that have changed since 1971. Most notably, the thesis refers to Dacca (renamed 
Dhaka in 1983) and Peking (now known as Beijing). 
3. The Literature Gap 
Until recently, the established view of the Heath-Nixon era has been characterised by the notion 
that Nixon’s early excitement and optimism with regards to the Anglo-American relationship were 
scuppered by Heath’s desire for Britain to become a distinctly European state. A particularly 
forthright example of such a view is Ritchie Ovendale’s portrayal of Heath as a man bent on British 
accession to the EC at all costs, labelling the Prime Minister “Europe obsessed” and accusing him of 
shunning Nixon’s offers of friendship with an attitude of “sustained aloofness”.43 Christopher 
Bartlett supports this view, suggesting that Heath saw the UK as “just another European” country 
and that British actions did not live up to American expectations.44 John Dickie and Robert Hathaway 
take a slightly different stance in as much as they both affirm that Heath was not an anti-American 
per se, but both similarly argue that Heath’s desire was for a more distant transatlantic relationship 
than his predecessors.45Although none of the accounts argue that Anglo-American cooperation 
completely broke down at this point, Ovendale and Bartlett both emphasise the negative role that 
British policymakers played in the relationship’s apparent weakening.  
Since the late 2000s there has emerged a revisionist scholarship of the Heath-Nixon relationship that 
has reached different conclusions to their predecessors and emphasised a lack of detailed analysis 
hitherto.46 For instance, Andrew Scott has argued that partly as a result of a lack of available 
information, older accounts of the Heath-Nixon era have relied too heavily on the work of Nixon’s 
                                                                 
43
 Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations p137. 
44
 Bartlett, The Special Relationship p127. 
45
 Dickie,  Special No More p144,”; Hathaway, R (1981) Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations 
since World War II Boston p95-96.  
46
 Dickie Special No More is the most prominent example of this. Chapter 8, being of comparable size to other 
chapters covers the years 1963-1979, whereas most other chapters in the book cover 3-5 years, with the next 
largest being seven years. Dimbleby, D and Reynolds, D (1989) An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between 
Britain and America in the 20
th
 Century Vintage Books; New York similarly glosses over the period with Chapter 
13 covering a period 50% larger than any other chapter on the post-war years.  
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Assistant for National Security Affairs in 1971, Henry Kissinger. Scott has put forward the case that 
the dominance of Kissinger’s account has skewed the historical narrati ve toward one that put the 
emphasis on Heath’s desire to see the UK become part of the EEC.47 With access to archival material 
made available from 2002, recent literature has made two major movements away from that 
written in the twentieth century.48 The first is to identify that the Anglo-American relationship in the 
early 1970s had its own set of ups and downs. Alex Spelling has argued that relations between the 
UK and US governments were generally cordial but for two periods in late 1971 and late 1973. 
Spelling goes as far as to speculate that had Heath left office prior to Kissinger’s surprise 
announcement of the White House’s “Year of Europe” in early 1973, the Heath -Nixon years may 
have been remembered as a friendly period for Anglo-American relations.49 
In terms of the period of poor Anglo-American relations in the latter half of 1971, attention is paid 
most closely to the two “Nixon shocks”. The first was a surprise announcement from the White 
House of a new US policy toward Communist China, the centrepi ece of which was the visit of 
President Nixon to Peking in February 1972. The second “shock” was that of a new US economic 
policy that was headlined by the imposition of a 10% import surcharge on a range of goods entering 
the US. Consideration of these events marks the second movement away from initial conceptions of 
the UK-US relationship in the early 1970s. Accounts written since the late 2000s make the case that 
it was the secretive nature of the Nixon Administration, one in which the State Department was kept 
uninformed of important aspects of US foreign policy, that was a larger cause of strains in the Anglo -
American relationship than was Heath’s desire for EEC accession.50 An investigation into the impact 
that White House secrecy had upon the Anglo-American relationship, particularly with regard to 
South Asia is an aim of this thesis. 
Anglo-American disagreements regarding the South Asian Crisis of 1971 are not widely discussed 
within the vast amount of work on the post-war bilateral relationship. In fact, British policy on the 
matter is not widely discussed in general, especially in comparison to the numerous analyses of the 
US foreign policy on the subject.51 Two exceptions to this trend are the works of Simon Smith and 
                                                                 
47
 Scott, A (2011) Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Special Relationship  Palgrave Macmillan: New York p9. 
48 These texts include Scott, Allies Apart; Hynes, C The Year that Never Was; Spelling, A “Edward Heath and 
Anglo-American Relations; Rossbach, NH (2009) Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship;  
49
 Spelling, p654. 
50
 For example, Scott Allies Apart; Rossbach, NH (2009) Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special 
Relationship; Spelling “Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations”. 
51
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Andrew Scott. Smith’s article in Contemporary British History focuses upon British policy toward the 
crisis and the reasons for the divergence in Anglo-American approaches. Smith locates differences in 
Anglo-American policy within the context of policy divergences between the two nations i n Asia 
following the Second World War.52 Smith contends that after a brief period of neutrality in 1971, the 
British government privately favoured India whilst maintaining a neutral position in public. Smith 
highlights a number of factors that resulted in Britain’s favouring of India. These include:  the British 
interpretation of the August 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between India and 
the Soviet Union; FCO and Cabinet reports that favoured India; and a desire on the part of Heath not 
to repeat an error made by his predecessor Harold Wilson, when Wilson severely damaged relations 
with India after he publicly blamed New Delhi for a previous conflict with Pakistan in 1965. This 
thesis adds depth to the reasoning behind British foreign policy and adds nuance to the argument 
that UK-US relations in South Asia in 1971 fit the post-war pattern. 
Where Smith’s article focuses upon British policymaking, Scott dedicates a chapter in his book, Allies 
Apart, to Anglo-American relations on the subcontinent in 1971, and is to date the only author to do 
so. Scott makes the argument that disagreements over South Asia in December 1971 were more 
virulent than talks at the subsequent Bermuda summit, held just days after the end of the conflict 
may suggest.53 Scott discusses major aspects of UK and US policy, notably the US desire to protect its 
rapprochement with China, the UK’s identification of its interests lying with India and the aligning of 
the UK and US governments with the policies of India and Pakistan respectively at the UN Security 
Council during the Indo-Pakistan War. This thesis supports Scott’s assertions, but provides a new 
level of detailed analysis and nuance to the study of UK-US relations with regard to the 1971 South 
Asian crisis, and consequently sheds further light on the general state of Anglo-American relations. 
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4. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is developed chronologically. Such a structure allows the thesis to trace the manner in 
which UK and US interests diverged over time and the points at which breakdowns in 
communication had their greatest impact. The first chapter considers the context for the post war 
period in Anglo-American relations up until Edward Heath’s election as Prime Minister in June 1970. 
It provides analysis on a macro-level before focusing on the relationship in two specifi c regions, the 
Middle East and China. The Middle East is considered to provide an example for the manner in which 
regional policy disagreements could be managed without souring the overall tone of the 
relationship. Consideration then turns to Anglo-American relations with regard to China in order to 
provide the necessary context for later discussions of the impact that Nixon’s “opening to China” 
had upon relations between the two governments. The chapter ends with a focus on the history of 
South Asia following the partition of British India in 1947, and the British and American shared desire 
for stability on the subcontinent. Such considerations are necessary for an understanding of the 
divergences of Anglo-American policy in South Asia that occurred over the course of 1971.  
The first six months of the Heath-Nixon period are the focus for the second chapter. The chapter 
analyses Anglo-American summits at Chequers in October 1970, and in Washington two months 
later. Anglo-American focus at the time was upon UK entry into the EC. However, the chapter 
challenges previously held assertions that this caused ruptures in the UK-US relationship from the 
outset. At the forefront of extra-European affairs were the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions, and 
the chapter assesses the competing interests within the Anglo-American alliance and introduces 
themes for future consideration; those of the White House’s secretive foreign policymaking and of 
Nixon’s personal diplomatic style. Though not yet high on the Anglo-American agenda at the time, 
the chapter also charts the run-up to the Pakistan elections of 1970. These elections produced the 
political stalemate that sparked the South Asian Crisis of 1971. The chapter serves to contrast Anglo-
American relations, both in South Asia and beyond, in late 1970 with subsequent chapters that 
consider the downturn in mid-1971. 
Chapter three assesses the growing dissonance within Anglo-American relations in the first half of 
1971 up to July 15th. As tension in South Asia boiled over into the military suppression of the Bengali 
nationalist movement, the White House was nearing the realisation of its secret efforts to open 
diplomatic communication with China. As a result of Pakistani President Yahya Khan’s vital role in 
facilitating the “Opening to China”, the eruption of conflict in East Pakistan provided a problem for 
Nixon and Kissinger. Amid reports of violence being perpetrated upon minorities by Yahya’s army, 
the White House’s primary concern was the maintenance of their relationship with a mutual ally of 
the US and China. The notion of proving the US’ worth as an ally to China continued as a priority for 
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Nixon and Kissinger throughout the South Asian crisis. Chapter Three assesses the knock-on effects 
that this policy had upon the UK-US relationship in the first half of 1971, whilst the White House’s 
China policy remained a closely guarded secret.  
On July 15th 1971, President Nixon announced to the world not only that Henry Kissinger had 
recently visited Peking under a cloak of secrecy, but that he too was to be the first US President to 
visit the People’s Republic of China in the Spring of 1972. The fourth chapter of this thesis assesses 
the impact that the announcement had upon the Anglo-American relationship and the growing 
policy differences that were emerging in South Asia. Analysis then moves on to the differing British 
and American interpretations of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed 
August 9th, 1971. The chapter also continues to consider the knock-on effects that White House 
secrecy, with particular regard to China, and consequently South Asia, was having on the Anglo -
American relationship as events on the ground in East Pakistan continued to deteriorate.  
As the situation in South Asia came to a head in November 1971, Chapter Five focuses upon the 
different policy trajectories of the UK and US governments. These differences are assessed through 
analysis of the contrasting meetings that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had with Heath and 
Nixon in late October and early November. Once India and Pakistan had declared war upon each 
other on December 3rd, Nixon and Kissinger moved to brand India the aggressor at the UN and 
called for an immediate cease fire. The Soviet Union vetoed the motion, the UK and F rance 
abstained and the newly-seated People’s Republic of China voted in favour alongside the Americans. 
In an attempt to dissuade India from a sustained attack upon Pakistan’s western wing, Nixon 
authorised the movement of a US Naval Task Force to the Bay of Bengal. Chapter Five assesses the 
breakdown in communication and understanding between the UK and US governments that led to 
the White House’s willingness to risk a global conflict without British knowledge, let alone a British 
understanding, of such a rationale. 
The final chapter assesses the impact that the disagreements of 1971 had upon Anglo-American 
relations both in South Asia and in broader terms. This thesis’ final chapter looks at the impact that 
issues surrounding the South Asian crisis had upon the UK-US relationship in the 15 months between 
the UK-US summits at Bermuda on 21st-22nd December 1971, and the Washington summit 1st-2nd 
February 1973. Through analysis of the Bermuda summit itself and the subsequent period up until 
the Washington summit in February 1973, the chapter reaches conclusions as to how the Anglo-
American relationship improved in 1972, and reflects on the lessons learned after the allies had 
tacitly supported opposing sides of a war in South Asia. 
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The thesis concludes with the consideration of three broad questions that arise from the study of 
Anglo-American relations and the South Asian crisis of 1971. How frosty were relations between 
Heath and Nixon? Were Anglo-American differences over South Asia in 1971 merely tactical, as both 
sides claimed in the aftermath? And did the disagreements over South Asia have a lasting effect on 
the relationship between the Heath government and the Nixon Administration? Finally, 
consideration will be made of the contribution this thesis has made to the study of Anglo-American 
relations, and the Heath-Nixon era in particular.  
 
 
Chapter 1: The UK-US Relationship, 1945-1970 
Introduction 
The opening chapter provides the requisite context for the in-depth study of Anglo-American 
relations and the South Asian Crisis of 1971. The chapter has five sections that map out Anglo-
American relations from 1945 to 1970. first in general terms before focusing on relations in specific 
regions of the world. The first section assesses the Anglo-American relationship on the macro-level, 
using key flashpoints and relationships between Presidents and Prime Ministers in the twenty-five 
years up to 1970. Initially, the section focuses upon the asymmetry of power within the relationship. 
It then considers the notion that British prestige on the global stage was inextricably linked with 
influence on foreign policymaking in Washington. The second section focuses attention upon the 
period between 1964 and 1969 during the Premiership and Presidency of Harold Wilson and Lyndon 
B. Johnson respectively. This enables a consideration of the changing dynamics in the six years prior 
to 1970-71, the main focus of this thesis. 
Section three turns attention to the Middle East. The region is singled out in this instance for its 
increased significance in the global Cold War of 1945-1970 relative to subsequent considerations of 
China and South Asia which are more pertinent to the study of Anglo-American relations and the 
South Asian Crisis of 1971. The section illustrates the notion that within the Anglo-American 
relationship, conflicts of policy arose on a regional level as the British need for US support was 
tempered by a concern that the Americans could supplant their interests, largely in oil, in the Middle 
East. The section also demonstrates the decline of British ability to project its power on a global level 
relative to the US over the twenty-five years to 1970.  
The fourth section focuses upon UK-US relations with regard to China in order to provide context for 
later considerations of the effect that President Richard Nixon’s alteration of US policy under his 
presidency had upon the Anglo-American relationship. The UK government was largely in favour of 
accepting China into the international community, a position which contrasted with their American 
allies. The UK and US had different approaches to other key issues with regard to China; over official 
recognition of the communist government; the seating of China at the UN; and a strategic trade 
embargo imposed by the US.  
The final section focuses its attention on South Asia. Throughout the period, the UK and US were 
caught between India and Pakistan, as good relations with one necessarily meant poor relations with 
the other. India’s non-aligned policy contrasted with Pakistan’s willingness to join Western alliance  
structures- in large part to arm itself against India. The section tracks British and American 
disagreements with regard to how far relations with India could be sacrificed in favour of acquiring 
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an important Cold War ally in Pakistan. These considerations are important in providing context for 
the decisions made by the UK and US governments throughout 1971. 
 
1. The UK-US relationship 1945-1970 
The UK and US entered the post-Second World War in radically different economic conditions. The 
British had lost 400,000 lives and a quarter of its national wealth, whilst the US benefitted from a 
booming wartime economy that had rendered it the world’s leading  economic power.1 The lend-
lease programme, where US food, oil and military hardware were exchanged for the leasing of bases 
to the US on allied soil was suddenly ended in September 1945. The US also attached what the 
British saw as harsh conditions to a post war re-development loan. Negotiations over this loan have 
been described by Dimbleby and Reynolds as hav ing “degenerated to a level more appropriate to 
bitter enemies than close allies”.2 Such unreasonableness in the eyes of the British fostered 
resentment of the US within the new postwar Labour government. Cabinet minister  Aneurin Bevan 
described the passing in the US of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, otherwise known as the 
Marshall Plan, which provided the UK with $2.7 billion of aid, as “no substitute for justice”.3  
Following Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s defeat at the 1945 general election, UK-US cooperation 
continued in areas of military research, standardisation of equipment and operational analysis.4 An 
area where cooperation did not continue, however, was the nuclear field. The McMahon Act, passed 
by the US Congress in 1946, prevented the sharing of information and research on nuclear 
weapons.5 This move was contrary to two prior agreements that had led the British to believe that 
nuclear cooperation would continue. An informal arrangement had been made at Quebec in 
November 1945 whereby the UK, US and Canada agreed to share nuclear information for the good 
of world peace.6 More substantively, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill signed an 
agreement at Hyde Park in 1944 stating that cooperation on “tube alloys” (the code name for 
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nuclear research) would continue until terminated by mutual agreement. 7 The British had 
contributed a great deal to the Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb, both in terms of 
research and development and access to uranium ore. The British were thus understandably upset 
when they failed to secure an information exchange to produce their own independent nuclear 
weapons. 
The McMahon Act was a blow to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s strategy to cement the UK-US 
relationship in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Bevin demonstrated his desire 
for an overt and close UK-US relationship as early as February 1946. In a letter to Prime Minister 
Attlee, Bevin advocated the integration of the UK and US armament industries in order to restrict 
undesirable competition between the two.8 By December 1947 the Soviet Union’s rejection of 
Marshall Aid allowed the UK and US to publically draw themselves closer to one another.9 To 
American surprise, Bevin agreed to the stationing of US B-29 bombers on UK soil without a formal 
agreement and accepted $400m of defence aid from the US. Bevin’s aim to publicly bind the US to 
the security of Western Europe had begun to pay off.  
The level of public acknowledgment of the UK-US relationship continued to be an issue in the 
immediate post-war period. Churchill’s famed “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946, was 
not welcomed by the press on either side of the Atlantic.10 In the speech, then leader of the 
opposition in the UK called for an Anglo-American “fraternal association” to fight the dangers of 
Soviet expansionism. Between 1945 and 1947, neither the UK nor the US wanted their relationship 
with each other to jeopardise their standing with the Soviet Union.11 The western contingent within 
the wartime Grand Alliance held out hope for amiable future relations with the Soviet Union. Attlee 
held out hope for an accommodation with the Soviets until early in 1947.12 However, by the late 
1940s the likelihood of a continued allegiance with the Soviet Union faded. In 1948, the Soviet Union 
blocked access to western controlled areas of Berlin in protest at the western allies’ introduction of 
the Deutschmark in West Berlin, thus preventing any supplies, including food from entering the city. 
In response, western allied air forces, including the Royal Air Force and US Air Force lifted supplies to 
                                                                 
7
 Rosencrance, RN (1968) Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch  Columbia University 
Press: New York p45; p85 The Hyde Park agreement was known only to a small group of advisors, and was not 
known by  Senator McMahon. 
8
 Ovendale, R (1998) Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century. Macmillan; London  p65. 
9
 Baylis  Enduring Alliance p32. 
10
 Bartlett, CJ (1992) The Special Relationship: A Political History Longman; New York p22. 
11
 Baylis, Enduring Alliance p31. 
12
 Bartlett, The Special Relationship p22. 
 22 
the people of West Berlin, eventually ending the crisis in May 1949. The blockade provided  the 
impetus for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, and the formal commitment of the 
United States to the security of Western Europe. 
Churchill returned to power having fought the 1951 general election on a platform to restore the 
UK’s global prestige; this necessitated a strong and close relationship with the US. Churchill’s  initial 
focus was upon renegotiating an agreement made by the Labour government over the American 
appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander of the Atlantic (SACLANT).13 Churchill’s main objective 
was to secure the ability for Britain to command its own forces when faced with the threat of Soviet 
invasion. The Prime Minister’s wish was to return to the joint command of the Atlantic that proved 
successful during the Second World War, but there was no American appetite for it. At a summit 
meeting with Truman in January 1952, Churchill drew a small concession whereby the UK retained 
command of its forces up to a 100 fathom line from the British coast. 14 The deal allowed the 
Americans to maintain the agreement and for Churchill to save face. The episode demonstrated 
three characteristics of the UK-US relationship in the early 1950s; Churchill’s high standing in the US, 
the British tying of global prestige to a cooperative and influential relationship with the US; and 
Britain’s junior status relative to its closest ally. 
The UK had to quickly adjust to its role as the junior partner in the post-war period. Churchill’s 
successor, Anthony Eden, advocated independence of UK foreign policy within the context of a 
strong cooperative relationship with the US.15 After the French rejection of the European Defence 
Community, Eden had been instrumental in the formation of the Western European Union that 
eventually paved the way for German rearmament and NATO membership in 1955.16 Earlier in 1954, 
Eden had brokered a peace deal in Vietnam against the wishes of his American counterpart John 
Foster Dulles, a man with whom he shared an infamously fractured relationship. 17 As part of Eden’s 
peace plan, France, the Soviet Union and Communist China agreed to the partition of Vietnam ahead 
of scheduled elections while the US refused to sign the agreement.18 Dulles reasoned that the 
American people could not sit by and subjugate millions of Vietnamese to communist rule. The 
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American government had also refused to negotiate with the Chinese communists at any point 
during the process.19 The deal demonstrated both the continuingly divergent Anglo-American 
attitudes toward global communism and that British prestige could still be used to forge deals on the 
global stage without the need for US agreement. Dimbleby and Reynolds argue that these diplomatic 
successes gave Eden confidence in Britain’s ability to act independently in the mid-1950s.20 
In 1955, the British and the Americans had agreed to loan $14 million and $56 million respectively 
for the building of the Aswan Dam, a major irrigation project for the Nile Valley. The loans were 
provided on the basis that the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser play a leading and 
constructive role in settling the ongoing dispute between Israel and the Arab world.  It was also 
hoped that the loans would help sway his allegiance toward the West. 21 However, angry with 
Nasser’s strategy to play the United States and the Soviet Union off against one another with regard 
to funding for the project, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided to cancel the Aswan loan 
on July 19th 1956.22 Nasser responded seven days later when he brought the Suez Canal into public 
ownership. Already slighted by what the British saw as a duplicitous US policy over the Baghdad 
Pact, a defence treaty the US refused to sign in part out of deference to Egypt, Eden made it clear to 
Eisenhower that the UK would go to great lengths to reclaim the canal.23  
In the autumn of 1956, without notifying the Americans, the British along with the French 
engineered an Israeli attack on the newly nationalised Suez Canal. The manufactured conflict 
between Israel and Egypt was used as a pretext for an Anglo-French reclaiming of the canal once an 
ultimatum for Egyptian withdrawal, issued on October 30th, was ignored. Incensed and having 
interpreted the British policy to be a return to the colonial policies of old, Eisenhower blocked the 
UK’s rights to draw funds from the IMF, a mechanism crucial for the UK’s defence spending. 24 The US 
government was also able to restrict British and French oil supplies until their forces were withdrawn 
from the Canal Zone.25 The crisis accelerated the UK’s withdrawal from the Middle East and ended 
UK pretensions about the ability to act independently. The crisis proved a watershed for post-war 
UK-US relations and affirmed the UK’s growing weakness vis-à-vis the United States. Fundamentally, 
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the US government was upset at the lack of consultation afforded them by the British government. 
Lucile Eznack has argued that violation by the UK of a norm within the relationship was the 
exacerbating factor in Eisenhower’s anger toward the British government. 26 She contends that the 
manner in which the dissatisfaction was communicated in both private cables and in public 
statements suggested that the courtesy of consultation was a key element of the UK -US 
relationship.27 
By the end of 1956, the UK and US relationship was at its post-war nadir; communication between 
the two allies had broken down.28 Such a weak relationship was in the interest of neither ally and 
both governments looked to rekindle the partnership. For the Eisenhower administration, the launch 
of Sputnik and consequent demonstration of the Soviet capability to launch inter-continental 
ballistic missiles, reminded of the need to nurture close allegiances.29 The British realised that they 
could no longer act alone on the world stage and global prestige was once more associated with the 
ability to influence American foreign policy.  
Eden’s successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was seen as the Atlanticist to mend the 
relationship even though he acted as Foreign Secretary in the midst of the Suez crisis. Macmillan had 
a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower that dated back to their days commanding allied 
forces in North Africa during the Second World War. At the 1957 UK-US summit in Bermuda, 
Eisenhower reinforced the strategic importance of the British Isles. The President arranged for the 
stationing of 60 Thor missiles on British soil and agreed to repeal the McMahon Act in 1958, thereby 
paving the way for a renewal of UK-US nuclear cooperation.30 Macmillan was able to secure a 
rhetorical commitment to the UK-US relationship that prevented any further slide in British prestige 
as well as a US agreement to sign the Baghdad Pact, a defence pact for the Middle East to be 
discussed further below.31 Following the 1957 summit, a State Department spokesman declared 
“*T+he United States-United Kingdom relationship is at the core of the NATO alliance and is an 
important element in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact”.32 The Prime Minister also secured the ability to 
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purchase the air-based Skybolt nuclear weapon system in return for American use of the naval base 
at Holy Loch in Scotland for their fleet of nuclear submarines. 
Nigel Ashton notes that although Macmillan was able to heal wounds at Bermuda, he did not 
achieve his aim to influence US policy.33 Although the notion of “interdependence” was overtly 
declared by both parties, it had different meanings on either side of the Atlantic. 34 Ashton argues 
that while the UK saw interdependence in terms of cooperation, the Eisenhower and subsequently 
the Kennedy administration interpreted it in terms of US control over British policy. Macmillan held 
out hope that Eisenhower would look to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, but it proved not to be 
the case.35 Macmillan’s disillusionment with the Eisenhower administration was complete when the  
President refused to apologise at the Paris summit following the shooting down of Gary Powers’ U2 
spy plane over Russia in 1960.36 For Macmillan, the U2 incident signalled an inherent inflexibility and 
lack of pragmatism on the part of the US when conducting policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Macmillan’s relationship with Kennedy was not as continually positive as it  has often been touted.37 
Differences in opinion over civil wars in the Congo and Yemen, policy toward Cuba and the 
cancellation of Skybolt led the British Prime Minister to conclude, early in Kennedy’s presidency, that 
“we are in a rather bad period with (the) US”.38 However, at the Nassau Conference in 1962, the 
British government secured a favourable deal in acquiring Polaris nuclear weapons. The sea-based 
Polaris system was secured with the British only having to pay a tokenistic 5% surcharge for 
Research and Development, in return for continued US use of the Holy Loch submarine base. The 
deal has been described by Christopher Bartlett as “*T+he most remarkable instance of British 
exploitation of the Special Relationship”.39 Although the pains of asymmetry were being felt in 
London, it was a time when the British could exact major concessions from a partnership that was 
strategically vital for the United States: Britain was a junior, yet crucial partner.40 In securing nuclear 
weapons, the UK had assured its status at the top table within the international community. The UK-
US relationship again demonstrated its ability to recover from crises in quick order. 
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2. Wilson and Johnson, 1964-1969 
As the 1960s wore on, levels of asymmetry in global power and influence continued to increase, and 
at a faster pace than had previously been witnessed. Prime Minister Harold Wilson and President 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s relationship was dominated by three major issues: that of a possible British 
force in Vietnam, the British withdrawal from military positions East of Suez, and the devaluation of 
sterling. Wilson had to balance three interrelated issues at once. He needed to maintain friendly 
relations with the Americans in order to have them provide support for sterling. To do this he 
needed to support US foreign policy, particularly in Vietnam. He then also had to keep enough 
distance from the war in Indo-China to prevent the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) from rebelling; 
this was to prove an extremely difficult task. 
Prior to meeting President Lyndon Johnson in the autumn of 1964, Wilson had promised n ot to 
devalue sterling. He was also aware that Johnson wanted a British military commitment in Vietnam 
alongside the maintenance of British forces east of Suez.41 Johnson was known to be distrustful of 
British prime ministers, especially since Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home defied American wishes 
and authorised the sale of Leyland busses to Cuba in 1963-64.42 At the meeting, Johnson highlighted 
the importance of the continued presence of British troops in Germany and reinforced the American 
opinion that maintenance of a British presence East of Suez was crucial to the security of the West. 43 
Nonetheless, Wilson declared himself to have “won the day” as he secured the cancellation of the 
Multi-Lateral Nuclear Force; a project which would have seen the UK share control of its nuclear 
weapons with other European nations.44 Wilson was keen to show the world that he had a strong 
and influential relationship with the President, even if no such thing existed.  For a British prime 
minister, prestige continued to be attached to a close consultative relationship with the US 
president. 
The level of overt acknowledgement of the UK-US relationship was again an important issue on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Over Vietnam, it was now the Americans that were  clamouring for overt British 
support for the military campaign. Johnson required only a tokenistic British force in Vietnam to add 
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international legitimacy to US operations and ease domestic opposition.45 The president, known not 
to be a fan of Wilson, once complained that “a platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient” just to 
represent a united UK-US front in Vietnam.46 Johnson resented Wilson’s attempt to act as an 
“honest broker” in the conflict. As he saw it, Wilson was offering advice from the sidelines.47 Wilson 
stuck to his 1964 position that there was no chance of a British force in Vietnam under his 
government.48 The commitment was made to appease the left of the PLP, but angered a US 
administration whose good graces were required to support the British economy. 49 The link between 
a British involvement in Vietnam and US support for sterling was never explicitly made, but often 
inferred.50 In 1965, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart reported that requests for help in supporting 
sterling were met with reminders about British unhelpfulness over Cuba and requests as to when 
British troops could be expected in Vietnam.51 At times, the provision and facilitation of loans by the 
US to the UK made it seem as if support for sterling was assured; at others Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Jim Callaghan was told that US support would not be forthcoming in future. 52 
Underpinning all of Wilson’s problems was the chronically weak British economy.53  The Prime 
Minister wanted to maintain a British presence East of Suez as much as the Americans did, but the 
British could not afford it.54 John Dumbrell has explained how telephone conversations between US 
Undersecretary of State George Ball and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in 1966 
demonstrated that the two valued a British presence East of Suez and in Europe much higher than a 
token presence in Vietnam.55 By late 1967, acceptance of this reality in Washington became 
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apparent as the Johnson administration began to further downgrade its expectations of the UK.56 
Robert Hathaway comments, with the benefit of hindsight, on the unreasonableness of American 
expectations for Britain to “simultaneously maintain a healthy economy, a substantial presence in 
the Far East and a major role in Europe”57.  
In January 1968, the British government announced an accelerated rate of withdrawal from military 
outposts east of Suez. This declaration closely followed the devaluation of sterling from $2.80 to 
$2.40 in November 1967. Although Britain still had a lot to offer the US in terms of being the world’s 
third nuclear power, having highly trained armed forces and 55,000 troops stationed in Germany,  
neither the British nor the Americans could shy away from Britain’s decline in global significance and 
power.58 The devaluation of sterling and the withdrawal from commitments east of Suez marked a 
sea change in Britain’s relationship not only with the US, but the rest of the world.  Furthermore, 
future British prime ministers would no longer have powerful bargaining chips such as control of the 
sterling area or a strong friendly military presence in the Middle and Far East to use with the 
Americans. 1967-1968 was a time when the level of asymmetry within the Anglo-American 
relationship increased more obviously than at any point in the post-war years. Upon Nixon’s 
inauguration in January 1969, the British contribution to the global strength of the Anglo-American 
relationship in both economic and military terms had dwindled. Britain was now a medium sized, 
albeit nuclear armed, European power. 
 
3. Strains in the Middle East 
In the early 1950s, the British were caught in a dilemma in the Middle East between the need for US 
support for their policies and what they saw as the Americans “supplanting their interests”. 59 
Aneurin Bevan alleged that the Conservative Party was particularly bitter toward what they saw as 
the Americans pushing anti-colonialism as a means of undermining and replacing British influence in 
the region.60 The UK generally welcomed US support, but in the early 1950s many UK Middle East 
officials had fractious relationships with their American counterparts. 61  
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The Iranian oil crisis of the early 1950s epitomised UK-US tensions in the Middle East. The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had long been a beacon of the British colonial legacy, and the UK 
government’s majority shareholding left it open to criticism as an instrument of foreign policy.62 
Thus when Iranian prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq nationalised the assets of AIOC, the UK 
faced losing its largest overseas possession.63 Though the UK and US had common interests in both 
fighting communism and the western stake in Iranian oil, their primary focuses differed.64 Steve 
Marsh points out that Middle Eastern oil was vital to Britain “financially, strategically, politically and 
militarily”.65 Middle Eastern oil was crucial to the development of the British economy and would be 
needed to fuel any future military expedition.66 Such concentration on the protection of the AIOC oil 
concession and focus on economic aspects of the crisis led to disagreements with an American 
government focused on maintaining the stability of the Iranian regime as a bulwark against 
communist infiltration of the Middle East.  
The US became disillusioned with British refusals to accept even the smallest of concessions that 
would lead to a settlement and refused to support military action to reclaim AIOC’s assets.67 In 
particular US Secretary of State Dean Acheson became irritated by the British refusal to concede the 
oil concession in return for adequate compensation.68 The stalemate between the UK and Iran 
continued when the British imposed export bans on steel, sugar and iron to Iran and dismissed 
20,000 Iranian workers from the Abadan refinery. In response, Mossadeq expelled  British staff and 
forced the British to backtrack on a commitment not to evacuate British nationals from the world’s 
largest refinery.69 The Truman administration was concerned that a standoff between the Iranians 
and the British could push Mossadeq’s Iran into the arms of the Soviet Union.  
The crisis continued into 1953 and Eisenhower’s presidency. The new administration was more 
prepared than its predecessor to take decisive action to prevent Soviet gains in the Middle East. 70 
The approach resulted in the joint CIA-MI6 “Operation Ajax” designed to overthrow Mossadeq’s 
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government and reinstall the Shah of Iran to power. Once the Shah was returned from exile the oil 
dispute was resolved, but resulted in British net losses. The UK’s monopoly on oil in Iran was broken; 
and AIOC’s share of the Iranian oil concession dropped to forty percent, American companies gained 
40% and Dutch and French companies the remainder.  71 Such an arrangement naturally fed 
Conservative Party fears that the Americans were looking to supplant British interests in the region, 
something the US administration strenuously denied.  72  
Conflicting British and American approaches to the region continued to play out over the creation of 
a defence organisation for the Middle East. Initially seen as a region of British responsibility , the 
Truman administration was cool on the idea of committing American troops to a Middle Eastern 
Defence Organisation (MEDO) that could become a NATO for the Middle East. The British strategy to 
create MEDO had been born out of a realisation that the UK could no longer defend the Middle East 
alone from Soviet advances in the early 1950s.73 The British needed American support for the 
defence of the region, but were sensitive to any perceived American attempt to supplant their 
primacy.74 The Eisenhower administration quickly disassociated itself from the MEDO proposal in 
favour of a “northern tier” of allied countries. Under the strategy, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan 
would form a barrier around the Middle East to ward off Soviet infiltration. The initiative allowed the 
Americans to protect the region without an association with the former colonial ruler. The plan was 
to improve their standing in the region, and with Egypt in particular.75 Therefore, when the northern 
tier was secured in 1955, largely through a British initiative in the form of the Baghdad Pact, the 
refusal of the US government to join the pact angered London. Dulles argued that the US did not 
promise to be part of such an organisation and that the US should not be associated with pacts that 
appear to be foreign impositions.  He then issued a moratorium on further members joining.76 Eden 
later accused the US of paying undue deference to Egyptian opinion, whose lack of favour for the 
pact coincided with that of the US.77 
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Although devastating to British pretensions toward the ability to launch independent military action 
in the Middle East, the Suez incident in 1956 did not end the UK’s role in the region. Neither did it 
end the British dilemma of being stuck between the need for US financial and military support and 
the supplanting of British influence. Likewise, the Americans still wanted the British to maintain as 
much of their responsibility as possible. Defence of Jordan was still seen as a British responsibility  by 
the US government and, under the Kennedy administration, the president felt that it should be the 
UK that moved should Egypt, Iraq or Syria threaten the western ally. 78 In fact the American 
government was actively encouraging a continued British involvement in the Middle East in  the early 
1960s. Simon Smith quotes Denis Healey’s comment that “the United States, after trying for thirty 
years to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East and Africa was now trying desperately to keep us 
in”.79 Within the context of American overstretch in Vietnam, the value to the US of a continued 
British presence in the Middle East increased. 
Conflicts of policy continued into the 1960s, Macmillan felt that US support for the Yemeni rebels 
undermined British support for the ruling monarchy. Macmillan was also incensed over Kennedy’s 
decision to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles, a decision that ended stated British hopes to 
sell to the Israelis its own Bloodhound system. The prime minister described the move as a 
“disgraceful piece of trickery”, but was most upset by the lack of consultation on the part of the 
Americans.80 Macmillan told Kennedy that “to be informed on Saturday afternoon that your 
Government are going to make an offer to supply on Sunday is really not consultation”. 81 Macmillan 
went further, claiming that “It certainly makes it necessary to reconsider our whole position on this 
and other allied matters”.82  
Consultation again became an issue during Wilson and Johnson’s rocky partnership. Nigel Ashton has 
argued that Johnson’s anger over the British withdrawal from positions East of Suez stemmed from a 
lack of consultation ahead of time. Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the move as having “the 
acrid aroma of fait accompli”.83 Further escalation of the conflict in Vietnam under Johnson rendered 
the US government keen for the British to maintain their presence East of Suez, but protestations 
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against the withdrawal came to naught. British influence in the Middle East was not over, as the 
former colonial rulers looked to secure the region through the federation of the former Trucial 
states in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. However, UK power in the region, as elsewhere, 
was on a steep decline.  
4. The China Question 
US opinion toward communism hardened in the post-war era. By March 1947 it was clear that the 
British could no longer afford to sustain their wartime commitments to the security of Greece and 
Turkey.84 In response, the Truman Doctrine ensured that the US would assume British 
responsibilities in order to curb the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union, and prevent 
communist from taking over in European countries. Although united in the Cold War struggle, the UK 
and US understood the threat of communism differently. In a 1954 Foreign Affairs article, shadow 
chancellor Hugh Gaitskell noted that anti-communist feelings in the UK “have never been as strong 
or as widespread” as they have been in the US.85 In 1951, Minister for Labour Aneurin Bevan 
resigned from the cabinet in protest at high levels of defence spending to counter what he saw as an 
exaggerated Soviet threat.86 Bevan attracted little support in parliament, but his stand tapped into a 
growing sense of anti-Americanism.87 This aside, British governments conducted policy toward 
communist nations within the context of a far less hostile public opinion than their American 
counterparts. In the US there was a latent sympathy for the Nationalists on Taiwan not evident in 
the UK. This meant that hostile Chinese actions during the Korean War, its aggressiveness toward 
Taiwan itself, and general anti-American rhetoric endured that American opposition to Peking lasted 
well into the 1960s.88 
Differing attitudes toward communism in the world punctuated the UK and US responses to the 
seizure of power by Mao’s communist forces  in China in October 1949. The British quickly 
recognised the communist government in January 1950.89 Prime Minister Attlee later explained that 
British recognition was not only to protect British interests in Hong Kong and acknowledge that the 
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communists were in control of mainland China, but also to help loosen the Sino-Soviet partnership.90 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson looked to follow the British lead in recognising the communists  
but was confronted by a wave of anti-communist congressional and public opinion.91 Before Mao’s 
ultimate success, but whilst a communist victory seemed inevitable, the Truman administration 
presented a White Paper that laid the blame for problems in China firmly with the Nationalist leader 
of the Koumintang (KMT) Chaing Kai-shek. The White Paper was dismissed by powerful members of 
the congressional China Bloc who, supported by The Wall Street Journal, Time, and The Chicago 
Tribune pressed the administration to withdraw diplomatic missions from mainland China prior to 
the communist victory. The move made recognition after such an event very difficult.92 The 
Democratic administration was under immense pressure to appear tough on communism; Truman 
stood accused of “losing” China to the communists.93  
The Americans told the British that recognition of the communists and withdrawal of recognition 
from the nationalists did not necessarily signal a fissure in the UK-US goal of a China “free of 
domination”.94 Such a proclamation proved premature. In a domestic climate unconducive to a 
pragmatic policy toward the communists, the American administration was unable to reduce its level 
of support for Chiang’s nationalists. Although the KMT were now confined to the island of Taiwan, 
the US maintained support for the nationalist government’s membership of the UN and seat on the 
Security Council. The US voted against the seating of the communists in 1950, but promised not  to 
use its veto power should there come a time when the majority of UN members voted in favour of 
the communists’ representation.95 Attlee believed that UN membership would further encourage 
Chinese independence of the Soviet Union, but was not willing to unsettle the UK-US relationship. 
Consequently, the UK government abstained on the Soviet motion to seat China. 96 
UK-US disagreements over China became a larger issue within the relationship sooner than the allies 
hoped. Following the end of the Japanese occupation and the Second World War, Korea had been 
split in two. The North, briefly occupied by the Soviet Union had a communist government, while the 
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briefly American-occupied South had a capitalist regime. Neither the North nor the South recognised 
the other government as legitimate, and both laid claim to the whole of Korea, though there was a 
de facto border in place at the 38th Parallel. In June 1950 Kim Il-sung ordered his North Korean army 
to attack their southern neighbours and reclaim the whole of Korea for the communists.  
The Truman administration, keen to prevent the spread of communism in any form, assumed the 
North Korean movement had been authorised by Stalin and acted quickly. With the Soviets 
boycotting the UN Security Council over the non-seating of Peking, the Americans easily passed a 
resolution calling for an American-led international force to push the North Koreans back.97 For their 
part, the British had little strategic interest in Korea, and although sharing the belief that Stalin likely 
sanctioned the attack, did not heavily endorse the American “domino” theory whereby successive 
nations could fall prey to the spread of communism.98 UK support for the American action, in the 
first instance, was provided largely on the basis that it would strengthen the UK-US relationship.99 
The British were looking to firm up the American commitment to Europe and were soliciting further 
financial assistance for post-war rearmament.100 Korea is an often cited example of the British 
willingness to “pay the price” of blood and treasure to ensure a strong relationship with the US. 
By September 1950, UN forces led by General Douglas MacArthur had pushed the North Korean 
Army back beyond the border represented by the 38th parallel. Ignoring warnings from Peking 
regarding a de facto American occupation of North Korea, the US administration continued to 
authorise the routing of the North Korean forces. Truman declared the American aim to reunify 
Korea under a democratic government as MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back to the Yalu 
River and the border with China.101 In response, China launched a massive counter attack in 
November 1950 that quickly drove the American-led UN forces back from the border.102 
Already concerned with MacArthur’s lack of restraint in provoking the Chinese, the British had 
pushed for a ceasefire and UN talks with representatives from Peking.103 Attlee was understandably 
aghast when Truman appeared to tell reporters in Washington that the US would consider using an 
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atomic bomb against the Chinese.104 Although Truman had misspoken and it became quickly 
apparent that MacArthur would not be authorised to use nuclear weapons, Attlee still required 
assurances at a snap Washington summit in December 1950. The Prime Minister met with the 
President in an attempt to persuade the Americans to consult further with the British over Korea. 
Attlee needed to ensure that the war was not extended beyond its current parameters and to 
encourage negotiations for a peaceful settlement with China.105 The British were relieved when the 
hawkish General MacArthur was fired in April 1951, but the Korean crisis had hardened the 
American attitude toward communist China. 
Following the armistice in Korea in 1953, prime minister Winston Churchill came under 
parliamentary pressure to support the admission of Communist China to the UN.106 However, 
unwilling to unsettle the UK-US relationship over a relatively minor issue, Churchill supported a US 
moratorium on UN talks regarding Chinese representation. His successor, Anthony Eden had a 
different attitude. Fresh from successful talks with the Chinese over Vietnam in 1954, Eden 
instructed the UK Ambassador in Washington to tell the Americans that continued British support 
for the moratorium in 1955 was given out of “a sense of comradeship, not real agreement”. 107 Eden 
had been an advocate for the communists’ inclusion as foreign secretary under Churchill, citing the 
fact that British public opinion favoured Peking’s acceptance. Nonetheless, he reluctantly supported 
the moratorium until his demise in the wake of Suez. 
Like Churchill, Macmillan did not want disagreements over China to obstruct strengthening the UK-
US relationship. The matter remained in the background until the early 1960s when the admission to 
the UN of a number of newly independent African nations made the passing of the moratorium on 
China difficult to maintain.108 The Kennedy administration privately favoured a “two Chinas” solution 
whereby Peking and Taipei could both be seated at the UN, but the new Democratic president 
needed to avoid accusations of being “soft” on communism: the administration had to come up with 
a different solution. The mechanism used to keep Peking out of the UN was to call the 
representation of China an “important question”, then once a majority voted in favour of such a 
resolution, a two-third majority vote would be required to change the status of China’s 
representation.109 Again wary of harming the UK-US relationship, this time in the wake of 
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Khrushchev’s demands for the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin, the British government 
deferred to the American policy despite disagreement on its substance.110  
Despite heavily criticising the Conservative government for its public opposition to the seating of 
Peking, upon coming to power Wilson’s Labour government continued to support the Important 
Question resolution.111 Again keen not to upset an American administration whose support for 
sterling was crucial to the British economy, the UK government extended its support for the US 
position on Chinese representation throughout the mid and late 1960s. As had the Eisenhower 
administration, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations continued to ponder a “two Chinas” 
solution whereby the Communists and Nationalists could both sit at the UN. However,  public and 
congressional opinion would not allow for movement on the issue until Nixon’s presidency in 1969. 
British public and parliamentary opinion had continued to support a more conciliatory approach to 
Chinese representation, but these attitudes continued to be trumped by deference to the UK -US 
relationship. 
in terms of UK-US relations, the issue of trade with Peking followed a similar course to that of UN 
representation. From the point that a communist victory against the nationalists appeared likely in 
1949, the Truman Administration placed restrictions upon the sale of goods to China that could be 
used for military purposes.112 Strategic goods fell under the embargo in two categories; List 1A were 
goods of major military significance whilst those on List 1B extended to transportation and industrial 
equipment.113 The Attlee government demonstrated strong opposition to the controls which 
required the assistance of the US’ allies if they were to have any effect. 114 British colony Hong Kong’s 
reliance upon trade with the mainland as well as the fact that British investments in China amounted 
to $840 million compared to the US’ $200 million triggered strong opposition from Attlee’s 
government.115 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was of the opinion that although the British shared an 
objective with the US in containing communist China, it believed the best way to do this was to 
encourage contact with Peking in order to pull it away from Soviet influence. 116 He also made the 
point that the British government would be hesitant to take any measures that could harm the 
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British economy.117 It took the UK government eight months to agree to place an embargo on List 1A 
goods only, and resisted subsequent US pressure to extend restrictions any further.118 It remained 
the case however, that overall the British would rather anger the Chinese than the Americans. 119 
The trade issue came up again amid British economic difficulties in the late 1950s. Both the British 
and the Chinese governments were keen to expand bilateral trade but were held back by the trade 
restrictions imposed at the behest of the US.120 However, like on the issue of Chirep, Macmillan was 
unwilling to press the Americans and the Eisenhower administration had no intention of reversing 
US policy.121 The early 1960s similarly saw little movement in the positions of the British and 
American governments, one FCO report in 1964 concluded that the issue of trade with communist 
China must be one that the UK and US must “agree to differ” on.122 This continued into the mid-
1960s as Johnson felt unable to relax trade restrictions on Peking after he had vastly increased the 
number of US troops in Vietnam that had been sent to fight against the communist threat. 123 
However, small alterations in US policy began to occur at the end of Johnson’s Presidency. After 
years of internal debate on softening the US stance toward China, Johnson authorised licences for 
the sale of pharmaceutical goods to mainland China for use in combatting various epidemics that 
had arisen in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.124 The British approved of the turn in US 
policy, but the issue of trade with China, much like that of Chirep, remained a manageable 
disagreement within the Anglo-American relationship. 
By 1969-70 UK policy toward China had served as a long-held British concession, necessary to ensure 
the prosperity of the UK-US relationship. It represented a token of appreciation for the post-war 
alliance. 125 Although Churchill and Macmillan had been unwilling to question the US policy, the 
British broad stance on the benefit of Peking’s admittance to the UN at the expense of the 
nationalists had not altered since 1949. The Korean War demonstrated the lengths to which the 
British were willing to extend in order to protect the UK-US relationship and exposed the differences 
in the allies’ positions on China. However, from the point of Attlee’s emergency meeting with 
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Truman in December 1950 consultation on the matter was consistent for the next twenty years. 
Both governments were aware of the pervading public consensuses in each country and the 
constraints this placed upon policy toward communist China. Only in the early 1970s did the 
situation shift significantly. 
 
5. The UK-US Relationship in South Asia 
During the Second World War both parties were aware that the manner in which power was 
transferred to the people of the subcontinent could have a huge effect on relations between the UK 
and US.126 In 1942 both allies sent missions to India. Their stated objectives were to solicit Indian 
help for the war effort, but both had more than an eye on the role India would play in the post-war 
world. The UK Mission, headed by Sir Stafford Cripps took with it the War Cabinet’s Offer to India. 
The offer proposed that an Indian Union would be created and given dominion status once the war 
was over. Each princely Indian state would be given the opportunity to accede to the Union, and 
those that decided not to accede would be given separate dominion status. Constitutions within the 
states would ensure the safety and equality of minorities. The British government would retain 
control of defence, but all other matters would be handed over to an Indian constituent assembly. 127 
The offer was quickly refused by the Indian Congress, who found British control of Indian defence 
unacceptable and saw the offer as a mandate for the splitting of India into a number of constituent 
parts.128 Mohandas Gandhi referred to the offer as a “post-dated check”.129 
At the same time as the Cripps mission, President Roosevelt sent a personal representative to India 
in the form of Colonel Louis Johnson, with the diplomatic rank of Ambassador.130 In discussions with 
Indian leaders, Johnson intimated that the United States would support Indian independence in the  
post-war world. Johnson’s talks suggested that the Americans disagreed with Churchill’s 
pronouncement that the Atlantic Charter’s provisions for sovereign rights and self -government only 
applied to those nations occupied by Axis powers.131 Johnson’s communications seemed to signal a 
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fissure in UK-US opinion that would allow for the US to forge a closer allegiance with an independent 
India once the war was over. 
Following the failure of the Cripps Mission, the Indian National Congress (INC) turned on the British 
administration and called for outright independence, rather than the dominion status they were 
being offered. The Tory government responded by arresting nationalist leaders and suppressing the 
resultant “Quit India” movement.132 Despite seeming to stay true to their anti-colonialist tradition, 
the US government was critical of the Indian Congress and sympathised with the British response in 
India. Wartime considerations, it seemed, were prioritised over principals of self-determination and 
independence for nations. 
Following the Second World War, the “granting” of independence to India has often been seen as a 
headline achievement for the Attlee government.133 However, Anita Inder-Singh has made the point 
that such a move did not fit within the context of British foreign policy at the time.134 The Attlee 
government neither wanted to grant independence, nor did it achieve its aims once it was resigned 
to it.135 As with elsewhere in the world, the British were primarily concerned with the maintenance 
of the UK’s economic interests, which required the retention of the empire wherever possible. 136 
Despite Indian independence being seen by some in the US as being the UK’s ‘finest hour’, the hand 
of the British was forced by violent outbreaks and civil service mutinies in early 1946. 137 After these 
incidents, a cabinet mission was sent and an agreement was eventually made whereby India would 
be split along religious lines with mainland India flanked to the north east and north west by a two 
winged Pakistan.138 
In the lead up to partition, a defence agreement with India, in whatever form independence was to 
take, was of paramount concern for the British. This was, in no small part, a result of the immense 
contribution India could make to the British Army; 2.5 million Indian soldiers had fought for the allies 
in Second World War. India was Britain’s source of power East of Suez and ensured that the UK 
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remained a power in the Far East.139 The British policy however, took no account of the new Indian 
Prime Minister, Jawaharal Nehru’s repeatedly stated position between 1945 and 1947 that India 
would remain neutral and would not allow foreign troops on its soil.140 The British felt that India’s 
membership of the commonwealth would help ensure the continuation of military links, but India’s 
commitment to non-alignment held firm into the post-war era. 
Since official Indian foreign affairs were conducted by the British Foreign Office until 1947, 
diplomatic contact between India and the United States was minimal.141 Despite his sympathy with 
the British position amid the “Quit India” movement, Roosevelt took all possible steps to ensure that 
Indian independence would occur once the war was over.  W. Norman Brown has argued that Indian 
goodwill for the United States in the post-war period was a result of the aid the President provided 
to all United Nations members, including India and his “strong democratic world leadership”.142 The 
President already had a high standing in India prior to the war as a defender of democracy and 
oppressed peoples, and his legacy ensured that the United States maintained a favourable image in 
India after his death.143 However, as was the case with the Middle East, the Americans saw the 
region as a British responsibility and were willing for their closest ally to take the lead.  
Almost as soon as India and Pakistan gained their independence, the two countries were at war. 
Under the terms of partition, each princely state within British India had the choice to accede either 
to India, to Pakistan, or remain independent. Kashmir was one of the few states that wished to 
maintain its independence. Its Hindu monarch, Maharajah Hari Singh resisted pressure from both 
sides for accession.144 India wanted Kashmir to join its secular federation and Pakistan wanted the 
state’s majority Muslim population to join the world’s largest Islamic nation. On October 24th 1947, a 
tribal rebellion broke out in Kashmir’s south-western province of Poonch; these tribesmen were 
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quickly reinforced by the Pakistani army and rapidly overwhelmed Kashmiri forces. 145 As the enemy 
marched on the capital, Srinagar, Hari Singh acceded to India in exchange for military assistance. 146 
Under the independence agreement, the British military command had the ultimate say over Indian 
military matters.147 Chairman of the Indian Defence Council Earl Mountbatten, against the wishes of 
Nehru, vetoed a decision to launch a full military campaign in Kashmir, and urged that the matter be 
taken to the UN.148 Once the matter was referred to the UN General Assembly, it called for a 
plebiscite and a commission visited the region in the summer of 1948, but was unsuccessful in 
finding a resolution.149 A second UN resolution called for India to withdraw its troops once Pakistan 
had done so. A solution was never found as India focused upon Pakistani withdrawals and Pakistan 
focused upon the provisions for the plebiscite.150 Neither side was happy with the agreement that 
led to a ceasefire without a settlement. The UK and US were thankful for an end to hostilities, but 
continued to see the solving of the Kashmir dispute as crucial to long-term stability- only in 1971 did 
the focus briefly move from Kashmir to East Pakistan. 
India’s continued unwillingness to formally join a defence pact caused a dilemma for the West. Since 
Pakistan’s need to ensure its security vis-à-vis India made it a far more willing partner in the fight 
against communism. For US administrations, the question was posed as to how far Indian protests 
would be taken into consideration: The Truman administration was initially unwilling to provide 
support for Pakistan at the expense of India, but this changed under Eisenhower.151 Intent on turning 
neutral countries into allies, Dulles instigated a Mutual Security Agreement with Pakistan that 
included military aid.152 Pakistan supported the US’s Northern Tier defence strategy for the Middle 
East and joined the Baghdad Pact in 1954, a move that confirmed its place within the western 
alliance system. The US administration demonstrated a will ingness to endure damage to Indo-US 
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relations, and greater instability on the subcontinent, in order to bolster their policy of containment 
of the USSR. 
Although broadly in agreement with the American strategy, the British had a higher sensitivity to the 
effect that arming Pakistan would have upon relations with India. 153 The British went so far as to 
counsel the Americans against the supply of weapons to Pakistan in the early 1950s for fear of Indian 
chagrin.154 The British were more sympathetic to Indian protests that the arms supplied to Pakistan 
for the fight against communism were in fact acquired by Pakistan for any future conflict with India. 
Although the Americans were keen to soften the impact on India as much as possible, the early 
1950s were a time when UK-US discord in South Asia revolved around the weight that should be 
given to Indian sensitivities and opinion.155 Underlying these considerations lay the continued 
difference in UK and US attitudes toward the communist threat, within the US policy of 
containment, Pakistan’s cooperation as an ally trumped Indian strategic concerns.  
US policy in the region altered under Kennedy. The administration saw more value in productive US-
Indian relations than its predecessors; a democratic alliance with India had more potential benefit 
than a military alliance with Pakistan.156 Closer relations with a strong India could also act as a check 
against Chinese power in the region.157 Favour in US relations on the subcontinent tipped toward 
India in the early 1960s. Missions to South Asia in 1961 and 1962 headed by Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson and special envoy Henry Kissinger both served to assure India of continued economic aid, 
whilst making it clear that no new pledges would be made to Pakistan. 158 Despite disagreements 
elsewhere in the world, UK and US opinion began to converge in South Asia as Indian sensitivities 
over the arming of Pakistan were taken into account. 
The UK and US acted in unison over the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962. The western allies 
moved quickly to supply India with weapons to ward off Chinese aggression, much to the chagrin of 
the Pakistani government.159 As with supply of arms to Pakistan in the 1950s, the West justified the 
military aid in terms of the communist threat, maintaining that any arms supplied to South Asia were 
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restricted to use against communist aggression.160 The border conflict ended abruptly with a 
unilateral Chinese ceasefire, apparently designed to avoid a full -scale war with the West and take 
the moral high ground in future negotiations.161 The conflict created a paradox within post-war 
British and American relations on the subcontinent. The need to defend South Asia from Soviet and 
subsequently Chinese aggression had led to the provision of arms to India and Pakistan. However, 
such arms helped to decrease levels of stability in the region that were seen as crucial to the fight 
against communism. 
Support for India in 1962 had a further unintended consequence. During the conflict on the Chinese 
border, UK and US officials had successfully persuaded Pakistan president Ayub Khan, against the 
advice of foreign minister Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto, not to launch an opportunisti c incursion into Indian 
territory. However, in the wake of the conflict, disillusionment within the Pakistani government over 
what they saw as a pro-Indian swing in US foreign policy, persuaded Ayub to allow Bhutto to open 
up contacts with the Chinese.162 In ceding the Aksai Chin region, an area within Kashmir claimed by 
India but occupied by Pakistan, Bhutto actively involved Peking in the dispute over Kashmir and 
gained Chinese support for Pakistan’s territorial claims.163 Bhutto allowed for the Chinese to develop 
communication links from Tibet through to the Chinese mainland, thereby demonstrating Pakistan’s 
long-term commitment to a close relationship with Peking.164 In trying to placate and support India 
in 1962, the UK and US had inadvertently helped push Pakistan closer to China. It was the resultant 
close Pakistan-China relationship that Nixon and Kissinger later exploited to improve US relations 
with Peking. 
Part of the UK-US strategy during the Sino-Indian border war had been to capitalise upon Indian 
goodwill to help solve the Kashmir dispute, but Bhutto’s dealings with the Chinese had put paid to 
the plan.165 However, the region was still regarded as the major source of instability- as 
demonstrated by the conflicts of 1965. The first, albeit brief confrontation between India and 
Pakistan occurred over the Rann of Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh in Gujarat close to the  western 
border between the two countries. A dispute over the border through the Rann had long been a 
cause for disagreement, but tensions rose in April 1965 when both countries ramped up their patrols 
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in the region and ended up clashing with one another. 166 On April 24th, a serious engagement 
occurred, rendering the two sides in open conflict for the first time since the first Kashmir war ended 
in 1948.167 The conflict over the Rann was successfully mediated by the Wilson government. 
Admonishments from the US and very wet weather in the region played a part, but the British ability 
to bring Pakistan President Ayub Khan and Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri together in 
London to agree a ceasefire in early May won international acclaim.168 Lyndon Johnson personally 
applauded Wilson in a letter of congratulations.169  
The dispute over the Rann confirmed Pakistani beliefs that the Indian army was demoralised in the 
wake of 1962 and boosted confidence that a military victory over Kashmir was possible.170 The result 
was the infiltration of 5,000 Pakistani soldiers disguised as civilians into the disputed region to 
actively encourage the population to call for independence. India quickly responded with a military 
thrust into Lahore to begin the second post-partition war over the disputed region.171 British efforts 
to mediate the second, and much more serious, conflict of 1965 were far less effective. Following 
the Indian movement of troops across the border, Wilson made a public statement condemning 
Indian aggression, much to Indian chagrin.172 India’s protests centred upon a longstanding disdain for 
being equated on the international stage with what they saw as a clearly provocative adversary. 
Wilson later claimed that a pro-Pakistan faction within the Commonwealth Office had manipulated 
him into making a statement that destroyed Indian faith in the British.173 Believing that Pakistan’s 
infiltration of Kashmir had clearly sparked the conflict, Indian leaders effectively disqualified the 
British from playing any further role in mediation. Eventually, it was left to the Soviet Union to forge 
a deal between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1965, where the belligerents agreed to solve the 
issue by peaceful means. For the Soviets, their role afforded them goodwill from both countries of 
the subcontinent and was begrudgingly welcomed by the UK and the US, as Soviet influence in the 
region was preferable to Chinese.174 
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The British position in South Asia after 1965 was one of severely diminished influence. The dispute 
over the Rann of Kutch was the last time the British played a leading role in a dispute in the region. It 
was also the last time the US deferred responsibili ty to the UK over issues in South Asia. The 
decrease in British influence in the region followed from the general decline in the British world role 
after the withdrawal from positions East of Suez. For the Johnson administration, the conflicts of 
1965 served to justify growing American indifference toward the subcontinent. 175 By the mid-1960s, 
Pakistan’s closer relationship with China had helped pull it away from its commitments to CENTO 
and its South Asian equivalent, SEATO.176 India was performing poorly in the economic field despite 
US aid that had been provided since the 1950s. The response of the US government to the Kashmir 
conflict was one of anger directed toward both sides of the dispute. With the support of the British, 
Johnson cut off all military supplies to India and Pakistan. In doing so, the administration took the 
attitude that if nothing could be done to stop the two neighbours from fighting, the US would no 
longer fuel a subcontinental arms race.177 
Neither India nor Pakistan was happy in their relationships with the US in the later years of Johnson’s 
presidency. Despite a relatively amicable relationship between Gandhi and the President, Indian 
protests continued over an arms embargo they thought had been imposed on the basis of a false 
premise. The Indian government maintained that to impose an arms embargo upon them ignored 
the fact that Pakistan had instigated the conflict.178 It was Pakistan however, that was 
disproportionately harmed by the ban on military aid. GW Choudhury recalls that the Pakistani army 
was almost completely equipped by the US, whereas US supplies accounted for only 10% of India’s 
military hardware.179 By the time Johnson left office, relations with all parties on the subcontinent 
were at a low ebb. 
Nixon’s 1968 election victory altered the dynamic in US relations with the subcontinent. A key 
negotiator in the country’s accession to western defence pacts during his vice presidency, Nixon was 
a popular man in Pakistan.180  On visits to Pakistan during his “wilderness years” out of political office 
in the 1960s, Nixon had received grand receptions and developed friendly relations with the 
country’s ruling elite, something he did not receive during visits to India. Upon Yahya Khan’s visit to 
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the US to celebrate 25 years of the UN in 1970, Nixon told his new friend that “nobody has occupied 
the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me”.181 Pakistan was a key part of the new 
administration’s strategy to develop relations with China, which meant that once more relations 
with Pakistan would be prioritised over those with India. New British Prime Minister Edward Heath 
looked to repair relations with both nations upon his election in June 1970. However, greater 
emphasis would be placed upon cultivating the more economically lucrative relationship with India; 
meaning that once again British sympathies on the subcontinent generally lay in the opposite 
direction to the Americans. 
 
Conclusion 
A running theme within UK-US relations up to 1970 and beyond is the importance of consultation. 
Whilst being a key feature in UK-US successes such as the Berlin airlift and the development of the 
nuclear relationship in the late 1950s, a breakdown in consultation had been the exacerbating factor 
during a number of difficult periods. A lack of consultation has been a major source of anger on both 
sides of the Atlantic on many occasions- the cancellation of lend-lease and passing of the McMahon 
Act; the public reaction to Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech; US revulsion at the British plot to 
reclaim the Suez Canal; and the British decision to withdraw from military positions East of Suez to 
name but a few. The importance of consultation permeated the entire UK-US relationship. 
For the British, consultation had been a pathway to the ultimate goal of influence over US policy. 
Throughout the post-war period, British leaders linked global prestige to an ability to cultivate an 
overt relationship with the United States. British governments had success i n committing the US to 
the defence of Western Europe through the North Atlantic treaty; urging restraint over Korea; and 
the development of a nuclear relationship in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the Americans, an 
overt relationship with the British government often caused a headache. This problem manifested 
itself in the immediate post-war years when there was hope for a moderate turn in Soviet foreign 
policy and in the Middle East where an association with the British colonial legacy was undesirable . 
However, the dynamic within the relationship regarding levels of overtness altered in the 1960s as 
levels of asymmetry within the relationship increased markedly.  
Although always the junior partner in the post-war world, British subservience to the US in the 1950s 
can be overstated. In the decade following the Second Word War, the UK remained the world’s third 
greatest power and was the only ally of the US to have a truly global presence. In 1954, led by 
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Anthony Eden, the UK successfully negotiated a settlement in Vietnam without the participation of 
the US. It was such global prominence and resultant prestige that helped convince Eden that the UK 
could act independently of the US and reclaim the Suez Canal. However, during Harold Wilson’s first 
premiership, levels of asymmetry began to increase as the British government firstly considered and 
then decided to both withdraw from military positions East of Suez and devalue Sterling. As the UK’s 
global power and significance began to diminish, its value as an overt partner of the US began to 
alter. Whereas once an association with a powerful Britain could complicate matters, an association 
with a weaker Britain could be advantageous. Although no longer able to effectively project global 
power, the UK’s experience in global affairs and seat on the UN Security council ensured that British 
opinion remained well-respected. For Johnson this meant that British support for his policy in 
Vietnam would add legitimacy to his decisions at home and abroad. Meanwhile Wilson ’s domestic 
considerations meant that he was unwilling to provide the token force in Vietnam requested by 
Johnson. Levels of overt cooperation within the relationship continued to be an issue into 1970.  
Consultation was also crucial on a regional level. Although the British lost a great deal of their oil 
concession, for better or worse, the removal of Mohammad Mossadeq was a triumph for UK -US 
consultation and cooperation. Conversely, the US refusal to sign the Baghdad pact caused ruptures 
and bred distrust within the relationship. Key to UK-US disagreements in the Middle East were the 
evident differences in priorities. Concerned primarily with the threat of communist gains, the US 
focused on creating bulwarks against Soviet gains whilst the British concentrated upon their 
economic interests. Such tension played out over Iran in the 1950s and Yemen in the 1960s. As 
Britain’s power began to wane, its continued military presence in the Middle East became coveted 
by the Americans. Eventually, a lack of consultation over the decision to withdraw British forces and 
subsequent American pleas to reverse the decision came to naught. Yet despite all of this, in 1970, 
the two looked to resume close consultation over the fallout from British withdrawal from postitions 
East of Suez. 
The issue of Communist China within UK-US relations from 1950 to 1970 is testament to the positive 
role thorough consultation could play in mitigating differences of opinion.  Through full and frank 
discussions, the UK and US managed a substantial disagreement over the status of China. Firstly, 
through a moratorium and subsequently through the “Important Question” resolution, the UK and 
US negotiated a solution that allowed the British to demonstrate their allegiance to the US and 
allowed the US government to maintain its tough stance. However, by the early 1970s a growing 
consensus within the UN toward the acceptance of China was about to alter British thinking toward 
outright support for Peking’s representation. Meanwhile, a new White House fore ign policy making 
team was about to set aside the tradition UK-US consultation on China in pursuit of wider 
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geopolitical aims. Such a breach of consultation would have a dramatically negative effect on top-
level UK-US relations.  
Before 1971, South Asia was not a crucial theatre within the global Cold War. Stability in the region 
was seen by both allies as the greatest defence against communist infiltration and a settlement over 
Kashmir could ensure such an outcome. However, within the confines of a desired stability, there 
were different focuses of policy among British and American governments. The British focused their 
efforts upon maintaining strong diplomatic ties with India. India received greater quantities of British 
investment than Pakistan and played an important role in maintaining British prestige in Asia. 
Although British and American policies converged under Kennedy’s presidency as the allies supplied 
India in an attempt to ward off Chinese territorial ambitions, US policy in the region leant toward 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s need to compete in an arms race with India had rendered it much more 
amenable to offers of US aid and subsequently joined western defence pacts CENTO and SEATO. 
However, by the mid-1960s US-Pakistan relations had deteriorated markedly amid a lack of Pakistani 
commitment to defence pacts and a 1965 US arms embargo that disproportionately harmed 
Pakistan. Once Richard Nixon became President, he would return to the US policy of setting aside 
Indian sensibilities for the sake of global aims. 
 
 
 
 
 49 
Chapter 2: The First Six Months of the Heath-Nixon Relationship 
This chapter assesses the nature of the UK-US relationship in the first six months of Edward Heath’s 
premiership. Section one assesses the commonly held notion that the relationship between the 
Prime Minister and President Richard Nixon began poorly as a result of Heath’s focus on entry into 
the European communities EC). The first two meetings between the two leaders at Chequers in 
October and Washington in December 1970 provide an insight into the Heath-Nixon relationship. 
Conclusions can then be drawn as to the effect that the UK’s impending EC entry had upon the UK -
US relationship. Kissinger’s contention that Heath signalled from the beginning his willingness to 
complicate the UK-US relationship in favour of a smooth relations with Europe is challenged. 1 
The second concentration of the chapter is upon the wider UK-US relationship. With interests both 
economic and geopolitical, the Persian Gulf and Arab-Israel dispute continued to be an important 
aspect of the UK-US relationship. Dependent upon Arabian oil, the UK continued its post-war 
tendency to have more sympathy with the Gulf States over the Israel -Palestine situation than did the 
US. The section provides a snapshot of the UK-US relationship at a regional level, assesses the utility 
of the relationship for both parties and highlights differences of interests and outlook. The British 
desire to federate the Trucial States (later to become the United Arab Emirates)  in preparation for 
withdrawal is analysed within the context of an extended Nixon Doctrine and American support for 
Iran. The British also had to consider the hypothetical use of their base in Cyprus for US air strikes 
against Jordan. Such considerations highlight the dilemma faced between what the British perceived 
to be the interests of the West as a whole and the interests of the Americans. There was a pervading 
sense within the British government that the US was reluctant to consult with the UK on poli cy in the 
Middle East. The chapter will assess the validity of such claims. 
Finally, the chapter will focus upon events in South Asia. Under the radar of top level UK -US 
discussion, in 1970 campaigns were being fought in Pakistan’s first general election. Not an area of 
immediate geopolitical concern, the Atlantic allies desired stability on the subcontinent as a buffer 
against communist advances. Since India and Pakistan were not on the brink of war, UK-US global 
concerns were focused elsewhere. Central policymakers were unprepared for the regional and 
global implications of the election result, although policy positions were being formed by diplomats 
on the ground in South Asia. The stage was being set for a regional and global flashpoint, as well as 
for issues within the UK-US relationship.  
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1. Heath and Nixon: The First Six Months 
Elected in November 1968 with only 43% of the popular vote, not much was expected from 
President Richard Nixon’s foreign policy.2 Nixon’s worldview, shared by Kissinger, stemmed  from a 
belief that global US hegemony was coming to an end. Sunday Times Washington correspondent and 
good friend of Kissinger, Henry Brandon, wrote in 1973 that the task of the Nixon administration was 
to move the US from a hegemon to a leader.3 A major aspect of the process was to have Western 
European powers heavily engage with global geopolitics, and have them share the Western defence 
burden. Although the White House wanted the Europeans to assume more global responsibility, 
Nixon was not willing to risk Western cohesion. For the 37th American president, the interests of the 
US and the Atlantic Alliance were one and the same.4 It was within this context that the President 
extended support to the UK’s proposed accession into the EC.  
Heath’s election victory was welcomed throughout the US government. Nixon had privately been a 
supporter of Heath, and was extremely pleased upon hearing news of his victory. 5 Kissinger claims 
that there was no world leader that Nixon held in a higher regard, especially in tandem with Alec 
Douglas-Home as Foreign Secretary.6 In fact, Nixon was so pleased that he had Heath’s phone calls 
sent directly through to his office; a privilege enjoyed by only a select few. Kissinger himself shared 
Nixon’s optimism, as did Secretary of State Bill Rogers. All three felt the Conservative Party victory 
would result in a more active role for the UK in foreign affairs and that the US government could 
look forward to a “highly constructive and congenial relationship with Heath’s Government at e very 
level”.7 Heath was a politician that shared a worldview with the administration. He was broadly a 
supporter of the Nixon Doctrine through his advocacy of the maintenance of commitments to 
friendly nations without absolving them of their security responsibilities.8 They both foresaw the 
emergence of a multi-polar world order, shared the opinion that UK accession into the EC should be 
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swiftly achieved and detected a reduced appetite for war on the part of the Soviet Union. 9 Like his 
predecessor Harold Wilson, Heath was reluctant to relinquish Britain’s global influence. 10 The 
Conservatives had opposed Labour’s decision to withdraw almost all of the British military presence 
from East of Suez and to devalue sterling from $2.80 to $2.40. The new prime minister therefore had 
a different set of foreign policy issues to deal with. Heath was de-shackled to a certain extent by no 
longer suffering the degree of dependency that Wilson had had upon President Lyndon Johnson. 
This meant Heath could concentrate upon reshaping Britain’s global role and look to solidify US 
support for EC expansion. 
Despite accusations to the contrary the Prime Minister was conscious not to appear pro-European at 
the expense of being anti-American. Heath believed that both sides were prone to overreaction 
when it came to what he referred to as the “so-called special relationship”.11 Heath’s vision in June 
1970 was of a wider Atlantic partnership. One where the notion of greater burden sharing on the 
part of the Europeans was compatible with a continued US commitment to the security of Western 
Europe. He thought it ridiculous that support for a greater European effort to provide for its own 
protection could be interpreted as an anti-American point of view.12 He found it equally implausible 
to think any US troop withdrawal from West Germany was a sign that the US could renege on their 
commitment to Western Europe.13 Opinion in Whitehall in mid-1970 was similar. FCO officials 
believed that although UK influence in Washington had waned during the Wil son-Johnson years, the 
only way the UK could remain relevant in Washington was through heavy involvement in European 
affairs.14 The Conservative Government wanted to be at the heart of Europe and have a strong 
relationship with America. The eventual aim of a strong US-Europe relationship required the UK to 
broker its entry into the EC whilst encouraging the US to improve the manne r in which it dealt with 
Europe.15 Naturally, these aims required the UK-US relationship to remain strong. 
Heath’s overarching foreign policy objectives were understood both in the White House and at the 
State Department. Nixon’s personal opinion was that EC enlargement, although potentially 
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damaging to the US economy in the short term, was in the long term common interest of the West. 16 
In 1970, Nixon was willing to ward off Congressional dissent that promoted European fears of 
American protectionism.17 The US Embassy in London assured the State Department in December 
1970 that although the UK may look to rhetorically downplay the “special relationship” and 
concentrate its foreign policy upon Europe and EC accession, the US-UK relationship would not be 
fundamentally altered: the UK would still ultimately depend upon the US to provide its security. 18 
The British knew that they had a sympathetic ear in Washington for the time being, and felt 
confident that as long as policy remained overtly pro-European rather than anti-American, the UK-
US relationship could remain strong.19 
Different thinking in the UK and US lay in the direction in which relations were eventually heading. 
Both Atlantic partners were aware that the relationship had changed in recent years. Heath was of 
the opinion that a strong US-European relationship would mean that the UK-US relationship would, 
one day, become less “special.” He openly speculated that in future, instead of instinctively looking 
to the opinions of their opposite numbers in Washington, FCO officials might look to their colleagues 
in Bonn or Paris when formulating policy.20 Similarly, the FCO at the time felt that following the UK’s 
entry into Europe, the UK-US relationship would go through a natural and inevitable process of 
becoming less and less “exclusive”.21 The Americans accepted that the UK was a dramatically 
weakened power compared to its status as recently as the mid-1960s and US opinion was that its 
future lay in a re-orientation of policy toward Europe. However, there seems not to have been any 
desire to weaken links or contemplation that this could be an inevitability in the future.  
Some scholars have pointed to Heath’s deferment of a visit to Washington immediately following 
the British General Election as an early indicator of the troubles that would mar the Heath-Nixon 
relationship.22 Kissinger argues that the cancellation of an early meeting and the holding of only a 
brief meeting at Chequers was a ploy on Heath’s part to allow him to consult with European leaders 
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before major talks with the Americans. However, there is no evidence that the British deliberately 
employed this tactic or that the Americans, other than Kissinger, believed this to be the case. 23 In 
fact, amid widespread industrial action and the death of Ian McLeod, the influential Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, there was actually a large degree of understanding of Heath’s predicament in 
Washington. Hal Sonnenfeldt, NSC member and Kissinger’s assistant, sent a memorandum to 
Kissinger in August that demonstrated sympathy for Heath’s position and accepted the validity of 
the reasoning.24 Nixon subsequently wrote to Heath on 15th August conveying a disappointment at 
the cancellation, but the President also expressed understanding of the domestic strife that 
prevented the visit.25  
Both leaders’ major objective at the Chequers meeting was to establish a close personal relationship. 
There was no suggestion that Heath would act aloof or try to distance the UK government from the 
US in favour of a closer relationship with Europe.26 The Prime Minister’s objective was to reinforce 
the closeness of the UK-US relationship and to ensure that the US would treat the UK accordingly.27 
Nixon’s major objective was similar, and he opened the talks suggesting that the two leaders agree 
to candour and confidence within their personal relationship. It was his belief that the strength of 
the “special relationship” was dependent upon regular consultation, and not just in times of crisis. 28 
Although the use of the term “special relationship” may have annoyed Heath, the prospect of a close 
relationship with the President was not one that he rejected.  
At Chequers in October 1970, the two leaders demonstrated a great deal of convergence on foreign 
policy. Heath supported Nixon’s plans to withdraw ground troops from Vietnam, offered technical 
assistance to the US in helping to combat Soviet movements in the Indian Ocean, and agreed with 
Nixon’s analysis that the Soviets currently saw a military conflict with China as a more pressing 
concern than such a conflict with the West.29 On Nixon’s part, he demonstrated his private support 
for the British position on the sale of arms to South Africa under the Simonstown agreement. The 
President agreed that despite international pressure to cease the supply of arms, “you just have to 
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bite that bullet” when it comes to national interests.30 He also pledged not to support any voices in 
Congress that may come out in support of what both men referred to at the time as “Black Africa”. 31 
Nixon was keen for Heath to know that he had the American President’s private backing, even if 
difficult executive relations with Congress meant that the Prime Minister could not always enjoy it 
publicly. Despite Kissinger’s claim that Heath was looking to keep the president at arm’s length by 
limiting talks to an hour and half as a result of The Queen’s presence, archival records paint a 
different picture. UK Ambassador in Washington John Freeman reported that the Queen’s presence 
actually impressed the President greatly and that the Royal pageantry made up for any 
disappointment Nixon may have felt about the truncation of the talks. 32 The two leaders left the 
talks happy with what they had achieved; more substantial talks would come in December.  
Discussion about UK entry into the EC, conspicuous by its absence at Chequers, was the first and 
major point of discussion at the UK-US talks in Washington in December 1970. Nixon agreed with 
Heath that the political arguments in favour of the UK joining the EC were stronger than the 
economic.33 He told the Prime Minister that British political leadership in Europe was essential if 
Europe was to fulfil its potential in world affairs, and that he disagreed with elements in the US that 
feared a more powerful Western Europe. Both leaders believed that any stable balance of global 
power required a “strong political and economic entity in Europe”. 34 The major concern Nixon had 
with the process was that the agricultural lobby, a major supporter of his, could take exception to 
the perceived protectionist policies of the EC, especially the Common Agricultural Policy.35 The Prime 
Minister explained that he wanted to avoid accusations of appearing as the US “Trojan Horse” that 
French president, Charles de Gaulle had long believed the British to be.  Heath was clear with Nixon that 
his government’s primary foreign policy objective was to gain entry into the EC; only then could the 
UK begin to address the concerns of the US government.36 Despite the reservations the President 
had over the economic implications of EC enlargement, there was no doubt that US support for UK 
entry was assured. 
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Prior to the December summit, Nixon insisted upon using the term “special relationship” in official 
communications with Heath, just as he had done with his predecessor, Harold Wilson. 37 The reason 
was in part to demonstrate defiance to those in the State Department that thought a severance of 
the “special relationship” would aid UK accession to the EC, and partly because he felt that to not 
use the term could undermine British self-confidence.38 This attitude changed during the talks. In 
line with his support of the UK’s policy toward the EC, the President accepted the British preference 
for the term “natural” rather than “special” relationship.39 Negotiations with the EC were at a critical 
stage and the desire of the UK to change the rhetorical categorisation of the UK-US relationship was 
accepted by the Administration.40  
Kissinger’s interpretation of the changing rhetoric was different. Although the altering of the 
terminology could have been seen as a concession to the French to help President George Pompidou 
accept the UK’s EC membership, it was indicative of a fundamental reorientation of the UK’s foreign 
policy.41 These claims have led to the inference that Heath’s first public mention of  the “natural 
relationship” at a speech in Washington on December 17th signalled a downgrading of the UK-US 
relationship as the UK undertook a reorientation of its policy toward Europe. 42 Although Heath was 
certainly concentrating UK foreign policy upon Europe and foresaw a less exclusive UK-US 
relationship, the change in rhetoric from “special” to “natural” was not a sudden indication of this. 
The UK’s third attempt at entry into the EC and reorientation of foreign policy toward Europe was 
the result of a decade of debate in Westminster and Whitehall.43 The Americans supported the 
British intention to strengthen its geopolitical influence through shaping policy from the heart of 
Europe and they were willing to take some short-term economic pain to ensure that it happened.       
Despite Kissinger’s recollections, the December talks were interpreted by the majority of observers, 
as a huge success. The UK-US relationship was seen to have been at worst consolidated and at best, 
conclusively strengthened. In an interview on CBS TV show Face the Nation Heath confirmed that 
what he referred to as the “natural” friendship between himself and the President had blossomed 
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into an “intimate partnership”.44 Furthermore, the New York Daily News proclaimed that the visit 
had “marked the first time since the Eisenhower administration that genuine personal friendliness 
had been enjoyed by the political leaders of the two nations.”45 Whatever the historical accuracy of 
the statement, it was a reflection on talks between leaders that understood one another’s position. 
Indeed, from December 1970 onward, Nixon substituted the term “special” for “natural” in all of his 
official correspondence. Both in a letter bidding farewell to UK Ambassador John Freeman in 
January, and a letter to Heath in April 1971 Nixon referenced the “natural relationship” between the 
two countries. The adoption of the term by the President, who had previously used the term 
“special” in a deliberate manner, demonstrated that the change of rhetoric was not construed as 
damaging to the relationship.46 
By the end of 1970, both sides had recognised the new reality of Britain’s rapid reduction in global 
prestige throughout the late 1960s. Both felt that the quality of the UK-US relationship had, for 
various reasons, suffered during the Wilson-Johnson years. The President was an avowed believer in 
the strength of the Atlantic bond and was determined to restore a strong relat ionship with the US’s 
closest ally. The US government understood the changing context within which British foreign policy 
was operating and acted accordingly. UK interests remained largely aligned with those of the US and 
the UK still looked to the US as its primary provider of security. The relationship was evolving, but 
doing so within the context of a burgeoning relationship between the Prime Minister and the 
President. 
 
2. The Middle East 
Prime Minister Edward Heath proclaimed in November 1970 that his government would “establish 
clearly and unmistakably that British policies are determined by British interests”.47 In his Guildhall 
speech, he made the argument that an expanded European community, with Britain at its heart, 
would “give back to Europe the influence which she once enjoyed”.48 Heath said that Western 
Europe was well served by peace in the Middle East, something that superpower confrontation had 
failed to achieve. Heath claimed that a lack of European involvement in the region had “permitted 
the steady growth of the Soviet presence and influence in the area”. The implication therein was 
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that US power alone was inadequate to protect western interests in the Middle East. In its analysis 
of the speech, the US Embassy in London reported that the change in British rhetoric was likely due 
to a perception at the highest levels of government that the US was not providing the UK with the 
whole picture in regard to policy in the Middle East.49 British perceptions were not unfounded. 
In late 1970, US-UK tension played out over the issue of the use of Cyprus as a base for potential US 
action in Jordan. In September 1970, Jordan was experiencing a civil war between the ruling 
Hashemite monarchy led by King Hussein and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), led by 
Yasser Arafat. On September 21st, Heath called a cabinet meeting to discuss a request from King 
Hussein to transmit a message to Israel requesting that they conduct air strikes over Syria- a mutual 
enemy and close ally of the PLO.50 The decision was made by the British government to pass on the 
message to the Americans. The Americans were closer to Israel politically and Israeli Prime Minister 
Golda Meir was then visiting the UN in New York. More importantly for the British though, should 
the situation escalate further, the government foresaw the possibility of the US requesting the use 
of the British air base on Cyprus for their own air strikes on PLO positions.  
The British government was stuck between the need to protect Britain’s Arab interests (largely in oil) 
and protecting the UK-US relationship. Allowing the Americans to use Cyprus as a base to attack 
Jordan would lead the Arab countries to see Britain as “having thrown in our lot with the United 
States and Israel”, but a refusal “might seriously damage Anglo-American relations”.51 Noting that 
public opinion would not allow for a significant split with the United States, the cabinet decided to 
suspend judgement on the lending of the Cypriate base.52 In the meantime, the British government 
looked to pre-empt any US request for the use of Cyprus. It resolved to steer the US away from any 
potential military action by concentrating upon discussions at the UN Security Council. 53  The cabinet 
discussions demonstrate that although British interests could be distinct from those of the US in the 
Middle East, the maintenance of the UK-US relationship, both in the region and more widely, was of 
utmost concern and that measures were quickly adopted to protect it.  
In late September 1970, Nixon and Kissinger were considering the effects of their Middle East policy 
upon the UK-US relationship. In a memorandum dated 23rd September, Kissinger noted that having 
received notification from the British of King Hussein’s request for an Israeli intervention in Syria, 
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“ostensibly” because Meir was in New York, Nixon now had a choice to make. 54 In preparation for 
Nixon’s meeting with Douglas-Home at the UN, the memorandum reminded Nixon that the US had 
told the UK nothing of its agreement in principle for the Israelis to make ei ther a ground or air strike 
in Jordan. Kissinger framed the decision in such a manner that provided only one logical answer; the 
choice given was between “not revealing our agreement passed to the Israelis (which I recommend) 
and the problem of dealing later with offended British sensibilities”. Nixon looked to avoid a direct 
disagreement with the British, but also signalled his willingness to keep the Heath government in the 
dark regarding American interests and agreements. 
Both the UK and US governments were faced with the challenge of maintaining an asymmetric, yet 
strong relationship. This required a degree of creativity in foreign policy-making; the British looked 
to prevent a difficult situation whilst the White House decided against full disclosure on an issue that 
would certainly cause conflict within the UK-US relationship. On a regional level, the allies could hold 
positions that favoured different sides in a conflict without threatening the sanctity of the UK -US 
relationship. The Atlantic partners would then work hard to ensure that these known divergences of 
interest would not harm the wider alliance. 
The second Middle Eastern issue for the UK-US relationship immediately following Heath’s election 
was that of British military withdrawal from and subsequent federation of the Trucial States around 
the Persian Gulf. Having opposed Labour’s accelerated withdrawal from British positions East of Suez 
in January 1968, Conservative Party policy had carefully avoided an outright commitment to reverse 
the decision. Then-Shadow Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home maintained sufficient criticism of 
the policy to make it an issue at the June 1970 general election.  55 Douglas-Home promised that the 
Conservative government would consult with nations of the Persian Gulf immediately with a view to 
maintaining a UK presence. By 1970, opinion had changed among Gulf nations. After reacting angrily 
to Wilson’s announcement of British withdrawal in 1968, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had, by 
the time the Conservatives won the election, declared that they no longer desired a British presence. 
In addition, the British defence budget would not allow for a reversal of the decision. 56 Douglas-
Home made US Secretary of State Rogers aware of the likely direction of British pol icy when they 
met in July 1970, where he confirmed that the major British presence in the Gulf would be naval. 57 
By October 1970 British rhetoric reflected an abandonment of the desire to maintain a substantial 
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military presence in the region in favour of a concentration upon stability and security.58 As a result, 
US expectations of a British presence in the region were lowered.  
Amid the realisation that they could not maintain forces in the Persian Gulf, no matter the political 
will, the new UK government had two inter-connected issues to tackle in June 1970. There was a 
pressing need to unite the small Trucial states into a united body (later to become the United Arab 
Emirates). This could not be achieved, however without the agreement of Iran, which had an 
ongoing dispute with two of the Trucial States, Sharjah and Ras-el-Khaimah, over two small islands 
within the Gulf. Problems over Abu Musa and the Tunbs, what Heath referred to as “these wretched 
little islands” dated back to the late 19th Century when Foreign Office cartographers incorrectly drew 
a boundary that awarded sovereignty of the islands to the Trucial States rather than to the 
Iranians.59 The Shah was adamant that Iran would not support the Union of Trucial States unless the 
island dispute was resolved. Unable to afford unfriendly relations with Iran, the other Trucial States 
would be unwilling to federate without the blessing of the Shah.  
At a meeting in Brussels in July 1970, the Shah told Douglas-Home that Iran would take the islands 
by force if they were not given up voluntarily.60 Bound to protect the Trucial States until December 
1st 1971, the British did not want to find themselves at war with Iran. Douglas-Home succeeded in 
persuading the Shah to hold off at least until British treaty commitments had expired, but the 
problem of a de facto Iranian veto over the Trucial union remained.61 Ultimately, the Iranians seized 
the islands on November 30th, one day prior to the end of British treaty commitments to the Trucial 
States. Unwilling to go to war over one day, the British put up no resistance; Iran regained the 
islands it desired and the Trucial States minus Qatar and Bahrain federated to form the UAE. 62 
The US supported the British position in as much as a federation of the Trucial States would 
contribute to stability in the region, but it was made clear to the British that any solution had to be 
acceptable to Iran.63 US opinion on the matter was informed by Nixon and Kissinger’s concentration 
upon macro-scale geopolitics, a substantial shift in outlook from previous US administrations. UK 
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and US policy in the Persian Gulf during the Johnson administration had been to foster cooperation 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia as a replacement for British power in the region. 64 The strategy 
known as the “two pillar policy” dated back to 1966, when the Wilson government pressed the US 
for its implementation amid considerations of a UK withdrawal.65After attempting to encourage the 
UK to maintain a presence in the Middle East, the Johnson administration adopted the  policy that 
would build and maintain Saudi and Iranian strength in the region.66 
In his monograph looking at UK-US relations in the Persian Gulf, Tore Petersen has argued that the 
Nixon administration forged ahead with the two pillar policy.67 Nixon went about this early on in his 
presidency, breaking the links between governments and western oil companies. A move that 
allowed oil prices to rise and meant that the Saudis and the Iranians, in particular, could keep a 
larger share of their oil revenue.68 The revenue could then be used by the larger Gulf States to invest 
in the military hardware necessary to maintain stability in the region. According to Petersen’s 
account, the two pillar strategy was a key component of the Nixon administration’s framework for a 
global peace and extension of the Nixon Doctrine outside of Southeast Asia. 69 Rohem Alvandi 
presents a different and more compelling explanation of US policy in the Persian Gulf. Alvandi’s 
central thesis is that US Gulf policy changed under Nixon in order to accommodate the 
predominance of Iranian power in the region.70 Rhetorically US policy would still demonstrate 
support for a Saudi-Iranian partnership, but the Saudis were not considered a “pillar” in the same 
manner as the Iranians.71 Openly backing the Iranians over the Saudis would only succeed in 
offending Arab sensibilities and breed instability. Stephen McGlinchey supports such a contention. 
He notes that in the drafting of the White House-directed US National Security Study Memorandom 
for the Persian Gulf, the strength of the Iranian position was a “de facto operating principle”.72 
                                                                 
64
 Alvandi , R (2012) “Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf” 
Diplomatic Historyp339 
65
 Gause ,“British and American policies in the Persian Gulf” p259. 
66
 Petersen, TT (2009) Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula Sussex Academic Press: Eastbourne p26. 
67
 Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain p3. 
68
 Petersen, p3 
69
 Petersen p50. 
70
 Alvandi “Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah”p356  
71
 Alvandi, p356. 
72
 McGlinchey, S (2012) Arming the Shah: US Arms Policies Toward Iran, 1950-1979 Unpublished Doctoral 
Thesis, Cardiff Unversity p138. 
 61 
McGlinchy also notes that by 1970, the US had abandoned the idea of convincing Britain to reverse 
its decision to withdraw from military positions East of Suez.73 
Policy in the Persian Gulf demonstrated Nixon’s penchant for personal politics. Nixon had a friendly 
personal relationship with the Shah of Iran that dated back to his first term as Vice President in 
1953.74 Both were stringent anti-communist practitioners of realpolitik. Far from the Johnson 
Administration’s opinion of the Shah as a reformist, looking to exert Iranian power contrary to US 
interests, the Nixon administration wondered how far the Iranian leader could fulfil his ambitions of 
regional hegemony.75 Safe in the knowledge of altered US policy, the Shah began to push for a 
“special relationship” with the US.76 The Iranian leader believed that the Soviet Union was sparking 
proxy wars in Egypt and Iraq as part of a plan to destabilise the region and re strict the West’s access 
to Middle Eastern oil supplies.77 He was also aware that US travails in Vietnam demonstrated that 
the Americans could not maintain their global order through military force alone, and would thus 
require strong regional allies to reinforce the global fight against communism.78 Within the context 
of a Nixon Doctrine that was expanding its scope beyond Southeast Asia, the Shah successfully 
pushed the White House for increases in arms supplies and strengthened his designs on regional 
hegemony. US arms sales to Iran increased from $103m in 1970 to $475m in 1971 and $552m in 
1972.79 The Shah could rely upon his personal relationship with Nixon to pay dividends.  
Kissinger refutes the notion that US policy in the Persian Gulf was based upon Nix on’s personal 
allegiance with the Shah. Nixon’s National Security Advisor claims that the Iranians needed strong US 
support in order to balance the power of the Soviet-backed Ba’thists in Iraq.80 Alvandi argues that 
the strength of the Iraqi government is overstated by Kissinger. UK special envoy to the Persian Gulf, 
Sir William Luce, did not see the Iraqis as a threat: The Iranians had already demonstrated their 
dominance over Iraq in a dispute over the Shatt waterway in 1969.  
In late 1970, British issues in the Persian Gulf occurred within the context of increased US support 
for Iran. The two countries’ interests converged over the islands dispute, but their outlooks were 
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different. The UK was looking to manage withdrawal on a regional level and to protect  its oil supply 
through the provision of stability. Less concerned by the supply of oil, the White House was 
administering policy on a global level through supplying the most powerful actor in the region with 
the means to prevent Soviet infiltration and influence. US support for Iran was also underpinned by 
a strong personal relationship between Nixon and the Shah. Although the British and Americans 
were tackling regional issues in very different ways, it did not seem to have an effect on top -level 
UK-US relations, which were on an upward trajectory in late 1970. As long as the allies knew of each 
other’s intentions, different geopolitical approaches could co-exist on a regional level, without 
damaging the quality of the UK-US relationship. 
3. A Developing Crisis in South Asia 
Unrest between the two wings of Pakistan, separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory began soon 
after partition in 1947. The peoples of West and East Pakistan had a common religion, but also 
different cultures, heritages and languages. Language immediately became a point of conflict after 
Pakistan’s founding father and first Prime Minister, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, proclaimed Urdu- a 
language not widely spoken in the Bengali-speaking Eastern wing- as the sole official language of the 
new state. Protests erupted in 1952 when the Prime Minister, a Bengali, Kwaja Nazimuddin, 
reiterated the discriminatory stance.81 A heavy-handed police response to the resultant Language 
Movement protests resulted in the death of a student and helped to ferment levels of resentment in 
the East. The subsequent nineteen years marked a struggle between Bengali nationalism and the 
efforts of West Pakistan elites to contain it.82   
A number of statistics indicate the degree to which the people of East Pakistan were exploi ted and 
discriminated against by the ruling powers in the West. Despite the East having a population of 75 
million compared to 55 million in the opposite wing, between 1947 and 1969 66% of US aid had 
gone to the more prosperous west;83 by 1971 there were 7,600 doctors in the East, compared to 
12,400 in the West;84 and in military terms, only 7% of the Pakistani army originated from East 
Pakistan.85 The “economic exploitation” of East Pakistan was readily recognised by both the UK and 
the US governments. A 1970 report carried out for the FCO on the prospects of an economic disaster 
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in East Pakistan agreed with a USAID conclusion that there was “a disguised transfer of capital 
resources of at least $95 million from East to West Pakistan during the year 1967/68”. 86 The report 
went on to describe how this “milking process” had taken the form of a heavy overvaluation of the 
Pakistani rupee that acted as a de facto tax on exports and a subsidy on imports. The West was the 
natural benefactor of such an arrangement given its status as a net importer and the East’s as a net 
exporter. It is within this context that Bengali nationalism gathered steam in the wake of Pakistan’s 
1965 war with India over Kashmir. 
Following a wave of nationwide protests throughout 1968, the presi dent of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, 
announced that he would not contest the general election that was scheduled for 1970. 87 To satisfy 
demands for a civilian government and ostensibly to ensure a stable transfer to an elected body, 
Ayub stepped down to be replaced by General Yahya Khan.88 Yahya’s task was to return Pakistan to 
the political environment present at its creation in 1947, namely one person one vote within a 
parliamentary democracy.89  
Sandhurst trained, Yahya had served in the British army during the Second World War. His persona 
was one of a strong, straight-talking leader; a contrast to the more softly spoken Ayub. The new 
president’s motivations for the decisions he made in 1970 and 1971 remain a matter for debate. 
However, based upon the memoirs of a senior Pakistani Brigadier, Srinath Raghavan asserts that 
Yahya’s government wanted to take advantage of the sectarian nature of Pakistani politics to 
produce a deeply divided National Assembly.90 A fragmented government would not be able to 
come to an agreement on a new constitution. Furthermore, the constitution had to conform to strict 
rules decreed by Yahya himself in March 1970. On January 1st 1970, the President lifted the ban on 
political activity that had been imposed by the military regime since his  swearing in nine months 
previously. The starting gun had been fired in Pakistan’s first general election on the basis of 
universal suffrage. 
The frontrunner in the East was the leader of the Awami League (AL), Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
(Mujib). Mujib came to prominence amid a wave of discontent that engulfed East Pakistan following 
the 1965 war with India over Kashmir.  Many in the East felt they had been abandoned by a 
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government more concerned with acquiring new territory than protecting the population of its own 
Eastern wing. The war confirmed the long-held notion that the government in the West cared more 
for its ethnic links with Kashmir than it did for its national links with East Bengal. In 1966 Mujib 
unveiled a 6 point plan aimed at providing autonomy for East Pakistan. The Six Points called for a 
parliamentary democracy and a federal constitution; the restriction of federal powers to foreign 
affairs and defence; separate currencies that allowed for the maintenance of foreign exchange 
within each wing; the devolution of fiscal and trade policy to the provinces; and the ability for each 
province to raise its own militia force.91 
Mujib served a brief prison sentence in 1968 after being accused of hatching a plot to secede East 
Pakistan from the West; this is an accusation he would continue to deny.92 He was released on the 
same day that Yahya Khan took over from Ayub Khan on February 21st 1969, to rapturous applause 
at a rally organised by the student wing of his party.93 During the 1968 protests against Ayub, the 
Student Action Committee (SAC), a faction that heavily supported the AL, had drawn up an 11 point 
plan headlined by calls for direct elections and full autonomy for the East. These demands erred 
further toward secession than Mujib’s six points. Mujib maintained his desire to continue within a 
unified Pakistan up until the army cracked down on East Pakistan in March 1971, but he endorsed 
the 11 point plan.94 Raghavan contends that Mujib’s support for the 11 point plan at the Dacca rally 
meant that the, moderate by comparison, Six Points became a minimal position after the election. 95 
His links to the student wing of the party also boosted opponents that accused him of agitating for 
secession. 
In the Western Wing, Zulfikur Ali Bhutto was looking to take power with a victory for his Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP). The former foreign minister had formed the party upon his release from prison 
in 1967 following his outspoken criticism of Ayub’s leadership during the 1965 war  over Kashmir. 
Bhutto epitomised the sectarian, personality based politics that dominated Pakistan in 1970. Often 
accused of demagoguery, Bhutto contributed to the polarisation of the West and East wings. 96 In the 
East, he was a symbol of the West Pakistani establishment that had been exploiting East Pakistan 
since partition. During the 1965 war, when asked how the East would be defended whilst Pakistan 
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concentrated its forces on Kashmir, he answered that the Chinese would take care of it. 97 Bhutto 
was a populist committed to a united Pakistan. Highly sceptical of the six point plan, he continued to 
argue that it represented a veiled manifesto for secession. 
In substance, the AL and PPP’s policies were similar in a number of areas. They were both parties of 
the left, they were both professed supporters of democracy and they both advocated a neutralist 
foreign policy for Pakistan. Mujib and Bhutto also had a common desire for a speedy transfer of 
power from the military government to a civilian National Assembly. Their differences were over 
larger issues relating to the future of the state and signified the ethnic division of the country. The 
PPP wanted a centralised government whereas the AL was calling for full autonomy for the regions. 
A hallmark of Bhutto’s career had been his strong stance against India. In contrast the AL was looking 
for a cooperative relationship with Pakistan’s neighbour. The National Assembly was sure to be split 
along sectarian lines. The PPP did not field any candidates in the Eastern w ing, while the AL’s 
presence on ballot papers in the West was tokenistic.98 
Impeding a speedy transition of power were the rules governing the framing of a new constitution. 
The Legal Framework Order (LFO) announced by Yahya in March 1970 set constraints up on the 
National Assembly in a number of areas.  Alongside the provision for a democratic constitution and 
the primacy of Islam, the LFO contained a number of controversial and contradictory constraints: the 
disparity in wealth and resources between the West and East Wing needed to be addressed; the 
territorial integrity of Pakistan had to be ensured; and autonomy for the regions must not be 
allowed to compromise the federal system.99 Crucially, the LFO required the National Assembly to 
concentrate solely upon the constitution until a draft was agreed: this must be done within 120 
days. Otherwise the Assembly would face dissolution and the calling of new elections. Once the 
constitution was agreed, it had to be personally approved by Yahya himself, who also acted as the 
sole arbiter of the LFO. The latter clauses were widely criticised by politicians of all stripes, including 
the Awami League and PPP for contradicting the democratic principles that governed the transfer of 
power.100 
Scheduled for October 1970, the elections were beset by problems. Floods in August engulfed 11 
districts in East Pakistan and caused the election to be postponed until December 8th. This disaster 
was followed by the devastation caused when the Bhola Cyclone hit land in the southern reg ions of 
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East Pakistan; official estimates of fatalities range from 200,000 to 1,000,000.101 Within an area of 
3,000 square miles, 90% of crops were destroyed and an estimated 3,000,000 people were severely 
affected.102 The Pakistan government faced fierce criticism for its response to the disasters from all 
quarters in the Eastern wing. Mujib went as far as to accuse the government of “criminal negligence” 
and warned that civil war could break out if the elections were postponed once more. 103 The AL was 
the only party pressing for a quick election and many opponents eventually boycotted the polls in 
protest. The path was open for a resounding AL victory. 
Despite the Awami League’s command of the majority of electoral support in the East, the election 
was difficult to predict. UK and US missions in Pakistan estimated the AL would win anywhere 
between 55% and 75% of the seats available in the East.104 The PPP was even more of an unknown 
quantity; the extent to which Bhutto could attract votes outside of his home province of Sindh was 
questionable. Exact levels of support for each party were very difficult to gauge; Pakistan was a 
developing society in which much of the electorate was illiterate and resided in remote villages. 
Many cast their vote based upon word of mouth and would put a mark next to a recognisable 
symbol rather than the name of the party spelled out. Yahya stayed up all night watching the results 
come in on television. When the shock results came in, he demanded an explanation from his closest 
advisors.105  
Yahya’s hope for a result conducive to military-backed stability had been dashed. The cyclone had 
played into the hands of the AL, who won an overall majority in the National Assembly. 106 A 
concession within the LFO had been to allow East Pakistan a majori ty of seats within the National 
Assembly as a function of its population. The military regime predicted the AL would only win 
between 46 and 70 seats; one can imagine Yahya’s shock when Mujib’s party returned 160 of 162 
seats in the Eastern province, giving them an overall majority in a National Assembly of 300. Mujib 
himself had only predicted the AL could win up to 80% of the seats in the East, and now faced 
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pressure he could not have imagined he would be under.107 Pushed by the student wing of his party, 
Mujib was forced to insist that the AL now had a mandate to draw up the constitution alone. 108 
An even greater shock was the scale of the PPP’s election victory. Although winning only 81 of the 
138 seats available in the West, they had performed much better than expected throughout the 
Western wing and had become the most powerful party in West Pakistan. The former foreign 
minister was in a tactically stronger position than his counterpart in the East. He first of all called for 
a PPP-AL consensus on the constitution; an outwardly reasonable demand that would expose 
Mujib’s rigidity.109 Any compromise would require Mujib to step back from the Six Points; when this 
did not happen Bhutto declared on December 20th that no government could be formed without the 
PPP.110 As leader of the largest party in the West, Bhutto claimed a mandate to be a part of any 
future government. Were he not to get his wish, he would derail the whole process with a boycott of 
the National Assembly.111 
The two most powerful parties in the National Assembly were thus the two most unlikely and unable 
to work with one another. A set of demands that were widely seen as up for discussion prior to the 
election the Six Points had become non-negotiable in the wake of the Awami League’s resounding 
victory.112 Unable to accept what he saw as a mandate for secession, Bhutto adopted a strong 
stance, intent on ruining the democratic process unless he had a say in the framing of the 
constitution. There was to be a difficult road ahead if Pakistan was to make the  transition to a 
democratically elected body that would govern both disparate wings of the country. In his memoir, 
US Consul General in Dacca, Archer Blood, concluded that the Pakistan general election of 1970 
demonstrated that “*S+ome elections can be too conclusive for the polity they are designed to 
serve”113. The election produced a result that nobody wanted and gave great scope for pessimism.  
Despite the potentially destabilising result of the Pakistani elections, South Asia was not on the 
agenda within top-level Anglo-American discussions in late 1970. Briefs prepared for Heath in 
advance of Nixon’s visit to Chequers in October 1970 did not contain any analysis of South Asia, 
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neither did briefs in advance of his visit to Washington in December. 114 After years of frustration 
with India and Pakistan, US policy had drifted into indifference under the Johnson administration 
and the trend appeared to be continuing under Nixon. The 1970 and 1971 foreign policy reports to 
Congress contained one and three pages on the region respectively and simply referred to the 
traditional emphasis on stability and a desire not to interfere with Soviet interests in the area. 115 In 
late 1970, South Asia was relatively unimportant in the context of the Nixon administration’s global 
geostrategy. As long as India and Pakistan were not threatening stability through conflict, the region 
was not a priority. The UK was also de-prioritising the region in 1970. As part of the re-orientation 
toward Europe, diplomatic posts were being cut in Pakistan. Such a process led the UK High 
Commissioner in Pakistan, Sir Cyril Pickard, to begrudgingly accept that entry into the EC would 
inevitably mean a decrease in UK influence in parts of the world such as South Asia. 116   
The impressions of the UK and US missions on the ground in Dacca demonstrated a degree of 
congruence. There was a measure of sympathy for Yahya among UK and US officials following the 
elections. In a November meeting between FCO and State officials to discuss South Asian affairs, 
there was general agreement that Yahya was a “reluctant dictator” and that he was genuine in his 
stated desire to transfer power to an elected government as soon as possible. 117 This sentiment was 
mirrored by both the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland and the British Foreign Secretary, 
Alec Douglas-Home.118  
British and American missions agreed that Mujib was also in a difficult position. Following the 
election result, Archer Blood knew the six point plan would be difficult to implement in its entirety. 
The fifth of the six points, allowing each federating unit to set up its own trade missions abroad, was 
particularly contentious. The Consul General questioned “*H+ow could a nation maintain a coherent 
and consistent foreign policy if its component units were free to follow their own economic 
policies?”119 UK and US diplomats in Pakistan were united in their belief that Mujib’s ability to 
negotiate was now constrained by his own success.120 The AL leader would have to stand his ground 
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on drafting a constitution alone if he were to keep his party united. Mujib’s inability to make even 
the smallest concession meant the drafting of a constitution seemed a difficult process.  
Bhutto’s image within UK-US circles was not a positive one. He was described as a “cynical 
opportunist” and as “utterly unscrupulous” by British officials in Pakistan who thought that his tough 
stance on Kashmir was nothing more than a populist ploy.121 The Americans were equally wary of 
the former Pakistani foreign minister, whose ambivalence toward the US was well documented. In 
private, Bhutto assured American officials that he had no ill -feeling toward the Americans and that 
his time studying at USC and Berkeley had been the happiest period of his life.122  These assurances 
came despite vigorous criticism of US foreign policy during the election campaign. 123 He was widely 
believed to be an individual that would do or say anything to preserve his own power,  and was not 
to be trusted. It was within this context that his policy in the aftermath of the election was 
interpreted. Bhutto was willing to sacrifice the handover of power to the civilian government to fulfil 
his ambition to become prime minister. 
The desired outcome of the election for British and American diplomats would have been a speedy 
transfer to a Mujib-led government of a united Pakistan. Although not necessarily easy to deal with, 
his pro-Indian and pro-western stances made him preferable to Bhutto or a continuation of the 
military government.124 In December 1970, UK and US missions in Islamabad and Dacca hoped 
Yahya’s claims that Mujib and Bhutto were already on the way to a settlement were true. 125 The 
road to a stable Pakistan would prove to be more traumatic than anyone could have imagined, as 
the geopolitical importance of the region rapidly increased in 1971. 
 
Conclusion 
The second half of 1970 was a time of flux within the UK-US relationship. The UK was on the brink of 
joining the EC, British withdrawals from East of Suez were nearing completion and there was new 
thinking on foreign policy in the White House. Nixon and Heath looked to navigate these issues 
through a strong personal relationship: a relationship they succeeded in developing at th eir 
meetings in October and December. The candour demonstrated by both men in their discussions 
highlighted the value of intimate consultation within the UK-US relationship. Heath clearly indicated 
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to Nixon that use of the term “natural relationship” was l inked to a desire not to appear as an 
American “Trojan Horse” within the EEC. Following the Washington summit in December 1970, top -
level UK-US relations were in good health. 
In the Middle East however, UK and US approaches continued to differ. In looking to steer the 
Americans away from a request to use its Cypriote air base, the British Cabinet demonstrated both 
an understanding of American interests and a desire to mitigate potential disagreements in order to 
preserve the UK-US relationship. In not revealing to the British the US secret agreement to allow 
Israel to enter Jordan, Nixon not only demonstrated an understanding of British interests, but also a 
willingness to conceal information from his closest ally. Similarly, with regard to the islands dispu te 
between Iran and the Trucial States, the UK was aware that the Americans wanted an agreement 
satisfactory to Iran, and acted accordingly.  
US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf set a precedent for the White House approach toward regional 
affairs. All matters were subservient to the overarching aim to curb Soviet power and influence 
around the globe. Powerful allies, such as Iran would be supported as the Nixon Doctrine was 
tentatively rolled out beyond Southeast Asia. Any US support for British aims, whi ch were assessed 
on regional basis, would have to fall within this wider context. In his relationship with the Shah, 
Nixon had demonstrated his tendency to favour leaders with which he had a personal connection. 
Nixon’s support for Iran went beyond what was required to rebuff Soviet advances. This was a 
pattern that would repeat itself in South Asia. 
South Asia was not discussed by Heath and Nixon in 1970. Prior to March 1971, it remained a region 
of low importance within the global Cold War. Study of the Middle East in late 1970 has 
demonstrated that, even in areas of great sensitivity, differences in regional interests could be 
managed if there was a clear understanding between the UK and US governments of the other’s 
interests. With regard to Pakistan, the FCO and State Department were largely in agreement on 
policy prior to the December 1970 elections. They agreed that a Mujib-led government would be the 
best outcome for both countries’ interests. Both assumed that stability in South Asia would continue 
to be the guiding force in the foreign policy of their respective governments in the region. Both the 
FCO and the State Department were unaware that in 1970 and 1971, Nixon and Kissinger were 
willing to risk stability on the subcontinent and cordial UK-US relations for the higher goal of a 
rapprochement with China.  
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Chapter 3: A Breakdown in Consultation 
Introduction 
This chapter charts the breakdown in UK-US consultation in the run-up to US President Richard 
Nixon’s announcement on July 15th 1971 that he was due to visit China in early 1972. The 
announcement marked a turning point in 1971 for the UK-US relationship as cordial relations in the 
12 months previous descended into rancorous disagreements. The chapter explains the ongoing 
crisis in Pakistan and the high levels of consultation and cooperation between the UK and US 
missions on the ground before exploring the knock-on effects the White House’s secret “opening to 
China” had upon US intra-governmental, and consequently, US-UK relations. 
Section one charts events in Pakistan up to July 1971. After elections in Pakistan had produced a 
deadlock in the constitution-making process, the months leading to March 25th produced little result 
as the province moved closer to civil war. On the night of March 25/26th the situation took a 
terrifying turn as the Pakistani military moved in to suppress the Bengali nationalists and to target 
East Pakistan’s Hindu minority. The second section focuses on the relationship between the FCO and 
State Department, both on the ground in Pakistan and in London and Washington. Interestingly, 
both bureaucracies had very similar intra-departmental disagreements but trust and consultation 
played a large part in a cooperative and productive Anglo-American relationship. 
At the same time as East Pakistan was descending into a battleground for guerrilla warfare, Nixon 
and Kissinger were in the latter stages of planning the “opening to China”. The crisis on the 
subcontinent proved an unwanted distraction amid a secret plan to improve the US relationship with 
China. Nixon and Kissinger used the President’s strong personal relationship with Pakistan President 
Yahya Khan and a “one time exception” arms deal to coax the Pakistani President into acting as an 
interlocutor with Peking. Section three explains the reasoning and subsequent process behind the 
White House policy that looked to exploit the divisions within the Sino-Soviet relationship and the 
subsequent tacit support for Yahya’s actions in East Pakistan.  
The final two sections assess the effects that White House secrecy had upon both intra-
governmental relations and intra-State Department relations before turning to UK-US relations. 
Aware only of the vague White House intention to eventually improve relations with China, the S tate 
Department was unaware of the diplomatic moves the White House had made made via Pakistan. 
Such deception led to the foreign service’s authority in conducting policies in South Asia being based 
upon completely different premises to the their superiors in the White House. State’s authority was 
undermined and internal disagreemments exacerbated following Nixon’s announcement on July 
15th. Finally, the chapter assesses the consequences that the White House’s secret foreign 
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policymaking had upon Anglo-American relations. Throughout early 1971, the UK was itself looking 
to improve its relationship with China through supporting its membership of the UN as a precursor 
to an exchange of ambassadors. Consultation had been a key component of the renaissance of th e 
UK-US relationship under Heath and Nixon in late 1970, and the British government maintained such 
a spirit over the issue of China. Communicating with the White House via a State Department 
oblivious to the true intentions of the US government, the UK was continually asked to delay its 
decision to support China’s membership of the UN. When it was revealed on July 15 th that White 
House secrecy and deception had cost the UK a speedy exchange of Ambassadors, the relationship 
was destined for a torrid second half to 1971- especially in South Asia. 
 
1. Deadlock in Pakistan 
In January 1971, the position of the two electoral v ictors had not changed since Pakistan’s general  
election a month earlier. The result had granted the AL an overall majority in the National Assembly 
and the PPP became the most powerful party in the Western wing. However,  AL leader Mujib was 
still a hostage to his own success. Powerful secessionist elements within his party saw the Six Points 
as a minimally acceptable outcome, whereas Bhutto and President Yahya Khan’s reputations still 
depended upon the continued territorial integrity of Pakistan.  
At a speech in Dacca on January 3rd, Mujib reaffirmed his commitment to draft a new constitution 
for Pakistan. He exclaimed that any new constitution would need to be based exclusively upon his 
party’s Six Point Plan for East Pakistani autonomy. During the speech, Mujib exclaimed his desire to 
seek the cooperation of leaders in the West, and declared that he would not be shaken nor 
intimidated.1 The Awami League leader remained steadfast in his refusal to negotiate on the 
substance of his demands and he threatened the government in West Pakistan with a peaceful 
declaration of independence for “Bangla Desh” (land of the Bengalis). If the country was to remain 
united, any deal had to be entirely on the AL’s terms. Two of the Six Points, a democratic 
government based upon universal suffrage and a separate militia force for East Pakistan, had already 
been agreed to by the military government in West Pakistan. Bhutto’s PPP remained, though, 
steadfastly opposed to the other four, namely those of separate currencies for the two wings, the 
limiting of the central government to issues of foreign affairs and defence, the power of taxation to 
be afforded to each wing and the separation of foreign exchange earnings, meaning East Pakistan 
could keep its export revenues. Bhutto, a former foreign minister, saw the Six Points as a veiled bid 
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for secession; the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was something both he and 
President Yahya were desperate to avoid.  
Debate continues as to Yahya’s true intentions in talks with Mujib in mid-January 1971. However, he 
was clear on the point that substantial negotiations needed to take place between the AL and the 
PPP, and an outline of the constitution be agreed before the National Assembly could meet. 2 This 
formula would inevitably require a climb-down from Mujib on the Six Points. Constrained by his own 
electoral success, Mujib refused to make any concessions- a move that confirmed in the President’s 
mind his long-held suspicion that Mujib was indeed looking for secession for East Pakistan. 3 Despite 
the fact that Mujib’s obduracy was hardening the President’s position, Yahya was keen to publicly 
display even-handedness. At a press conference on January 15th, the President referred to Mujib as 
“The future prime minister of Pakistan”. Such rhetoric was designed to curry favour with non -AL 
supporting Bengalis and to maintain his international image as an “honest broker” of the impasse. 
After talks between Bhutto and Mujib in late January produced very little, Bhutto looked to firm up 
anti-Mujib opinion in West Pakistan.4 Firstly, he was successful in influencing the government to the 
point that a former aide of Bhutto claimed that in the period from January to March 1971, the 
government and PPP’s objectives were effectively in concert.5 Bhutto twice persuaded the President 
to postpone the convening of the National Assembly, once on February 11th and again on March 1st. 
These postponements gave Bhutto time to establish the PPP as the sole representative of West 
Pakistan in the mind of the public and rally leaders of other parties n West Pakistan against the 
Awami League. Further delays in the convening of the Assembly could also encourage splits within 
the AL which could either drive it to a more extreme position or make it more amenable to PPP 
demands.6  Bhutto found some success in presenting his view as that of the West Pakistani people, 
but smaller parties in West Pakistan were reluctant to back Bhutto’s proposed boycott of the 
National Assembly.7  
In response to what Mujib referred to as “electoral theft” when Yahya again postponed the 
convening of the National assembly on March 1st, Mujib called a province -wide Hartal (general 
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strike) that would culminate in a rally at Dacca Racecourse on 7th March.8 Concerns were sparked 
both in Yahya’s mind and around the world that the Awami League leader was to make a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Bangla Desh: a move that would surely force a swift and 
bloody response from the government in Islamabad. In an effort to prevent any UDI, Yahya sent a 
letter to Mujib on March 6th urging him not to make a “hasty decision”. The letter also claimed that 
the President had a scheme in mind that would satisfy the Six Points and allow for the transfer of 
power to the civilian National Assembly.9  
Mindful not to give the military regime any justification for military action, Mujib did not declare 
independence for Bangla Desh on March 7th.10 Rather he made four demands that had to be met 
before the AL would sit in the National Assembly: Martial Law, which had been in effect since  Yahya 
assumed the Presidency 1969, had to be revoked; troops had to return to their barracks; there 
needed to be an enquiry into recent suppressions of Bengali protests; and power needed to be 
immediately transferred to elected representatives.11 Mujib’s speech has been described by Richard 
Sisson and Leo Rose as “a masterful demonstration on oratorical skill”.12 He both accepted Yahya’s 
plea to negotiate and satisfied his core support in demonising the military government in West 
Pakistan and demanding emancipation for the Bengali people.13 The ball was now back in Yahya’s 
court. 
Yahya responded to Mujib by agreeing to travel to Dacca for talks beginning 17th March. Prior to 
Bhutto’s arrival on the 20th, Mujib and the Awami League had been optimistic that an agreement 
could be found. Yahya had told Mujib that it may be possible for the military government to hand 
over power to elected officials before the framing of a constitution, as Mujib had demanded in his 
7th March speech.14 As late as March 22nd it appeared that the impasse could be broken: British and 
American missions reported that the parties seemed to be close to a deal whereby the central 
government could retain control over foreign, defence, and monetary policy whilst a constitution 
was agreed.15 However, throughout the constitutional crisis, Yahya had insisted that although he had 
no principled opposition to the Six Points, Mujib must have Bhutto’s agreement to implement 
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them.16 Bhutto’s agreement was never forthcoming. In hindsight, it seems unlikely that talks in the 
third week of March were conducted in good faith by the parties from West Pakistan. 17 Talks 
allowed the government to stall for time in order to allow preparations for the military suppression 
of the Bengali nationalist movement. 
On March 25th, Operation Searchlight was ruthlessly put into action by the Pakistan Army. Its mission 
was to regain control of East Pakistan and to eliminate the Awami League; Bengali nationalists and 
the Hindu minority in East Pakistan. Dacca University, home to many influential Awami League 
supporters was specifically targeted; a dorm predominantly housing Hindu students was firebombed 
and the fleeing masses machine-gunned. Accounts of the night of March 25th/26th are filled with 
chaos, terror and murder. American Consul General in Dacca, Archer Blood, estimated that 4,000-
6,000 people were killed in the following days.18 Mujib was quickly arrested and transported to West 
Pakistan. A prominent member of the Pakistan military establishment told US Ambassador Farland 
that the government’s intention was to try Mujib for treason and “punish him accordingly”. 19 From 
March 25th onwards, Yahya refused to negotiate with the Awami League. In a speech on March 26th 
he openly accused Mujib of being a traitor, claiming that the Hartal organised by the Awami League 
in March was “an act of treason”. Following the crackdown, East Pakistan quickly became the setting 
for sustained guerrilla warfare between the Pakistan Army and Bengali militants known as the Mukti 
Bahini. Any realistic hope for the continuation of Pakistan as a unified sovereign state ended on the 
night of March 25th 1971. 
The conflict in East Pakistan provoked a refugee crisis of an unimaginable scale. Tainted by an 
association with India and blamed for the rise in Bengali nationalism, Hindus became a specific 
target for extermination and fled in their millions.20 By mid-June, almost 6 million refugees had 
crossed the border into India, the vast majority of them Hindu. 21 The crisis increased domestic 
pressure upon the Indian government, particularly within the border states of Tripura and West 
Bengal.22 Prior to March 25th Pakistan’s neighbour and rival had attempted to remain aloof from the 
crisis, with a preference for the continued unity of Pakistan. Such an attitude quickly changed. 
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Chapters four and five chart the impact of India’s involvement and the issues it raised for the  UK-US 
relationship. 
 
2. UK-US relations on the ground in Pakistan 
UK and US goals in South Asia were aligned in early 1971. Both wanted to continue a policy of 
communist containment through stability. In 1971 this meant that the most favourable outcome for 
the allies in Pakistan was an India-friendly, Mujib-led government of a united Pakistani state. 
Diplomats were under no illusions that such an outcome would come about easily, or that it could 
occur in a peaceful manner.  Although there was still palpable sympathy for the Bengali cause among 
UK and US officials, frustration was beginning to build with Mujib’s stubbornness on the Six Points. 23 
The AL leader’s lack of flexibility was breeding pessimism among UK and US officials as to the 
likelihood of a peaceful solution to the impasse. Such pessimism was compounded by their 
prevailing view of Bhutto as a demagogue intent on claiming power for himself at all costs. UK and 
US hopes for a resolution rested on Yahya’s willingness to accept Mujib’s Six Point plan in  full.24 
The British and American missions worked closely together in Dacca. From March the US Consul 
General Archer Blood and UK Deputy High Commissioner Frank Sargeant cooperated on the 
evacuation of US and UK nationals. Having put together contingency plans for the evacuation of UK, 
US and other nationals, there were doubts over the continued availability of Dacca airport for 
emergency flights out of Pakistan. In response, Blood and Sargeant held a joint meeting with East 
Pakistan Martial Law Administrator Farman Ali on March 13th. They gained assurances that 
operations at Dacca airport could be speeded up to allow for emergency evacuation should it be 
necessary.25 The joint representation was also successful in gaining Pakistani protection for UK and 
US nationals to safely travel from pre-arranged evacuation points to the airport.26 Reflecting his 
friendly relationship with Sargeant, Blood asked that Farman’s assurances be passed on to the UK 
High Commission in Dacca as his British colleague was busy that evening meeting with local British 
ex-pats. 
The level of policy coordination on evacuation extended to a shared sensitivity toward the Pakistan 
government. Both the FCO and State Department were aware that a full -scale evacuation of ex-pats 
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could provoke a hostile response from Yahya, even after the military crackdown of March 25th. A full-
scale evacuation could easily be interpreted as a lack of confidence in his ability and or willingness to 
bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis. In order to mollify such a response the British used, and 
the Americans adopted, the term “thinning out” to describe the movement of British and American 
citizens out of Pakistan.27 However, on March 29th Blood and Sergeant jointly agreed to begin 
evacuation proceedings for all non-essential personnel.28 
Hope in Yahya’s ability to mediate in talks and maintain Pakistani unity via peaceful means was all 
British and American missions could cling to. On March 11th, Head of the South Asian Department at 
the FCO Iain Sutherland, in a minute sent to various posts at the FCO, said that British objectives 
would only be to ascertain Yahya’s true intentions and made it clear that the UK was not looking to 
play an intermediary role. Sutherland explained that a diplomatic intervention by th e British 
government would be ineffective and counter-productive. The FCO realised that any hope for a 
settlement rested on Yahya’s ability to accept the Six Points, and then convince Bhutto to follow 
suit.29 American opinion was similar, although US diplomats in Dacca found themselves under 
heavier pressure to intervene. In a February meeting with Mujib, Blood was asked by the Awami 
League leader if the US could bring diplomatic pressure to bear in order to soften Yahya’s position 
on autonomy for East Pakistan. Blood was commended by his Ambassador in Islamabad for flatly 
refusing the request: Mujib again asked for a US intervention with Yahya on March 23rd, but again to 
no avail.30 The State Department’s position was clear. Any intervention with Yahya could make it 
appear as if the US was in favour of secession for East Pakistan.31 
Hopes for a peaceful settlement on March 24th turned to horror on the night of March 25th as the 
Pakistani army moved in. Based on reports from Dacca, the British Ambassador to Pakistan, Sir Cyril 
Pickard reported from Islamabad of “callous disregard” for life on the part of the Pakistani Army as 
they ruthlessly cleared the streets in M-24 tanks on the night of March 25th/26th.32 On March 27th, 
the Deputy High Commissioner reported on an attack at Dacca University in which he described the 
police guard at the campus as having been “massacred”.33 In mid-April Sargeant continued to 
describe how the “Army have been steadily continuing their reign of terror”, burning and looting 
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villages in the countryside outside of Dacca.34 Cables from the US Consul General in Dacca reflected 
strikingly similar sentiments. On March 28th, Blood sent a cable entitled “Selective Genocide” in 
which he described how the Awami League hierarchy, student leaders and intellectuals had been 
“marked for extinction”.35  On March 31st, Blood sent another cable describing how the Pakistan 
military was continuing to commit “wanton acts of violence” in countryside villages on the outskirts 
of Dacca.36  
Consultation between Blood and Sargeant’s missions in Dacca was considerable in the months 
following March 25th. The missions keenly shared reports of events in Dacca. Blood’s cable to the 
State Department on March 29th described how Sargeant had sent a British official to see Blood to 
report an incident in which British citizens taking photographs of the military were only saved from 
execution through the intervention of officials from the Deputy High Commission.37 Blood again 
cited British sources when reporting on April 1st that three planes full of Pakistani military 
reinforcements dressed in civilian clothing had landed at Dacca airport to be briefed by Pakistan Air 
Force officials.38 There was also evidence of consultation on events at higher levels within the 
bureaucracies as British situation reports in April were passed by the FCO to the US Embassy in 
London.39 
Like the missions in Dacca, the bureaucracies in London and Washington shared an outlook on the 
crisis, but one that was far more focused upon the continued unity of Pakistan than the prevention 
of bloodshed. The US Consul General’s cable of March 28th entitled “Selective Genocide” has since 
become known as the “Blood Telegram” after the furore it caused in Washington. The Consul 
General reasoned that “*F+ull horror of Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner or later. I, 
therefore, question [the] continued advisability of [the] present USG (US Government) posture of 
pretending to believe GOP (Government of Pakistan) false assertions.40 The dissent cable from Dacca 
gained signatures in support from both the Consulate and the State Department and was quickly 
leaked.41 More than a week later, Secretary of State Bill Rogers personally responded to the cable, 
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assuring Blood that US policy had been restrained in order to ensure the continued cooperation of 
the Pakistan government in bringing a peaceful end to the crisis.42 Rogers also emphasised the fact 
that the US was heavily supporting UN humanitarian initiatives. At this point the State Department 
was working toward the same policy outcome as the White House. It would later become clear, 
though, that it was based on a very different premise. 
Sargeant’s reporting caused a similar, albeit lower scale, problem for the FCO. In early April an 
exchange between Sutherland and a fellow South Asian Department staff member, P.F. Walker, 
reveal a scepticism toward Sargeant’s reporting. They agreed that Sargeant had been unfair to 
President Yahya in describing his approach to talks in March as “desultory” and “lethargic” and felt 
that although the outlook was far from positive, the Deputy High Commissioner’s assumption that a 
future bloodbath would occur was misplaced.43 This discussion built on the concerns of the UK’s 
High Commissioner in Islamabad, Sir Cyril Pickard who in a conversation with US Ambassador Joseph 
Farland revealed that the UK government was “terribly concerned about the emotional and rumour-
laden reporting which had emanated from his Dacca Deputy High Commissioner”.44 Blood and 
Sargeant were both removed from their posts in June 1971 for very similar reasons. Blood at the 
behest of the White House that had been angered by the leaked “Blood Telegram” and Sargeant for 
his perceived lack of care in reporting from Dacca.45 Their dismissals allowed both bureaucracies to 
focus upon maintaining the unity of Pakistan without the distraction of evocative reports of the 
violence from East Pakistan. 
The State Department and FCO faced similar internal conflicts between March and June 1971. British 
and American missions in Dacca were as aligned in their condemnation of the West Pakistan regime 
as their parent bureaucracies were determined not to intervene. Internal debates on policy mirrored 
one another; both departments felt that their representatives in Dacca were “going native” and 
were overly motivated by a sentimental attachment to East Pakistan. An often overlooked aspect of 
British and American policy in the aftermath of March 25th is the degree to which both foreign 
services were committed to a non-interventionist stance as a means to maintain influence with 
Yahya and the unity of Pakistan. Rather, the focus for analysis has been upon the policy of the Nixon-
Kissinger White House as it supported Yahya Khan as part of a higher geopolitical aim; that of the 
“opening to China”. 
                                                                 
42
 USNA CF 1970-1973 Box 2530 Pol 23-9 Pak State to Dacca 6/4/71. 
43
 UKNA FCO 37/889 Walker to Sutherland 9/6/71. 
44
 USNA CF 1970-1973 RG 59 Pol 23-9 Pak Islamabad to State 16/4/71. 
45
 Blood Cruel Birth p233. 
 80 
 
3. Nixon, Kissinger and China 
In a 1967 article for Foreign Affairs Richard Nixon explained his thinking on US foreign policy toward 
Communist China. Whilst he recognised Peking as the main threat to stability in South East Asia, and 
emphasised that the US must not rush into recognition of the communists, confer upon them a seat 
at the UN, nor make trade deals (three moves he made as president), he argued that the US could 
not “afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations”. 46 Nixon argued that a nuclear-
armed China, outside of non-proliferation treaties could be free to distribute such weapons freely 
among communist insurgent groups around the world.47 Only once the Chinese leadership realised 
that its imperialist aims could not be achieved would Peking begin to alter its outlook. In Nixon’s 
view, this required a binding together of American allies in South-East Asia to prevent Chinese 
expansion. An emphasis on America’s Asian allies taking a greater role in the defence of the region 
became the rationale behind the Nixon Doctrine. 
Nixon’s ideas in the late 1960s sat well with his future National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. A 
speech written by Kissinger for Republican Presidential Primary Candidate Nelson Rockefeller in May 
1968 described how a “subtle triangle” could be created between the US, China and th e Soviet 
Union within which the US could improve its relationship with both communist powers. 48 A gradual 
but deliberate rapprochement with China would not only help produce a rival for the Soviet Union’s 
control of global communism and force Moscow into adopting positions more favourable to the US, 
but also help toward a smoother American withdrawal from Vietnam. 49 Stronger relations with 
Peking could bring about a linkage between the withdrawal of US military forces from Taiwan and 
Chinese cooperation in Indo-China.50 Improved relations with Peking and Moscow could also bring 
pressure to bear on the government in Hanoi to bring the war to an end. 51 
The beginning of Nixon’s first term was an ideal time for the United States to improve its relationship 
with China. In 1969 the Sino-Soviet relationship reached its nadir when the two engaged in a brief 
armed conflict over the Ussuri River in the far eastern reaches of the border between the two states. 
Relations between the communist powers had been deteriorating for over a decade and the border 
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had been a matter of dispute since the late 1950s. In the wake of Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia, the Chinese felt that the Brehznev Doctrine of interventionism in order to uphold 
Soviet-defined socialism could eventually be applied to them.52 In response, the Chinese began to 
demonstrate support for Romania and Yugoslavia, and to ensure that their protests were to be taken 
seriously, they launched an attack on the Soviet Union along the disputed border. 53 Various clashes 
occurred throughout the summer of 1969 before talks between Soviet foreign minister Alexei 
Kosygin and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai led to a cooling of the conflict in October. 54 The upshot for 
Nixon and Kissinger was that China now viewed the Soviet Union as a threat on at least the same 
level as the US, and this made them more amenable to a rapprochement.55 
Domestic opinion was also conducive to an improvement in Sino-US relations in 1969/70. 
Domestically, the once-powerful Congressional “China Lobby” that had acted on behalf of the 
Nationalists on Taiwan since the Communists took control of the mainland was declared by the New 
York Times to be “moribund” in April 1970.56 American public opinion was also beginning to turn in 
favour of supporting Peking’s admission to the UN.57 The US public mood mirrored a shifting of 
opinion within the UN itself toward Peking’s membership. US officials realised that the “important 
Question” requiring a two-thirds majority vote to seat Peking at the expense of the nationalists was 
quickly running out of support.58 The US could be left in an awkward position if it found itself in 
opposition to a UN majority vote to seat the communists.  
Not only was the timing good for the development of diplomatic ties with China, Nixon was ideall y 
suited to the task. His pragmatic policy toward China was more palatable, especially among 
American conservatives, as a result of his staunch anti-communist credentials. Nixon made his name 
in leading the campaign to bring Alger Hiss, a US government off icial accused of being a Soviet spy, 
to trial in 1950. He was also one of the chorus of politicians that accused President Truman of having 
“lost” China; and as Vice President he had supported President Eisenhower’s decision to ward off 
Communist aggression over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.59  Nixon not only brought to the 
                                                                 
52
 Garthoff, R (1994) Detente and Confrontation the Brookings Institution: Washington DC p200. 
53
 Garthoff Détente and Confrontation p200. Hanhimäki, JM (2004) The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and 
American Foreign Policy Oxford University Press: London p40. 
54
 Garthoff Détente and Confrontation p211. 
55
 Garthoff p200. Hahnhimaki Flawed Architect p56. 
56
 Kaufman Confronting Communism p214 
57
 Kaufman p214 
58
 Kaufman p226 
59
 Kaufman p211 
 82 
Presidency his credentials, but also his unique way of operating. In 1969 he immediately set out to 
achieve an “Opening to China”. 
Nixon and Kissinger’s distrust of the Washington bureaucracy heavily influenced the manner in 
which the “Opening to China” was conducted. Nixon had a deep-seated dislike for the State 
Department. Kissinger recalls how Nixon believed that officials from State had held disdain for him 
during his time as Vice President and was upset that contact had not been maintained during his 
time out of office in the 1960s.60 The appointment of his friend Bill Rogers, a man with no previous 
experience in foreign policy, as Secretary of State was a move designed to protect the President 
from interference from the bureaucracy.61 In order to prevent any bureaucratic dissent, the decision 
was made to conduct diplomatic approaches toward China in complete secrecy. Although the State 
Department was aware of the gist of US foreign policy toward eventually improving relations with 
Peking, it was unaware of the specific diplomatic manoeuvres that took place to bring about Nixon’s 
visit to China in 1972.62 The White House did not trust the State Department to guard against leaks 
that could derail the process of rapprochement. Nixon and Kissinger believed any public debate 
would severely hamper and slow their attempts to reach out to China within the confines of Nixon’s 
first term. 
The White House strategy toward China in 1969 and 1970 has been described by Nixon’s former 
speechwriter, Bill Safire, as akin to “applying the opposite of water torture, a bit-by-bit relaxation of 
economic restrictions, little flatteries and probes through the Pakistanis and Romanians”. 63 The first 
move made in 1969 was to very slightly relax the long-held trade and travel embargo on China, by 
allowing US citizens to travel to the Chinese mainland and to allow the shipment of grain to China by 
American companies.64 This was followed up by Nixon’s discussions of Sino-US relations with the two 
countries. During his world tour of 1969 he asked both Pakistani President Yahya Khan and 
Romanian President Nicolae Cauceșecu to convey a message to the Chinese to the effect that the US 
believed that Asia could not “move forward” unless China was brought out of its international 
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isolation.65 Both channels for communication remained in use throughout 1970, but by April 1971 
Pakistan’s lack of ties to the Soviet Union made it the preferable interlocutor. 66 
Throughout the period 1969-1971 Yahya Khan was provided with a significant incentive to cooperate 
with American requests vis-à-vis China. Yahya wanted the US to lift the arms embargo imposed on 
both India and Pakistan following the conflict over Kashmir in 1965. Pakistan had been 
disproportionately weakened by the US embargo, as India obtained a significant proportion of its 
military supplies from the Soviet Union and also had a domestic arms manufacturing industry that 
was superior to that of Pakistan. By 1969, Pakistan had fallen far behind its neighbour in an arms 
race on the subcontinent. Talk of a new US arms deal was first mooted when Nixon visited Yahya in 
August 1969. The Pakistani President pressed for the US to provide replacements for previously 
ordered arms and/or to authorise the sale of 100 Turkish owned, and US supplied tanks to 
Pakistan.67 At this early stage, Nixon provided no guarantees on arms sales, but gave assurances that 
he would continue to foster friendship between Pakistan and the US. 68 
After many months of silence on the matter from the White House, in May 1970 Nixon and Kissinger 
were cajoled on the matter by Pakistan Ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly. In a meeting with 
the State Department’s Head of Near East Asian affairs (a department whose remit also i ncluded 
South Asia), Joe Sisco, Hilaly brought up the fact that Nixon had promised in the August 1969 
meeting that a decision on arms to Pakistan would made within a few months. 69 Grateful for 
Pakistani cooperation over China, Nixon authorised a “one time exception” to the arms embargo in 
the summer of 1970. Among the deal were twenty aircraft and 300 armoured personnel carriers that 
amounted to around $50 million.70 On providing the deal to the Pakistanis, Kissinger was keen to 
emphasise the fact that the “one time exception” was made as a personal favour from Nixon to 
Yahya. Whilst relaying the decision to the Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Kissinger said that the 
decision had been made “on the basis of his *Nixon+ personal intervention and personal interest 
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based on the President’s desire to help Pakistan”.71 Nixon’s personal relationship continued as a 
feature of US policy throughout 1971. 
Whilst the US and China continued to make public signs of reconciliation in the form of an invite to 
the American table tennis team to play on the Chinese mainland in April 1971, Yahya continued to 
play a key role. Messages from the Chinese in December indicated that Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai 
would be willing to meet with an American emissary. Kissinger has argued that , by May, the 
Pakistani channel had become indispensable in fleshing out Kissinger’s secret meeting with Zhou 
which was set for July 9th.72 Yahya was a willing collaborator in Kissinger’s plan to reach China 
without public detection.73 The plan was for Kissinger to slip off into China after a visit to New Delhi 
and then Islamabad. Whilst in Pakistan, Kissinger feigned a stomach ache, which then prompted 
Yahya to invite the National Security Advisor to the Presidential rest house in the Nathiagali hills 
outside of Islamabad. Kissinger’s “recovery” period provided a cover story for his trip to Peking. 74 
Kissinger has described how Yahya “personally reviewed each detail of my clandestine departure; he 
put the full facilities of his government at our disposal and lent me his trusted personal pilot”.75 
Nixon and Kissinger repaid Yahya’s favour throughout 1971.  
Kissinger’s talks with Zhou were focused upon Taiwan and Vietnam. The National Security Advisor 
succeeded in gaining agreement in principle to withdraw American forces from Taiwan in return for 
Chinese support for American withdrawal from Vietnam.76 Kissinger was keen to demonstrate 
America’s worth as an ally to the Chinese throughout 1971, so much so that Seymour Hersh has 
alleged that the National Security Advisor went as far as to share highly sensitive intelligence and 
high resolution photographs of Soviet military positions.77 Kissinger’s account omits any sharing of 
classified information but rather focuses on the headline achievement of  the talks; an agreement 
with the Chinese for Nixon to visit Peking in early 1972.78 Nixon announced his impending visit to 
communist China in a televised announcement on July 15th, and he revealed to great surprise that 
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Kissinger had already secretly visited China in an attempt to normalise relations between the two 
countries.79  
The crisis in East Pakistan provided an unwanted headache for the White House. Although there is a 
great deal of debate over the necessity of Yahya’s involvement in the China initiative after the 
crackdown on March 25th, as US-Chinese communication was still occurring via Romania, he was by 
far the White House’s preferred option.80 Nixon and Kissinger believed that in order to secure the 
“opening to China” they needed to support their mutual ally in his desire to keep Pakistan united. In 
March, Kissinger had persuaded State Department officials that the US should not counsel Yahya 
against military action, and should adopt a policy of “massive inaction” toward the ongoing crisis. 81 
Nixon and Kissinger’s unwillingness to condemn Yahya’s brutality reflected their desire to continue 
to protect the China link and demonstrate to Peking the US’ reliability as an ally. 82 In a memorandum 
from Kissinger outlining policy options toward Pakistan on April 28th, Nixon chose to adopt a policy 
designed to help Yahya end the war as quickly as possible. This entailed the continuation of 
economic and food aid, as well as the continued supply of non-lethal military spares and equipment, 
to make sure Yahya did not think that the US was cutting him off. At the bottom of the 
memorandum, Nixon added a handwritten note instructing “To all hands, Don’t squeeze Yahya at 
this time”.83   
Amid increasing pressure from American missions in Dacca and New Delhi and mounting  press 
accusations of moral insensitivity toward the evident slaughter on the subcontinent, the Nixon 
Administration refused to condemn Yahya’s government.84 In letters to the Pakistani President on 
May 7th and May 28th, Nixon failed to criticise Yahya for the use of military force on his own 
population. Instead he opted to mildly encourage Yahya to continue on the path toward a political 
solution and to encourage the return of the vast numbers of refugees that had fled East Pakistan 
into India.85 Whilst in Pakistan, Kissinger reminded Yahya that the refugee flow could give India the 
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pretext for a war they were confident of winning.86 As the crisis moved into the second half of 1971, 
the Nixon Administration concentrated upon humanitarian support and a return home for the 
refugees as a diversion from its tacit support of the military regime. 
The White House suffered embarrassment in June as the New York Times reported that a freight ship 
bound for Pakistan had been loaded with US arms. The revelation prompted Chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat Frank Church to write to the President claiming the 
shipment was a “violation” of the current US policy to ban all supply of arms to Pakistan whilst the 
current crisis continues.87 Church was referring to a decision made by the State Department in early 
April in response to evidence that US arms were being used against the Bengalis, to impose a 
temporary “hold” on US supplied military equipment to Pakistan.88 The impression of a full embargo 
was then given in a statement made by a State Department spokesman on April 9th in which 
reporters were assured that, in terms of military equipment “there is nothing in the pipeline” and 
that no arms had been shipped under the “one time exception”. 89 However, required White House 
approval had not been given to such a move. As Nixon told Church, “*T+he Administration…has not 
imposed a formal *arms+ embargo that would prevent shipment to Pakistan of military items”. 90 The 
amount of arms delivered was small and issued under commercial licences to commercial vendors in 
Pakistan before the State Department’s decision in early April. Nonetheless , US arms supplies to 
Pakistan continued into October 1971. The incident heightened US domestic criticism of the Nixon 
administration and publicly exposed the disconnect between the White House and the State 
Department prior to the China announcement on July 15th. Only then did officials at State realise the 
true extent to which they had been cut out of the foreign policymaking process.  
 
4. State kept in the dark 
Having no knowledge of the initiative designed to “open” China, State Department officials believed 
the “one time exception” to Pakistan to be a strange policy. In February 1970, Acting Secretary of 
State Elliot Richardson wrote a memorandum for the President that explicitly stated the case against 
the supply of arms to Pakistan. He wrote that the State Department was “more convinced than ever” 
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that the US should retain an arms embargo to South Asia.91 He reasoned that relations with both 
India and Pakistan were good at present and that the supply of arms to Pakistan would jeopardise 
this for a negligible gain in influence. Furthermore, he asserted that arms supply to Pakistan would 
have a net negative effect on US interests in South Asia. Such a move would damage the relationship 
with India, a country that was relatively more important to US interests than Pakistan. 92 
Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Joe Sisco was particularly concerned that the 
breaking of the 1965 arms embargo in favour of Pakistan would cause lasting damage to Indo-US 
relations. Prior to the announcement, US Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating added to growing 
State Department discontent in expressing concern that the supply of arms to Pakistan would  renew 
the South Asian arms race and prompt India to call for a similar lifting of restrictions in their favour. 93 
In February 1971, Keating ramped up his opposition to the “one time exception” when he branded it 
a “terrible mistake” that only increased the  risk that US arms would once again be used in a South 
Asian conflict, as they had been in 1965.94  
Despite deep reservations throughout the organisation, the State Department defended the decision 
to grant a one-time exception amid vociferous Indian protests. At a November meeting in New Delhi 
with Indian Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, Keating and Assistand Undersecretary for Near East Asian 
Affairs, Christopher Van Hollen, in an attempt to mollify Indian protests, explained that Indian 
sensitivities had been taken into account in the US Government’s decision to supply arms to 
Pakistan.95 Van Hollen explained that the decision had been made so that the US could increase its 
levels of influence with the Pakistani government. He assured Kaul that the amount of eq uipment 
supplied under the exception was too insignificant to have an effect on the military balance of power 
on the sub-continent and emphasised that this exception was strictly “one time only” in nature 
(State officials were unaware that Kissinger had in fact left the door open to future exceptions).  96  In 
response, Kaul mirrored Keating’s concern from two months earlier that US arms supply policy could 
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spark conflict, citing the fact that since the American announcement, levels of anti -Indian 
propaganda in Pakistan had increased significantly. In October, a US State Department Desk officer 
confidentially told a UK Embassy official that the “one-time exception” was bound to put the State 
Department in “an India-Pakistan crossfire”.97 The prediction turned out to be an accurate 
assessment of the State Department’s position in late 1970.  
Indian protests had died down by early 1971, but the State Department remained in an awkward 
position. Many bureaucrats disagreed with major aspects of their own government’s policy on South 
Asia, and they were completely unaware of the White House’s true rationale. One diplomat that did 
not oppose White House policy toward Pakistan was US Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland. In 
communications over arms policies, he had supported Nixon’s decision to make an exception to the 
arms embargo, relaying his view that the US should not be “overly impressed” with Indian protests 
and disagreed with Keating’s assertion that US supply to Pakistan could spark an arms race. 98 
However, until June 1971, he too was unaware of Nixon and Kissinger’s true motives. He was only 
told of the plans for Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking when he was summoned to meet Nixon in 
California and sworn to secrecy.99 In July, Farland played a crucial role in ensuring Kissinger’s 
stomach ache ruse was not uncovered by making sure US Embassy doctors were predisposed at the 
required time. 
The desired outcome of the crisis for the State Department during during the first half of 1971 did 
not differ significantly from that of the White House inasmuch as the continuation of Pakistan as a 
unified state was the desired outcome. However, until July, the bureaucracy was hampered by its 
lack of knowledge of the extent of close relations between Yahya and the White House. Its support 
for the Pakistan government was based upon considerations for South Asian stability. In a 
memorandum for Rogers in January, Joe Sisco explained that any position other than support for the 
unity of Pakistan could undermine and upset the government in the Western wing, and in any case, 
politicians in the Eastern wing could act as a moderating force in relations with India. 100 Also, an 
independent and weak East Pakistan could be ripe for Chinese infiltration and result in further 
instability.101 
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Prior to the military crackdown, the State Department was unaware of the influence US opinion 
evidently had upon Pakistan’s President. Throughout early 1971 the US mission on the ground had 
to allay high-level Pakistani fears that the US was working to split rather than preserve Pakistan. 
Farland had to twice remind Yahya in January and February that the US did in fact support the 
continued unity of Pakistan.102 Well into March, it was State’s assumption that Yahya was distrustful 
of American intentions, which seems unlikely given the favours that the White House had conferred 
on him in return for acting as an interlocutor with the Chinese. The result was a perception within 
the State Department that any US intervention with Yahya was ineffective and that other powers 
were better placed to persuade the President against using military action. 103   
Doubt about the extent of US influence played out in the form of reaching out to the UK to intervene 
with Yahya. On the eve of Mujib’s Dacca racecourse speech on March 7th, there was much concern 
that a potential Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) would precede an immediate military 
intervention by the Pakistani military. In a meeting with a UK Embassy official in Washington, Van 
Hollen reached out to the British in an attempt to prevent Yahya from taking repressive action that 
would seriously jeopardise the unity of Pakistan. He put it to the Embassy that the UK was better 
placed than the US to persuade Yahya not to act militarily in the event of a UDI. 104 Van Hollen 
believed that any approach by the US government would fuel fears in West Pakistan that the US 
government supported the secession of East Pakistan. The British responded negatively to the 
proposal. UK Ambassador to Pakistan Sir Cyril Pickard believed that such an intervention would be 
“quite fruitless and extremely dangerous to our interests” in much the same manner that the State 
Department imagined a US initiative could be.105 The White House wanted to avoid bloodshed too, 
although the situation in Pakistan had yet to fully catch Nixon and Kissinger’s attention in March. The 
difference between the White House and the State Department was the rationale: State policy had a 
humanitarian element in wanting to prevent unnecessary bloodshed that would make the sp litting 
of Pakistan inevitable. The White House was most concerned with supporting the Pakistan 
government, and Yahya personally, as a means to prove their worth as an ally and protect the link to 
China.   
The White House’s secret policy also hampered the manner in which State Department machinery 
functioned and exacerbated disagreements within the bureaucracy. Following the crackdown by the 
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West Pakistani military government on the Bengali nationalist movement on March 25th, the 
American consulate in Dacca and the US Embassy in New Delhi began voicing dissent against what 
they saw as a US foreign policy that was supporting the widespread murder of civilians in East 
Pakistan, (discussed further in Section four below). US diplomats on the ground were protesting 
against a policy, the full rationale for which, they did not understand. Meantime their superiors at 
the State Department defended the policy of non-interference based on a different set of 
calculations to the White House. In retrospect, an official at the Consulate in Dacca believes that, 
had they known of the China initiative, the dissent cables would likely still have been sent, although 
“the decibel level would have been down a notch or two”.106 It seems certain that US diplomats at 
the State Department and on the ground would have been less focused on rancorous infighting and 
more on the situation at hand had the White House’s secretive foreign policymaking not been the 
order of the day. 
From April through to July, the State Department continued to be constrained by a major White 
House initiative of which they had no knowledge. An April 16th State Department report to the 
Kissinger-chaired Senior Review Group, a committee of the National Security Council, neatly 
demonstrated the differences in White House and State Department policy premises. The report’s 
major contention was that the US government should begin to reconsider its position in support of a 
united Pakistan.107 The State Department reasoned that the vicious use of military force had killed 
the notion of a united Pakistan in Bengal and that the fighting was not likely to end in the short term. 
Therefore support for two viable states could be an option as it was the likely eventuality. The 
report, along with others presented to the executive branch between March and July, was 
disregarded by the Executive branch. The State Department’s assessments, unbeknown to them, 
were ignorant of the wider context.108  
The inability of the executive branch to reveal its true motives led to what Van Hollen has since 
described as “little coherent policy direction” being given to the bureaucracy.109 The Assistant 
Undersecretary for Near East Asian Affairs cited embarrassment over revelations that US arms were 
being shipped to Pakistan in June 1971 as a case in point. In April  the State Department, which had 
long been opposed to arms supply to Pakistan and the “one time exception”, gave the impression to 
reporters that the US had imposed a temporary moratorium on the small amount of military spare 
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parts bound for Pakistan.110 In reality, the White House had never formally responded to a State 
Department request for such an action, and the ban on arms supply had never been imposed. 
Therefore, when The New York Times broke the story that US arms were being loaded on a Pakistani 
ship headed for Islamabad, Nixon was forced by leader of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
relations, Frank Church, to publicly explain the confusion.111 
The arms embargo was put to the White House as an “interim decision” that required Executive 
approval. The fact that no response was received led to embarrassment when arms shipments to 
Pakistan were reported by The New York Times in June.112 Van Hollen alleges that, as a result of a 
lack of presidential leadership and the dismissing of State Department opinions, White House 
guidance on policy for State was vague and unhelpful.  
Before July 15th, State was pursuing a policy for which it did not understand the true rationale and 
about which serious reservations were held throughout the organisation. The Department had been 
ignored, neglected and had inter-departmental relationships unnecessarily strained. Being cut out of 
the loop to such an extent severely harmed its credibility in the latter half of 1971.  
 
5. The UK kept in the dark 
Like the Nixon administration, the Heath government was looking to improve its relationship with 
Communist China in late 1970 and early 1971. The Chirep issue, that of Peking’s seating at the UN, 
had been a minor bone of contention within UK-US relations since the UK formally recognised the 
Communist government in 1950. By the autumn of 1970 the British foresaw that majority opinion at 
the UN, influenced by the stance of many new African members, would soon favour the seating of 
Peking at the expense of Taiwan.113 For the British government, this meant that it could look to drop 
support for the “Important Question” a motion that ensured that a two thirds majority vote would 
be needed to seat the communists. A long held agreement between the UK and US over Chirep had 
been that the UK would support the “Important Question” resolution as long as there was no overall 
majority in favour of Peking: the agreement was about to expire. British negotiations with China had 
stalled in mid-1970 as a result of the UK’s stance on Chirep: by the end of the year Heath and 
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Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home had decided to make a sustained effort to end the UK’s 
ambivalent attitude toward China.114 
British relations with Peking had steadily improved in the years preceding 1971. Relations had 
soured in the 1960s amid the brutality of the Cultural Revolution, but began to improve in 1967 
when UK officials returned to the Embassy in Beijing having been evacuated years earlier. 115 In 1970, 
Mao made two symbolic gestures of reconciliation. He held a meeting with British charge d’affaires 
John Denson and sent a birthday message to the Queen.116 In November of 1970 discussions shifted 
to an exchange of ambassadors. Peking’s charge in London told the FCO of the Chinese desire to tear 
down their current London Embassy and build a new one “capable of accommodating an 
Ambassador”.117 The theme was built upon by Zhou when he promised Denson in March 1971 that 
the Chinese would rebuild the British Embassy that had been damaged by protestors years earlier.118 
Keen to support a burgeoning trade relationship with China and to ensure favourable conditions for 
the handing back of Hong Kong in 1997, the British pushed forward with their own 
rapprochement.119 In early 1971, the British were expecting the Chinese to formally request they 
drop support for the Important Question as a precondition for an exchange of Ambassadors. In an  
attempt to mollify possible US objections to the dropping of support for the Important Question, the 
UK kept the US government informed of the process at every turn. 120 In February, British 
Washington Embassy Minister John Moberly explained the UK’s position to Kissinger’s Assistant 
National Security Advisor Hal Sonnenfeldt. In a report of the conversation for the NSC, Sonnenfeldt 
explained that the British wanted to take the US position “into account” before committing to a 
policy. Aware that the Chinese request could come at any time, the British were keen to learn when 
the White House may come to a decision on the Important Question: a matter the British were 
aware was currently under review.121 When Sonnenfeldt was unable to provide a timescale, British 
Embassy official Guy Millard pressed the issue, as British ministers would have to make a decision in 
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the very near future and did not want to be found in an isolated position vis -à-vis the US.122 Mutual 
frustration over China began to build. 
In March, reports reached Washington that the British government were soon to make a decision to 
drop support for the Important Question without waiting for the outcome of the White House policy 
review. Such concern prompted US Embassy officials to call upon Foreign Office Minister Anthony 
Royle to remind the UK that any British decision on China made before the White House review 
concluded could be damaging to UK-US relations. Without giving any indication of when a US 
decision would be made, the US Embassy delegation strongly urged the UK to delay any decision on 
Chinese representation at the UN until the White House had made up its mind. 123 Royle responded 
by explaining that although no public announcement would be forthcoming and the UK would 
inform the US before any solid decision was made, a decision could not be put off for any longer 
than “a few weeks”. The White House did not take kindly to the pressing of the issue by the Foreign 
Office. In a memorandum for Kissinger ahead of his meeting with FCO Minister Geoffrey Ripp on, 
Sonnenfeldt suggested that Kissinger “take the opportunity to suggest that we do not like being 
confronted by the British with deadlines on the China representation issue”. 124 Tempers were clearly 
frayed on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The Chirep issue continued along the same vein through high-level meetings between Foreign 
Secretary Home and Secretary of State Rogers. In London at the end of April, Home told Rogers that 
the UK’s position on the Important Question was “wearing terribly thin” and that the government 
would have to change its position in the very near future.125 Unaware of the true thinking of the 
White House, Rogers continued the US government line of urging the British to delay their final 
decision for another month, to which Home agreed.126 In terms of the direction in which US policy 
was headed on Chirep, Rogers told Home that the Americans were heading toward a position that 
would allow for both Peking and Taiwan to sit in the UN. However, the seating of Taiwan was a 
further point of disagreement between the allies, the British feeling that a “Two Chinas” solution 
was unworkable as neither the communists nor the nationalists would agree to such a formula.  
In a June 3rd meeting with Home in Lisbon, Rogers was still unable to clarify the American position 
on Chinese representation at the UN and had no timetable within which a decision would be made. 
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The Secretary of State did, however, drop opposition to the UK making its own decision before the 
completion of the White House policy review.127 Therefore on June 22nd, Royle told the Chinese 
charge that the UK would no longer support the Important Question, would not support any further 
delay in the seating of Peking at the UN, and would oppose any form of “Two Chinas” solution that 
would allow Taiwan to maintain its UN membership.128 The British also assured Peking that as long 
as the Chinese responded positively to a request to exchange ambassadors, the UK would withdraw 
its consulate from Taiwan.129 The British were then caught by surprise when on July 10th the Chinese 
significantly increased their demands for an Ambassador exchange to the point where they required 
an official exchange of notes whereby the UK recognised Taiwan as a province of the People’s 
Republic.130 The official British line on Taiwan was that its sovereignty was undetermined and de 
facto support for the communist position on the matter was a step the government was reluctant to 
take.131 An announcement by President Nixon days later, however, made it difficult for the UK to 
refuse Chinese terms.132 
Nixon’s July 15th revelation that Kissinger had secretly visited Peking and arranged a trip for the 
President to China in 1972 caused understandable consternation in London. The British quickly 
realised that whilst the Americans had been urging the British to delay their decision on making a 
concrete move toward improving relations with China, they had been secretly arranging a move of 
their own.133 Not only had the British been deceived by the White House’s secretive foreign 
policymaking, but it had also harmed their national interest. The price for an exchange of 
ambassadors with China had increased as a direct result of China’s improved position with the US. 134 
White House secrecy had directly impinged upon British foreign policy. Publicly, the UK welcomed 
the US-China rapprochement as it signalled a convergence of British and American opinion over the 
role of China in International politics, but Prime Minister Heath flatly refused to send Nixon a 
message of congratulations.135  
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The British government had been aware of the disconnect between the White House and the State 
Department since at least the autumn of 1970. Then-Ambassador John Freeman sent a letter, seen 
by the Prime Minister, to Permanent Under-Secretary of State Denis Greenhill explaining the White 
House’s tendency to formulate policy without consulting the State Department. 136 Freeman 
described how Nixon interpreted his role as Chief Executive very literally and was too heavily reliant 
upon Kissinger. The letter described how the White House formulated policy alone on important 
matters such as the concurrent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Vietnam, while less important 
matters would be under the purview of the State Department. For the British there was no way to 
definitively draw the line and know upon which matters the State Department was kept fully and 
truthfully informed. 
Knowledge of the White House-State disconnect did not soften the blow of July 15th. In Greenhill’s 
communication with Freeman he described how an invitation from Sonnenfe ldt for the British to 
bypass the bureaucracy on important issues must be declined. 137 The Permanent Undersecretary 
reasoned that such a move would put at risk the FCO’s vital relationship with the State Department. 
Not only was the vast majority of UK-US business conducted between the bureaucracies, but British 
opinions were far better represented when presented to the Executive branch via State. Therefore 
State’s evident lack of effectiveness in presenting its own views to the President had a knock -on 
effect for the presentation and consideration of British views. The State Department’s 
communications with Britain, and every other state, were being deliberately undermined by the 
White House.138 Necessarily, this meant that a lack of trust became endemic within the FCO-State 
relationship. There was now no issue on which the British could confidentially trust the word of a 
State Department so distrusted by the White House that it was not receiving accurate instructions 
with which to conduct policy. A previously cooperative relationship in South Asia was now under 
threat. 
 
Conclusion     
Nixon and Kissinger’s approach toward South Asia in two ways continued the pattern of US foreign 
policy in the region since 1947 and acted contrary to it in another. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities 
in East Pakistan in March 1971, South Asia was considered a low priority within the global Cold War. 
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Although a departure from Johnson’s blanket arms embargo to South Asia, the White House 
decision to grant a “one time exception” fitted within the previous administrations’ preferences for 
strong support from an allied Pakistan over India’s commitment to non-alignment. After the Pakistan 
Army’s crackdown on Bengali nationalists on March 25th, the White House continued an American 
tendency to sacrifice Indian goodwill for gains in the global struggle against the Soviet Union. It can 
be argued however that Nixon and Kissinger in fact took something of a departure from the policy of 
previous administrations inasmuch as they tacitly jeopardised stability on the subcontinent through 
their continued support for Yahya Khan, a President that demonstrated little ability to bring the 
situation to an end. The British leaning toward India on the subcontinent did follow a post -war 
pattern of favouring the larger, more populous and more economically lucrative Commonwealth 
member.139  
The secrecy with which Nixon and Kissinger conducted their policy consequences for operational 
credibility of the State Department. Although the State Department was in line  with the White 
House in wanting to maintain the unity of Pakistan, its priority was South Asian stability, not the 
“opening to China”. The State Department’s lack of information undermined both its standing with 
Yahya’s government and eventually the British FCO. The British government was aware that the 
White House kept many secrets from the State Department, but Nixon’s announcement of 
Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking on July 15th exposed its true ramifications. Not only was the State 
Department excluded from one of the biggest shifts in US post-war foreign policy, it also had the 
effect of undermining policy in South Asia: US requests for the UK to intervene with Yahya 
demonstrated how far the bureaucracy had been misled and the UK misinformed with regard to the 
US’ true standing with the Pakistan government. 
The US insistence upon the UK deferring its decision to drop support for the Important Question and 
Nixon’s 15th July revelation undermined the clear consultation evident between the governments in 
late 1970 and early 1971. At the top level, much of the work put into developing what Heath 
referred to as a “natural friendship” between himself and the President was qu ickly eroded. The 
previously productive Heath-Nixon relationship was quickly filled with British resentment and 
mistrust. Although publicly supportive of a US policy that finally aligned with the British opinion on 
accepting China into mainstream international politics, privately Heath was fuming at the lack of 
consultation.140 This contravention of a crucial norm within the UK-US relationship ensured frosty 
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top-level relations as the crisis in South Asia marched toward a conflict between India and Pakistan 
in the second half of 1971. 
In early 1971, White House secrecy also disrupted the dynamics of the UK-US relationship on the 
ground in Pakistan. Consultation was a key feature of the relationship between the US Consul 
General and the UK Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca. Archer Blood and Frank Sargeant worked 
together in highlighting the plight of the Bengalis and cooperated on the evacuation of British and 
American citizens. Ultimately, the White House’s exacerbation of disagreements within the State 
Department led to Kissinger’s insistence upon the removal of Archer Blood from Dacca, and the 
imposition of a Consul General sympathetic to the White House line. Frank Sargeant was removed 
from his post in Dacca for similar reasons minus the internal turmoil.  141 
As he had with the Shah of Iran, Nixon busily demonstrated his personal style of diplomacy. As he 
gained a personal allegiance with the Shah to protect against Soviet infiltration of the Middle East, 
he developed a “special relationship” with Yahya to cultivate a rapprochement with China. Nixon’s 
commitment to personal diplomacy in pursuit of wider geopolitical aims became a feature of US 
policy in the second half of 1971, even after Yahya had outlived his usefulness as an interlocutor. July 
15th was a turning point for UK-US relations in 1971; a breakdown in consultation and Nixon’s 
continued allegiance to Yahya Khan provided the context for the UK and US to “tilt” in opposite 
directions as the South Asian crisis continued into the summer of 1971.  
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Chapter 4: Tilting in Opposite Directions 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on the theme developed in chapter three regarding the consequences of the 
secretive White House foreign policymaking system for UK-US relations. The chapter consists of six 
sections that assess events on the ground in Pakistan, the international reaction to the crisis and the 
nature of the UK-US relationship into the summer of 1971. Much of the chapter pivots around 
President Richard Nixon’s July 15th announcement that National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had 
visited China to make preparations for a presidential visit to Peking in 1972. This announcement had 
repercussions both for the international context surrounding the crisis in East Pakistan and for th e 
UK-US relationship. 
The opening two sections describes the ongoing situation in South Asia after the Pakistan Army’s 
crackdown in East Pakistan on March 25th 1971. Section One charts Yahya’s unwillingness to stop the 
war through an accommodation with the Awami League inability to slow the number of refugees 
crossing the border from East Pakistan into India. An understanding of the situation is developed in 
order to provide context for later discussion of the UK ’s and US’ respective positions on the return of 
the refugees. Section two introduces the Indian response to the ongoing crisis. After an initially 
cautious reaction to the events of March 25th, India looked to focus international attention upon the 
atrocities that were being committed by the Pakistani regime. Top Indian officials including Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi travelled the world in an attempt to foster international sympathy for the 
plight of the refugees and highlight the burden that the situation had placed upon India. Section 
three considers the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was signed by India and the Soviet 
Union on August 9th 1971.The section provides an analysis of the motivations of the signatories and 
the implications it had for the crisis in South Asia. Different UK and US interpretations of the treaty’s 
significance with regard to the intentions of India and the Soviet Union are important for 
understanding UK-US differences with regard to the crisis. 
The final three sections demonstrate the consequences that White House secrecy had for the UK-US 
relationship in the second half of 1971. Section four charts the White House’s rationale for its 
continued favour for Yahya Khan: a policy that has become known as the “tilt” toward Pakistan. 
Alongside the need to prove the worth of the US as a potential ally to China, the White House 
developed a unique interpretation of Indian and Soviet motives with regard to conflict on the 
subcontinent. The assumptions developed by Kissinger, in particular, shaped US policy toward South 
Asia and ensured the White House continued its support for Yahya. The fifth section analyses the 
differences in opinion between the White House and the State Department after the split between 
 99 
the two was indirectly publicised on July 15th. The section highlights the high level of discord that 
marked relations between the two organisations. In the midst of the South Asian crisis, the section 
assesses the increasing extent to which the bureaucracy was cut out of the foreign policymaking 
process.  
The final section assesses the effect that Nixon’s announcement of the White House’s 
rapprochement with China on July 15th, and the evident White House-State Department discord had 
on UK-US relations. The section assesses the difficulties that the UK government faced 
communicating with the US government. The section also highlights the areas of agreement that the 
British shared with the State Department, but not the White House. Namely, the need for 
international focus to be on Yahya’s responsibility for the creating conditi ons amenable to the return 
of refugees to return from India to East Pakistan, and a shared assessment of Indian and Soviet aims. 
The chapter ends by drawing conclusions as to the difficulties that the White House foreign 
policymaking style contributed to the cooling of the UK-US relationship in the latter half of 1971, 
before an assessment of the impact that the July 15th announcement had upon UK-US relations in 
South Asia.  
 
1. Crisis in Pakistan 
On the evening of March 25th/26th 1971 the Pakistani military expected Operation Searchlight to be a 
surgical strike that would eliminate the Awami League and prevent the military personnel stationed 
in East Pakistan from switching sides.1 The action was designed to create political conditions 
susceptible to the rise of political parties more palatable to West Pakistan political parties, and the 
military establishment.2 The plan was to carry out the mission in such a way that would not provoke 
India, nor bring the conflict close to the Indian border. None of the objectives were fully achieved. 
Many of the Awami League’s senior leadership escaped to India; 20,000 Bengali members of the 
Pakistani armed forces turned on their leaders. And Yahya’s plans to produce a stable government in 
East Pakistan never materialised.3  
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On March 26th Yahya immediately looked to shift the blame for what was already becoming a 
military debacle, onto the shoulders of Mujib and the Awami League.4 This tactic continued into April 
when the Pakistani President claimed that the already evident outflow of refugees from East 
Pakistan was a result of murders that had been committed by Bengali separatists and he 
complimented his West Pakistani forces on the level of restraint they had shown. 5 Yahya also acted 
to ban the Awami League as a political organisation and ordered the complete censorship of the 
press within newly imposed Martial Law regulations. Although Mujib’s obduracy on the Six Points 
had undoubtedly helped bring the crisis to such a bloody head, British officials believed it undeniable 
that it was Yahya’s Operation Searchlight that initiated the widespread violence that engulfed East 
Pakistan for the remainder of 1971.6 
Accused alongside the Awami League by Islamabad of inciting secessionist militarism in East Pakistan 
were the Indian government. Although wanting to avoid a military confrontation with India Yahya 
wanted to demonstrate to the world that the aims that the nefarious aims of Indian imperialism 
were to dismember and destroy Pakistan.7 In May, a government spokesman accused India, along 
with Hindus living in East Bengal of looking to undermine the nation of Pakistan through communal 
agitation dating back to the turn of the century.8 Accompanying the official government statement 
was a paper entitled The Awami League’s Bid for Secession. The report expanded upon the notion 
that, incited by the Hindu minority and with arms smuggled over the border from India, the Awami 
League was planning an armed uprising set for March 26th, a coup that was only prevented by the 
swift actions of West Pakistan’s military.9 British diplomats believed there was validity to claims that 
elements within the Awami League had been stockpiling weapons, but Head of the South Asian 
Department at the FCO, Iain Sutherland believed the Pakistan government’s cl aims to be a post-hoc 
justification for their actions on the 25th/26th March.10  
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By late April, the Pakistani military had regained a measure of control in East Pakistan, particularly in 
Dacca and the major port city of Chittagong.11 In May, Yahya accelerated his plans to hand over 
power to a government amenable to the wishes of leaders in the Western Wing. Awami League 
National Assembly members that had not been disqualified or accused of a crime would be allowed 
to take up their seats as independents, with by-elections to be held for the remainder of the seats.  
On May 26th, Yahya told US Ambassador Farland that, in mid-June, elections would be held in about 
seven percent of East Pakistani constituencies and that the new National Assembly would be 
“presented” with a constitution that had been drawn up by an appointed legal committee. 12 The 
government’s plans not only drew scepticism from the diplomatic community in Pakistan, but also 
from the PPP leader, Zulifukur Ali Bhutto. Bhutto’s ownership of the majority  of National Assembly 
seats in the Western Wing gave him significant leverage over Yahya’s decision-making. On June 28th, 
Bhutto publicly announced his belief that the military government had no intention of handing over 
power to an elected civilian body, and they never did.13 
By mid-1971, Yahya was also forced to address the growing refugee crisis. In May, a conservative 
estimate put the number of refugees crossing the border from East Pakistan into India at 60,000 per 
day.14 By July, over 6 million people had fled and by December the number was around 10 million.15 
The crisis provided the Indian government with fuel to condemn Pakistan on the global stage. Yahya 
offered the first invitation for refugees to return on May 21st. In a public statement he acknowledged 
the fact that innocent people had been forced to flee their homes in East Pakistan, but claimed that 
the numbers had been exaggerated and that India continued to encourage people to leave so that it 
could further exploit the situation.16 He claimed that law and order had been restored in East 
Pakistan and that “Bona Fide” Pakistan citizens were welcome to return. However, his pleas rang 
hollow. As refugees continued to cross the border despite the President’s repeated invitations for 
them to return throughout June.17 UK High Commissioner in Islamabad, Sir Cyril Pickard saw the 
initial May announcement as being largely for domestic consumption in West Pakistan and certainly 
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designed to convince the international community that Pakistan was proactive on the  question of 
refugees.18 
The Pakistan government’s focus upon the return of refugees changed the tone of the international 
debate and forced India to alter its position, but it contributed little toward a solution. In an attempt 
to further soften international attitudes toward his regime, Yahya announced that new elections 
were to take place in East Pakistan whilst the Pakistani military controlled large areas of the province 
in May and June. Although they controlled large areas of the countryside, Bengali guerrillas had yet 
to become a cohesive and effective fighting force. Plans for elections therefore relied on the 
government’s ability to control East Pakistan and its infrastructure. Such control soon became 
impossible amid the Mukti Bahini’s gains during the summer monsoon season as the guerrillas 
systematically targeted the Army’s communication and supply lines. Ultimately, fresh polls could not 
take place.19 The humanitarian crisis caused by the outpouring of refugees despite Yahya’s calls for 
their return continued to cause problems for Pakistan’s government and formed the basis for India’s 
decision to mount an attack in December. 
 
2. India’s response 
Although the response was reserved, the Indian government was largely pleased by the result of 
Pakistan’s general election in 1970.20 The Indian government kept a low profile during the 
constitutional negotiations in early 1971 as overt support could embarrass Mujib, who faced regular 
attacks for his more conciliatory stance toward Pakistan’s neighbour. Also, Ind ia’s own general 
election took precedence - an election in which Indira Gandhi increased her control over India’s 
parliament, the Lok Sabha.21 The Indian government assumed that Yahya, along with Bhutto would 
be reluctant to hand over power and would cheat Mujib with deception and the threat of force.22 
Ultimately though, the Indian government believed that the government in Islamabad had gone too 
far down the path of handing power over to a civilian government for the Martial Law Authorities to 
retain viability.23 They believed a peaceful settlement was in everyone’s interest and they saw 
negotiated settlements as the tradition on the subcontinent, Sisson and Rose quote the reasoning of 
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one Indian leader inasmusch as the British negotiated with Mahatma Gandhi,  so Yahya would 
negotiate with Mujib.24  
The initial Indian reaction to the events of March 25/26 was restrained. The most fervent criticism of 
the Pakistani military from within India came from the press, where unsubstantiated stories 
emerged of three hundred thousand people being killed in the days following the crackdown. Many 
opposition politicians and the media exerted pressure upon Indira Gandhi to act swiftly. 25 In a 
statement to the Lok Sabha on March 31st, Gandhi highlighted the plight of the East Pakistani people 
at the hands of Yahya’s military regime but did not, as many of her critics demanded, pledge to 
directly intervene. She declared that the Pakistan government were supressing the people of East 
Pakistan by “bayonets, machineguns, tanks, artil lery and aircraft” but only went as far as to offer 
“sympathy and support” for those affected.26 Gandhi and her government were keen not to imply 
that the Indian government would provide material support to the Bengalis or recognise the newly 
formed government of Bangladesh-in-exile.27 The Indians continued to believe that, after a brief 
military confrontation, negotiations would begin in earnest. This was the way in which previous 
internal disputes in Pakistan had played out.28  
There were three major reasons for the ambiguous Indian response. Firstly, India was wary of the 
highly factional Bangladesh government-in-exile. The word of Mujib, as given via the Bangladesh 
Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed was disputed by other officials and the Indian government fores aw 
a difficult decision as to who to support should the exile government fracture. 29 Secondly, high-
ranking military personnel regarded the oncoming monsoon season as a barrier to an early military 
intervention. Waiting until later in the year would also al low for snow to fall on the Himalayas which 
would impede any Chinese intervention. Finally, India worried about the international implications 
for any intervention or extension of diplomatic recognition, both among Islamic nations with which 
                                                                 
24
 Sisson and Rose War and Secession p141. 
25 Bass The Blood Telegram p89. USNA RG 59 Box 2530 POL 23-9 PAK New Delhi to State 3/4/71. 
26 “Indian Support for East Pakistan Cause” The Times (London, England), Thursday, Apr 01, 1971; pg. 6; Issue 
58136.  
27
 Sisson and Rose pp142-143; Bass Blood Telegram p89. 
28
 Sisson and Rose p142. 
29
 Raghavan Raghavan, S (2013) 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh  Library of Congress: 
Cambridge, Mass p66. 
 104 
they had close ties, and the scorn of the wider international community that could consider a 
military intervention illegal and a violation of the UN charter.30 
A cable from the US Embassy in New Delhi accurately summed up the strategy of the Indian 
government at the end of March and described two aspects thereof that continued for the 
remainder of 1971. It noted that alongside the strong public condemnation of the Pakistani 
government, the Indian government looked to covertly fund and train the Mukti Bahini. 31 Initially 
this was to be done via the Indian government’s refusal to prevent “private” individuals from 
donating to the Bengalis, but quickly morphed into outright support for the separatists. In the few 
weeks following March 25th, up to 20,000 Bengali members of the Pakistan military joined the Mukti 
Bahini but enjoyed only limited support from the Indian Border Security Force, a branch of the 
Indian armed forces formed in the wake of the 1965 conflict over Kashmir. 32 Once the various 
Bengali guerrilla forces formed a unified command in July, they began to make substantial gains. 
Training inside of India began to bear fruit in August when the Mukti Bahini made a series of 
successful attacks on Pakistani merchant ships and engaged in successful acts of sabotage elsewhere 
that severely disrupted the Pakistani Army’s supply lines.33 Also in July, the British Deputy High 
Commission in Calcutta reported that the Mukti Bahini (then known to many as the Mukti Fauz) had 
become better trained and better equipped, had high morale and were enjoying a great deal of 
cooperation from the civilian population.34 Opinion in London began to shift toward the idea that the 
effectiveness of the Bengali forces would eventually take the fight beyond the capacity of the 
Pakistani army in terms of scale and expenditure.35  The Indian strategy, designed to weaken the 
Pakistani Army ahead of a possible invasion in November, was working. 36 
Indian support for the Bengali guerrillas was well known from the outset in London, Washington and 
throughout the world. A State Department Intelligence brief on April 24th explained that there were 
reliable reports that India was providing small arms, ammunitions and communication equipment 
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and other supplies to Bengali forces.37 In May, Deputy High Commissioner Frank Sargeant reported 
from Dacca that he could be certain that training camps had been set up in India for the training of 
guerrillas and that they were receiving support from the Indian government. 38 The international 
press also widely reported upon Indian support for the Mukti Bahini, which gave the Pakistan 
government cause to accuse India of interfering in its domestic affairs and working for the secession 
of East Pakistan. The urging of restraint upon India with regard to the Mukti Bahini became a theme 
for both UK and US diplomacy as the crisis came to a head in late 1971.   
The US Embassy in New Delhi also described how India looked to mobilise an international 
diplomatic effort designed to focus international attention upon the atrocities being committed by 
the Pakistan army, and the resultant influx of refugees into West Bengal.39 In May, India called upon 
the international community to stop providing economic aid to Yahya’s regime before embarking 
upon a global PR campaign against Pakistan. This was to both avoid international fatigue in a region 
that had already seen two large-scale conflicts since 1947 and to avoid being equated on the 
international stage with a government they had begun the armed conflict within East Pakistan. 
There was a contradiction, however, in the message put out by the Indian government that caused 
them problems in the international realm. Sisson and Rose have pointed out that from the beginning 
of the crisis on March 25th/26th, India was keen to present the situation as a battle between two 
Muslim groups within Pakistan, rather than a conflict between Pakistani Muslims and Indian 
Hindus.40 India’s claim that the forcing of millions of people over the border into India as refugees 
was an act of “indirect aggression” contradicted their argument that the crisis not be considered a 
conflict between India and Pakistan.41  
In May, June and July, Gandhi, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, and other high-ranking Indian 
diplomats toured Asia, the Middle East and Europe gaining nothing more than sympathy and aid 
contributions for the refugees in West Bengal.42 They secured the support of the Israeli government 
but found that Islamic nations naturally favoured the Pakistanis.43 On May 24th, Gandhi called upon 
the “Great Powers” to act in East Pakistan and warned that otherwise India would be forced to do so 
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itself, but failed to receive a positive reaction.44 The Americans were steadfast in supporting Yahya’s 
efforts to end the war, and the Soviet Union continued to provide economic aid to Pakistan. 45 
However, the situation changed after Nixon’s July 15th announcement that the rapprochement 
between the US and China was well under way. In the first week of August, Gandhi was invited to 
Moscow and received a “people’s welcome” upon her arrival.46 On August 9th, India signed a treaty 
of friendship with the Soviet Union that helped shape events over the coming four months and 
shone a light upon the consequences that White House secrecy had upon UK-US relations. 
 
3. The Indo-Soviet Treaty 
In the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Johnson administration left the door open for the 
Soviet Union to negotiate a settlement between the two parties at Tashkent. The issue of Kashmir 
had become a thorn in the side of the USSR, and India and Pakistan’s agreement to re sort to 
exclusively peaceful means to resolve the dispute provided relief. Prior to the mid-1960s, the Soviet 
Union’s policy in South Asia was directed toward preventing the US from forming military alliances in 
South Asia that would strengthen its ring of containment.47 By 1965 however, the focus of policy had 
changed toward the need to contain Chinese influence on the subcontinent. 48 Rather than expend 
blood and treasure fighting each other, the Soviets much preferred a situation whereby peaceful 
relations between India and Pakistan could unite South Asia in opposition to the Chinese threat. 49 
To India’s chagrin, the Soviet Union made a departure from their traditional leaning toward India in 
favour of a more even-handed policy post-Tashkent, and Soviet arms supply to Pakistan in the late 
1960s proved extremely worrisome for New Delhi.50 However, by 1969, the Soviet attitude had 
altered. Key to the restoration of a preference for India was the need for Indian support for Soviet 
leader Leonid Brezhnev’s “Asian Collective Security System”.51 Indian acquiescence was crucial to the 
success of the proposal, and the Soviets were willing to suspend their military aid to Pakistan if India 
signed up.52 It was proposed that Indian support for the Soviet plan would take the form of a treaty 
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of friendship between the two nations, and a draft was drawn up in March 1969. 53 The draft 
encountered trouble when Indira Gandhi was wary of overtly supporting the Collective Security 
System, as it could compromise India’s commitment to non-alignment. The second draft of the 
treaty completed in May 1970 reflected a compromise whereby Indian support for the Soviet 
proposal remained ambiguous while the Soviet Union “suspended” arms supplies to Pakistan. 54 
Eventually, concerns over the vulnerability of her minority government to anti-Soviet attacks 
combined with accusations of abandoning the policy of non-alignment led Gandhi to leave the treaty 
on the table.55  
The initial Soviet reaction to the events of March 25/26 was, although condemnatory o f the 
Pakistani military, open to continued cooperation with Islamabad. On April 2nd, Soviet President 
Nicolai Podgorny wrote a letter to Yahya in which he expressed the Soviet people’s concern at the 
numerous casualties in East Pakistan, as well as disapproval at the arrest and imprisonment of 
Mujib.56 However, the letter maintained that there was true friendship between the two countries 
and implied that healthy relations were possible in future should Yahya “correctly interpret the 
motives” by which the Soviets were guided in making such an appeal.57 At the time, the State 
Department saw the strength in Podgorny’s message as a clear indication that the Soviets were 
responding to Indian pressure, but subsequent research suggests an alternative explanation. 58 Indian 
pressure on the Soviets only came after they had seen encouragement for a more aggressive Indian 
position in Podgorny’s letter, and even then their representations fell on deaf ears. Gary Bass has 
explained that the Indian Ambassador to Moscow, D.P . Dhar and Indira Gandhi’s most senior 
advisor, P.N. Haksar were bitterly disappointed when their hopes that Soviet support may extend to 
war with Pakistan were dampened by calls for restraint from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. 59 
The Soviet attitude toward the crisis remained somewhat ambivalent into mid-1971. Although 
seeming to sympathise more with India than Pakistan, the Soviet Union refrained from explicit 
endorsement of Indian policies and continued economic aid to Pakistan. 60  In the first week of July 
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Moscow Radio announced that Soviet policy continued to be guided by the “Tashkent spirit” of 
cooperation in South Asia.61 Robert Jackson has argued that, in the four months following the 
commencement of Operation Searchlight the Soviet Union were still attempting to appear even-
handed in their pursuit of stability on the subcontinent post-Tashkent; this changed on July 15th 
when Nixon made his China announcement. 
There is debate over the motives for the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty just over three weeks later 
on August 9th. Jackson and others have argued that Nixon’s announcement of his secret China 
initiative brought home the danger to the Soviet Union of a US-China-Pakistan axis in South Asia. 
This, indeed, was Gandhi’s public reasoning.62 Both India and the Soviet Union were wary of growing 
Chinese power and the possible increase in Peking’s influence in Islamabad that could result from 
rapprochement with the US. Therefore the Indo-Soviet treaty represented a trade whereby India 
gained a measure of insurance against a Chinese retaliation in exchange for increased Soviet 
influence in New Delhi. Sisson and Rose have argued that, for the Indians, the treaty was signed in 
haste to reassure both the Indian bureaucracy and the wider public that attempts to gain 
international support for India’s position on East Pakistan had not come to naught. 63 Their research 
suggests that the Indians were confident that China would not intervene on Pakistan’s behalf and 
that the idea of a military allegiance between Washington and Peking at such an early stage in talks 
was fanciful.64 There is agreement among scholars, however, that the timing of the Indo-Soviet 
treaty was a reaction both to India’s realisation that war with Pakistan was increasingly inevitable 
and the Soviet Union’s need to make a significant international statement in response to July 15th.65 
The only amendment to the earlier 1970 draft of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, and the most 
controversial, was Article IX. The clause bound the two countries to not aid any third party attack on 
the other and to immediately consult with one another should they be subject to a third party 
attack. The subtext or lack thereof sparked international disagreement for the remainder of the 
year. 
“Article IX: Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance 
to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of 
either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall 
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immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take 
appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries”.  
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, 9 August 1971.66 
Naturally, such a close association with one of the superpowers called into question India’s 
credentials as the de facto leader of the non-aligned movement. Gandhi’s government justified its 
actions by emphasising the fact that the treaty fell short of a mutual defence pact and claimed that it 
would happily sign such treaties with other nations, including the United States. 67 The treaty also 
explicitly stated Soviet respect for Indian non-alignment.68 What the Indians gained from the treaty 
was a measure of security against an attack from China and a greater measure of Soviet support for 
their policy positions. Meanwhile the Soviets improved their standing in New Delhi, and gained a 
stronger foothold from which to stabilise the situation on the subcontinent. 69 
Despite the signing of the treaty, the Soviet position in favour of stability and, if possible, the 
continued unity of Pakistan did not change until late September/early October. 70 In fact, in the days 
leading to the signing of the treaty, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was insistent upon the Soviet 
line that a political solution was the only manner in which the situation should come to a head. 
When Ambassador Dhar conveyed a message from Gandhi in which the prime minister solicited 
Soviet support and cooperation should a war be “forced upon India”, the Soviet premier refused to 
commit to such an undertaking.71 In the following days Kosygin refused to entertain requests for 
assistance in the event of a hypothetical war that the Indians promised they would do everything to 
avoid. In fact, he counselled restraint in the starkest of terms, telling Dhar that “you *India+ should be 
more careful…otherwise you will face many difficulties and many dangers”. 72 Gromyko believed that 
India’s military strength relative to Pakistan, together with the Indo-Soviet treaty, would be enough 
to prevent Islamabad from launching an attack on India.73 Although the Soviet Union had leant 
toward India and against China and the US in response to July 15th, it had continued to remain 
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somewhat aloof from the crisis in East Pakistan and was plain with New Delhi in expressing its desire 
for India to avoid war.  
Although clear in their position that India show restraint, the Soviet Union did begin to side with 
India’s stated international position. On July 19th UN Secretary General U Thant followed up an aide 
memoire for the Security Council with a letter to the President of the Security Council a day later. In 
it, Thant placed the events squarely within the context of continued “unresolved differences 
between India and Pakistan…which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago” and suggested that 
UN personnel be stationed on both sides of the border to facilitate the safe repatriation of 
refugees.74 In this case, the Soviet Union leant their support to the Indian objection to being equated 
with Pakistan and opposed any UN Security Council proposal unacceptable to India. 75 Meanwhile, 
Soviet relations with Pakistan remained ambivalent. In April, Podgorny’s letter had led to what Yahya 
himself described as an “inevitable deterioration in relations” between Pakistan and the USSR.76 
However, the Soviets continued to send economic aid to East Pakistan and discussions continued on 
the subject of an overland transit route between the two countries through Afghanistan. 77 The 
Soviets were unwilling to completely close off relations with Pakistan, and were looking to position 
themselves for positive relations with an independent East Pakistan. 78 
During the first Indo-Soviet consultations held under the provisions of the treaty in late September 
1971, much to Indian dismay, the Soviet position had not changed despite the continued influx of 
refugees over the border into India. In Moscow on September 27th, Gandhi requested both military 
aid and that the Soviets publicly push for a political solution in Pakistan that would begin with the 
release of Mujib from prison in Karachi.79 The Soviet leadership agreed only to consider these 
options whilst continuing to urge restraint.80 Only upon Indian insistence did the resultant 
communique contain a passage that explained how the Soviet side “took into account” Gandhi’s 
statement that the Indian government reserved the right to take any necessary action to prevent the 
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flow of refugees into India from East Bengal.81 In terms of the Soviet position, the communique 
simply read that the government stood by the position set out in Podgorny’s letter of April 2nd.82 
Soviet support for India increased in the following weeks. State -controlled press outlets steadily 
became more critical of the Pakistani government and the Indians were able to secure much-desired 
military aid. As tension between India and Pakistan intensified, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Nikolay Firyubin arrived in New Delhi for talks on October 22nd specifically under the provisions of 
Article IX of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty.83 These talks came after a discussion between 
Podgorny and Yahya in which the Soviet President had come away believing that Yahya was 
unwilling to work toward a reasonable solution. Yahya managed to convince  Podgorny of his 
obduracy through insisting that he would never negotiate with “that traitor *Mujib+”; it is here that 
Srinath Raghavan argues that the Soviet government decided to lend their full support to the 
Indians.84 Firyubin’s visit marked a convergence of Indo-Soviet views on the situation in East 
Pakistan.85 To reinforce the shifting of the Soviet position, a senior Soviet Air Marshall was sent to 
New Delhi to negotiate the defence supplies requested by India, which led Indian Foreign Minister 
Swaran Singh to confidently tell a parliamentary consultative committee that they could now rely on 
“total support” from the Soviet Union.86  
Although still looking to counsel restraint and maintain stability in South Asia, the Soviet Union had 
taken the decision that a “tilt” in favour of India was the most sound policy course. Moscow was far 
from sure that an Indian invasion of East Pakistan would be in its interest. For instance, the resultant 
Indian domination of the subcontinent would render them less depende nt upon Soviet support.87 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union decided to support Indian calls for Yahya to negotiate with Mujib, 
shore up the Indian position at the UN with the use of its Security Council veto, and continued to 
supply arms up to and during the December war. If the Indians were set on invading East Pakistan, 
the Soviets decided they would rather maintain favourable relations with the likely victorious party 
than sour its ties with the future South Asian hegemon.88 
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4. The Tilt 
In his memoir, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made a brief attempt to dampen criticism 
that Nixon’s July 15th speech altered the course of events on the subcontinent. He claims that en-
route to India on June 28th 1971, he was made aware of reports that the Soviet Union had both leant 
its approval to Indian support for the Bengali guerrillas and had promised India protection against 
Chinese reprisals should it decide to invade East Pakistan.89 Subsequent research has not supported 
the reports, of which Kissinger does not reveal the source. During his visit to India, which was 
scheduled solely as cover for his eventual trip to Peking, Kissinger assured New Delhi that the US 
would take a dim view of any “unprovoked” Chinese attack. Kissinger, however, acknowledges that it 
was only after the July 15th announcement that the Indians realised both why Kissinger had 
mentioned such an eventuality, as well as the meaning of “unprovoked”. 90   
Though July 15th altered the geopolitical context, Indo-US relations had already suffered as a result 
of the US’ continued support for Yahya in the first half of  1971 and subsequent revelation that $3.8 
million worth of munitions had left the US bound for Pakistan between March and September 
1971.91 These factors combined with the Indian government’s  continued denial of its evident 
support for the Mukti Bahini to produce a frosty relationship. On the first day of Kissinger’s visit, 
whilst maintaining the untruth that the Indian government had not given any arms to the Mukti 
Bahini, Gandhi’s most senior advisor P.N. Haksar berated Nixon’s National Security Advisor for the 
US government’s continued supply of arms to Pakistan, no matter how small the quantities. 92 
Kissinger was also lambasted at the hands of Indian Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, who explai ned 
the enormous pressure he was under to act against Pakistan and accused the US of being “almost 
entirely” responsible for Pakistan’s continued ability to wage war in East Pakistan. 93 
From as early as June 28th, Kissinger held the opinion that the Soviet Union had given a de facto 
green light to attack Pakistan. On his trip to South Asia, prior to his secret excursion to Peking, he 
received what he referred to as “disturbing information” (Kissinger does not disclose the source) to 
the effect that the Soviet Union had abandoned its policy of restraint toward India and had promised 
New Delhi protection against Chinese reprisals should they invade East Pakistan. 94 These opinions 
were then reinforced after the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, something he described as a 
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“bombshell”.95 In his memoir, Kissinger focuses on Article IX and argues that the term “appropriate 
effective measures” rendered the treaty a significant strategic move that signalled the malign 
intentions of both signatories.96 For India, he believed that the treaty conveyed Soviet support for an 
attack on East Pakistan and allayed their fears of Soviet disapproval that could lead to an end to 
military aid.97 For the Soviets, Kissinger provides a two-pronged reasoning for their actions. Firstly, in 
Pakistan, they could humiliate a mutual ally of both China and the US and demonstrate two rivals’ 
lack of reliability as an ally; Secondly, the Soviets thrust a dilemma upon the Chinese: to intervene in 
East Pakistan could provoke a Soviet response, whilst not doing so would make them appear 
ineffective on the world stage.98 Kissinger believed that the treaty represented a green light 
provided by the Soviets for India to attack Pakistan.99 
Kissinger’s interpretation of Soviet intentions were unique inasmuch as they were not shared 
entirely, even by one of his closest advisors. In a July 7th memorandum for President Nixon, General 
Alexander Haig explained the Soviet Union may have concluded that, in a crisis such as that in East 
Pakistan, they would have to adopt a position in opposition to Islamabad. However, the Deputy 
National Security Advisor went on to explain that although the Soviet Union may provide some form 
of guarantee to India, which eventually came in the form of the Indo-Soviet treaty, “It would be a 
major and radical break in Soviet policy to issue the Indians a blank check”. 100 The notion that the 
Soviet Union both desired and actively encouraged India to attack Pakistan is possibly the largest 
weakness within the White House’s policy rationale in 1971.  
There is a great deal of controversy over the true significance of the Indo-Soviet treaty from an 
American standpoint. Almost all scholars and commentators agree that it was far from a 
“bombshell” and most disagree with Kissinger’s interpretation.  Raymond Garthoff points to the fact 
that prior to the signing of the treaty, Kissinger had clarified the comments he made during his trip 
to India when he told Indian Ambassador in Washington, L.K. Jha, that the US would not help India if 
China attacked them after an invasion of East Pakistan.101 From the State Department, Christopher 
Van Hollen has claimed that Nixon’s July 15th announcement was considered a true “bombshell”, not 
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the Indo-Soviet treaty. In terms of substance, Garthoff argues that the treaty did not represent the 
unequivocal Soviet support for an invasion that Kissinger infers. 102 Similarly, Seymour Hersh 
endorses the State Department view, to be discussed in section four below, that the treaty did not 
contain specific clauses pledging mutual defence and emphasised India’s non-aligned status.103 
Henry Kissinger is an extremely polarising figure within the study of 1970s foreign policy, and his 
detractors can be as vociferous in their criticism as Kissinger is in defence of his policies. There 
seems little doubt that the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed in response to July 15th and was not as 
shocking as Kissinger claims. However, there was more substance to the treaty than Garthoff and 
Hersh, among others give credit. Although far from the green light for invasion that Kissinger claims, 
it did signal the beginning of an alteration in Soviet policy and gave India further courage in its 
convictions for the remainder of 1971. 
Nixon and Kissinger have been further criticised for the basis of their decisions  on South Asia. As 
Jussi Hahnhimaki has pointed out, the White House decided its policy with the use of four key 
assumptions that were reinforced by the Indo-Soviet treaty; First that India was bent upon using East 
Pakistan as a pretext to destroy West Pakistan; Second, that the Soviets were encouraging Indian 
aggression; Third, the Chinese were ready to attack Pakistan; and finally the Soviets would be willing 
to follow the Chinese into Pakistan and risk sparking a global conflict. 104 Nixon and Kissinger’s 
decisions from August 9th until the end of the Indo-Pakistan conflict on December 18th 1971, were 
guided by these principles. White House critics believe Kissinger was misguided by the “underlying 
fallacy” that the Indians were acting as a Soviet proxy and subsequently misapplied his realpolitik.105  
With these assumptions in mind, and whilst looking to avoid a conflict between India and Pakistan 
Nixon and Kissinger continued to see the protection of the link to China as their utmost priority.106 In 
meetings with State Department officials in the weeks following July 15th, Nixon was keen to let the 
bureaucracy know that he did not want the events in South Asia to become capable of jeopardising 
the link to China.107 It is clear from Kissinger’s memoir that in July and August 1971, the White House 
perceived its flagship foreign policy achievement to be in need of fierce protection. Therefore Nixon 
and Kissinger were willing to ward off any semblance of a threat to its development. 108 It is in this 
                                                                 
102
 Garthoff, p266. 
103
 Hersh (1983) The Price of Power: Nixon in the Kissinger White House Summit Books: New York p452. 
104
 Hahnhimaki Flawed Architect p165. 
105
 Garthoff Détente and Confrontation p267; Hahnhimaki p165; Hersh The Price of Power p451. 
106
 Kissinger White House Years p864. 
107
 Kissinger p864. 
108
 Kissinger pp864-865; Kissinger pp766-767.  
 115 
context that the White House was keen not to upset Peking through taking a harsher line with Yahya 
Khan. Critics point to the fact that during Kissinger’s July meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou En -Lai, 
the two men agreed to the setting up of a direct line of communication via the American Embassy in 
Paris, a move that reduced Yahya’s value as an interlocutor to practically nil.109 However, although 
Islamabad was no longer required in order to communicate with Peking, Nixon and Kissinger fe lt that 
being seen to abandon a friend when politically convenient would have undermined the US’ 
credibility as a reliable ally. 
More convincingly, critics of White House policy highlight the notion that Nixon and Kissinger 
misread the intentions and interests of the Chinese government. The initial Chinese response to the 
crisis was comforting for the Pakistan government albeit somewhat reserved. On April 12th, Chinese 
premier Zhou En-Lai wrote a letter to Pakistani President Yahya Khan that supported the continued 
unity of Pakistan, emphasised the point that the crisis was an internal matter for Pakistan and 
chastised the Indian government for its “gross interference” in the affairs of Pakistan. 110 However, 
for the Pakistan government the Chinese pledge of “firm” support did not go far enough in 
guaranteeing a direct Chinese involvement in the event of an Indian offensive in East Pakistan. Also, 
according to Sisson and Rose’s sources there was a crucial sentence that was deleted from 
subsequent Pakistani, and Indian publications of the letter. The statement that “the question of East 
Pakistan should be settled according to the wishes of the people of East Pakistan” (emphasis in 
original) was removed as it would naturally imply support for a kind of political settlement not 
desired by the Pakistan government.111  
Chinese support for Pakistan and a commitment to come to its aid in the event of an Indian attack 
waned over the course of 1971. In August and September 1971 the government in Peking was in 
turmoil as a result of the Lin Biao affair, an alleged coup d’état aimed at unseating Leader Mao 
Zedong that ended with Vice-Premier Biao’s death under suspicious circumstances in a plane crash 
on September 16th. Three days later, Zhou En-Lai claimed he had no time to meet with the Pakistan 
Ambassador to discuss the crisis in East Pakistan. Clearly the Asian subcontinent was not a priority 
for the Chinese at this time.112 Instead, Zhou sent vice foreign minister Han Nien-Lung who told the 
Ambassador in no uncertain terms that China did not wish to aggravate evident tension on the 
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subcontinent.113 By November, the Chinese actively encouraged the Pakistan government to come 
to a political solution. Upon the return of the Bhutto-led Pakistani delegation to China which had 
been sent to solicit stronger support from the Chinese, the US Embassy in Islamabad reported that 
the message from Peking had an “eye-opening” effect on the West Pakistani military leadership. A 
senior Pakistan official told Ambassador Farland that the Chinese advised Islamabad to work toward 
a political settlement, and suggested that they not take any offensive action against India and should 
not call for a UN Security Council meeting to discuss the dispute.114 Kissinger himself visited China for 
a second time in October 1971 where he found Zhou En-Lai reluctant to discuss South Asia.115 
Kissinger’s own impression of the Chinese position was that they “seemed more sober” than they 
had in July regarding the possibility of conflict. The only comment Zhou made was to reaffirm 
Chinese support for Pakistan and disdain for India.116 The White House’s unique interpretation of the 
Chinese position is crucial in understanding its disagreements with the State Department, and 
subsequently the British government. 
As a result of its various policy assumptions and aims, as well as pressure from Congress and the 
media, White House policy focused upon the refugee issue in East Pakistan. Such a focus, it was 
believed, would help dampen criticism of the US government’s lack of humanity and remove the 
probable (and eventual) Indian pretext for an invasion.117 Kissinger’s opinion, similar to that of Soviet 
President Nikolai Podgorny, was that Yahya did not have the requisite qualities to solve the crisis 
alone. For the US, the refugee issue was an area where they could provide solid assistance.118 In a 
July 16th meeting of the National Security Council Kissinger explained his opinion that India was 
intent upon beginning a war, whilst on the other hand the Pakistani Army was not up to the task of 
maintaining control of East Bengal in the long term.119 Therefore the aim of the US government must 
be to prevent an Indian attack and help along a smooth path to East Pakistani independence through 
a reversal in the flow of refugees.120 
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Following July 15th, the White House set about proposing specific measures aimed at relieving and 
reversing the flow of refugees into India, with little success. The Pakistan government were, for 
Kissinger, surprisingly receptive to American proposals to station UN supervisors in the border 
regions to ensure safe passage for refugees and for the appointment of a civilian administrator to 
oversee the process. Naturally, the Indian government opposed any international legislation that 
implied they be treated as an equal of Pakistan with regard to the crisis. Kissinger saw the entire 
situation as a Catch-22: In order for there to be conditions for peace in East Pakistan, the Pakistan 
Army had to return to its barracks and the refugees had to return home. However, the Pakistanis 
would be unwilling to back down unless India stopped aiding and abetting the Mukti Bahini. In short, 
refugees would be unable to return as long as the Indian government remained uncooperative. 121 
The White House also used the promise of, and threats to cut off, aid in an attempt to prevent an 
armed conflict. In late July for the relief for the refugees, the US provided $90 million directly to 
India and another $150 million to international groups working along the India-East Pakistan border. 
The White House then threatened to cut off aid to India and eventually did so during the December 
war (see Chapter 5).122 Aid was also an issue with Pakistan, with the White House coming under 
increasing public and congressional pressure to cut off all aid to Yahya’s government as media 
coverage focused upon East Pakistan in the summer of 1971. The Pakistani president eventually 
acquiesced to the White House’s reluctant decision to do so in November, just in time for Indira 
Gandhi’s visit to Washington.123 
 
5. The White House/State split exposed 
Immediately prior to the China announcement, on July 12th 1971 the State Department had 
produced an extensive study of US policy in South Asia, and clearly stated its opinions on the region. 
Still three days from learning of the China initiative, the bureaucracy described an outlook on policy 
at odds with that of Nixon and Kissinger. In summing up the US government’s present strategy, the 
paper described how the US had “no vital security interest” in South Asia and that continued stability 
remained the cornerstone of US policy.124 More importantly, the paper persisted in the long-held 
State Department view that although relations with both India and Pakistan were important to the 
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US, India was of “potentially greater significance” and that the “relative pre -eminence” (quotation 
marks in original) of India should be the guiding principles of US policy going forward. 125  
Up until July, whilst blind to the China initiative, and aside from the notable exception of the 
embargo on arms sales to Pakistan, the State Department enacted a policy of respect for Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity that broadly coincided with the designs of the White House. The 
July 12th paper changed this coincidence of policy direction. Its first suggestion for the future was a 
public statement to be made by either the President or Secretary of State Bill Rogers that would urge 
restraint upon both India and Pakistan.126 Furthermore, the paper argued that in the event that 
hostilities did break out on the subcontinent, US interests would be best served by a swift Indian 
victory without the intervention of any third parties. This eventuality would be followed by a swift 
and peaceful transfer of power. Much to Kissinger’s chagrin, the paper also recommended that if 
China were to intervene, the US should consider providing military assistance to India. 127 The July 
15th announcement made it clear to all involved, if it was not already, that the ex ecutive and the 
bureaucracy had lined up on completely opposite sides of the debate.  
In his memoir, Kissinger lays heavy criticism upon the State Department. He accuses the bureaucracy 
of a “flagrant disregard of unambiguous White House directives” with re gard to South Asia.128 
Kissinger contends that Nixon had repeatedly ordered that the US treat Yahya with understanding 
rather than pressure.129 Despite knowledge of Nixon’s wishes, the State department went ahead 
with private negotiations with Yahya to cut off  the small amounts of US military aid headed for 
Pakistan in the aftermath of the March 25th crackdown.130 Kissinger’s incredulity is somewhat ironic 
given the nature of White House policy toward China, but it highlights the efforts that were being 
made by the State Department to carry out policies that were contrary to the wishes of the 
President.131 The former National Security Advisor admits that what he perceived as State’s lack of 
understanding of the China initiative was a result of the manner in which the White House had 
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conducted its business, but maintained that the bureaucracy should always carry out the will of the 
elected President, irrespective of its own opinion.132 
Deputy Undersecretary for Near Eastern Affairs during the 1971 crisis, Christopher Van Hollen had a 
very different interpretation. He dismisses Kissinger’s suggestion that the disagreements were over a 
number of “trivial issues” which were of too technical a nature to present to Nixon. Rather, it was 
the case that the disagreements were over a fundamental issue. State’s view was that war between 
India and Pakistan could only be avoided if there was a political accommodation in East Pakistan, 
and therefore the US should privately encourage Yahya to accept a settlement that provided 
autonomy for the Bengalis.133 In a sense Van Hollen believed it was the White House that was 
perpetuating its own Catch-22. The goal of the entire US government remained that of preventing 
war on the subcontinent, something that required the return of East Pakistani refugees and the 
ceasing of Indian aid to the Mukti Bahini. In State’s view, such an outcome could only be 
accomplished if Yahya came to an accommodation with the Awami League. 134 However, upon his 
return from South Asia and China in July, Kissinger held the opinion, later to be shared by the Soviet 
Union, that Yahya would only listen to advice on relief assistance and would never negotiate with 
Mujib or the Awami League.135 He therefore shot down any suggestion that the US government 
counsel Yahya in the direction of such an accommodation. Evidence presented in section three 
suggests that Kissinger was correct on this matter. 
Another key point of disagreement between the White House and the bureaucracy was that of the 
intentions of the Soviet Union. As discussed above, Nixon and Kissinger were firm in their belief that 
the Soviet Union were intent on encouraging India to attack and ultimately destroy West as well as 
East Pakistan. The State Department disagreed. Van Hollen cites both Undersecretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco and Director of the CIA Richard Helms’ adherence to the idea that 
there was no evidence to support the notion that a Soviet-backed India was intent upon destroying 
Pakistan. Here, subsequent evidence supports the State Department’s position. Gary Bass has 
recently put forward the argument that Indira Gandhi, in fact took an early decision to go to war 
with Pakistan in April, but was persuaded by her senior Generals to wait until the end of the 
monsoon season to invade. Srinath Raghavan’s analysis disagrees. He claims the story surrounding 
the talking down of Indira Gandhi by the Generals is “perhaps the most tenacious of all myths about 
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the 1971 crisis”.136 Instead Raghavan makes the case that Gandhi knew that India was vulnerable 
should Pakistan mount an attack from the Western wing as well as to a Chinese intervention. He 
thus argues that Gandhi only definitively decided to escalate Indian operations in late November. 137 
On the charge that India had the backing of the Soviets to dismember Pakistan, Kissinger is alone in 
making such a case. 
At Senior Review Group meetings between White House and State officials on July 23rd and July 30th, 
Kissinger describes the differences between the organisations as being as acute as at any po int 
during Nixon’s first term.138 State disagreed with a White House it accused of being totally obsessed 
with a China link that was clouding its judgement of what the State Department saw as a regional 
issue.139 Although it was widely known beforehand that the relationship between the State 
Department and the Nixon White House could be frosty, July 15th made plain the extent of the 
situation and caused embarrassment for the State Department. The summer of 1971 was a point of 
turmoil for the US foreign policymaking system amid a quickly changing geopolitical landscape. The 
infighting had already affected policy in the form of an arms embargo that turned out not to be an 
embargo, and was having an effect on relationships with allies, most notably the United Kingd om. 
6. The UK’s t ilt toward India 
On July 15th, Prime Minister Edward Heath was given just thirty-five minutes warning of President 
Nixon’s historic announcement, which was enough time to put together a statement in support of 
the burgeoning rapprochement.140 In substance, the announcement finally marked a convergence of 
UK and US opinion on China, and was a crucial step toward welcoming Peking into the international 
community and away from the Soviet Union. Andrew Scott has argued that it was not the substance 
of the decision, but the manner in which the American decision was made that caused consternation 
in London, after the UK had kept the US informed at every turn during its concurrent improvement 
in relations with China.141 Kissinger’s trip left both the FCO and Downing Street feeling betrayed and 
used by the White House. In a meeting with US Under-Secretary of State John Irwin on July 20th, 
FCO Minister Geoffrey Rippon let it be known that Whitehall was surprised at the announcement. In 
a minute regarding the meeting, Rippon noted that the FCO’s shock was particularly acute since 
Kissinger had met with Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend at the end of June and not given any 
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indication of an abrupt turn in US policy.142 For his part, Heath duly refused to send Nixon a note of 
congratulations and began to doubt the word of the Americans in other areas of foreign affairs. 143 
On August 11th, Nixon sent a letter to Heath explaining his China policy in broad terms. The 
President argued that the shock of the July 15th announcement should not obscure the fact that the 
ongoing development of relations with Peking was part of an evolution in US policy toward China 
that had taken place over the course of his Administration. Only four days later on August 15th, the 
UK government was again angry at a lack of consultation after they received only a few hours ’ notice 
of what has been referred to as the second “Nixon Shock” of 1971.  144 Long-held British fears of 
American neo-isolationism and protectionism were stoked when Nixon announced a new economic 
policy where the headline measures were an end to dollar convertibility and the imposition of a 10% 
import surcharge.145 Although the measures were not specifically aimed at Britain and had wider 
reaching ramifications for Germany and Japan, Downing Street and the FCO were again outraged at 
the continued lack of consultation.146 
The second “Nixon Shock” reinforced the level to which the State Department had been excluded 
from the policymaking process. The Washington Embassy reported in the Autumn of 1971 that the 
manner in which US foreign policy was formulated was a large part of the problem within what it 
saw as a poor year for UK-US relations. In a letter to Permanent Under-Secretary Denis Greenhill, 
Minister at the Embassy, Jonny Graham explained that the “shocks” that took place over China and 
the new monetary policy were even more harmful in light of the fact that foreign secretary Home’s 
talks with secretary of state Rogers in June had given the British “an expectation of rather more 
consideration”.147 It is clear that the damage caused by the lack of consultation was beginning to 
have a negative affect not only at the very top level, but also within the relationship between the 
FCO and the State Department, where Graham accused State of not treating the UK with the same 
level of confidence over the Middle East as it used to.148 
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The response and strategy of the FCO remained as it had been when former Ambassador John 
Freeman had reported in October 1970 on Nixon and Kissinger’s tendency to draft  foreign policy 
alone.149 Then, Denis Greenhill believed that the FCO should not risk harming its relationship with 
the White House by raising a complaint or, more crucially, jeopardise its relationship with the State 
Department through bypassing the bureaucracy and communicating directly with the White 
House.150In September 1971, Greenhill again did not advocate any action on the British part, and 
acknowledged that the British simply had to accept the “realities of power” and put up with the 
manner in which “Kissinger et al” conducted themselves.151 During an informal meeting, US 
Secretary of State under the Johnson Administration, Dean Rusk told Greenhill that the manner in 
which the Nixon Administration was working with regard to the State Department was worse than 
he could ever remember.152 Although not the only reason for the relative deterioration in UK-US 
relations, the White House’s foreign policymaking system was considered the single most significant 
factor.     
Although there was a good level of understanding within the FCO of the White House-State 
Department disconnect, the scale of the issue still proved perplexing. Upon his visit to the UK on July 
20th 1971, John Irwin, who was acting as a last-minute replacement for Secretary of State Bill Rogers, 
was not briefed to discuss the circumstances under which Nixon came to his decision to visit 
China.153 Furthermore, in discussion with UK Ambassador Lord Cromer in Washington on July 21st, 
Rogers admitted that the US government did not know the effect that the China announcement 
would have upon the Soviet Union.154 FCO Minister Geoffrey Rippon concluded that the conduct of 
US foreign policy is “all very odd” and one that would not aid the strength of the US’ relationships 
with its allies, seen as the UK seemed not to be alone in being kept in the dark.155 That the UK was 
not singled out for deception seemed the only saving grace for a White House decision that had 
provoked fury in London. 
Less than a week after Nixon’s China announcement and immediately following discussions with 
Rogers and Irwin, the FCO experienced at first hand the White House’s lack of candour with its own 
foreign service. At the top of Cromer’s report of his conversation with Kissinger on July 21st 1971, he 
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made it clear that none of the information contained in the cable should be passed back through 
official diplomatic channels as it was very likely that the State Department did not agree with 
Kissinger’s analysis.156 The meeting was a de-brief for the British Ambassador on Kissinger’s visits to 
New Delhi and Islamabad prior to his trip to Peking. Kissinger said that the Indians were under a 
great deal of public pressure and that the government was in danger of talking itself into a war. He 
also said that Yahya Khan was an honourable man although his timescale for a transfer to civilian 
rule looked unrealistic.157. Clearly believing that his comments would not be passed on to the State 
Department, Kissinger openly accused the US Embassy in New Delhi of ‘going native’. He told 
Cromer that the dissenting Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating and his staff were “more Indian 
than the Indians”. Kissinger made it clear to the British that the White House’s focus was upon 
preventing India from beginning a war that they were stoking through the funding and traini ng of 
the Mukti Bahini. He made it plain that the State Department held a different, and opposing view 
that the responsibility for any war would be with the government in Islamabad.  
It was immediately apparent to the UK government that the White House China policy was 
impacting their attitude toward Yahya Khan. Rippon noted on July 20th that the Pakistani 
Government must have been closely involved in preparations for Kissinger’s secret visit in early July. 
In his view, that development went some way toward explaining the White House’s lack of 
willingness to chastise Yahya or to “make any statement over recent weeks that might cause offence 
in Islamabad”.158  In terms of the State Department’s involvement, India Desk Officer Tony Quainton 
confirmed to a British Embassy official that the White House had indeed ceased all communication 
on South Asia with the State Department.159 These developments necessarily complicated 
communication between the two governments with regard to the issue for the remainder of the 
year, especially as the FCO had made a conscious decision not to bypass the State Department.  
Although the second half of 1971 was generally characterised by UK-US dissension over South Asia, 
there was agreement on a few key principles. First and foremost, both countries publicly stated that 
the crisis in East Pakistan was a strictly internal matter and that the continued unity of Pakistan was 
the desired outcome. Secondly, there was agreement that the return of the refugees was the key 
issue and that this had to be addressed in order to prevent a war between India and Pakistan. 
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Thirdly, there was agreement that restraint needed to be counselled upon India in order to prevent 
them from invading East Pakistan. However the UK government, along with the State Department, 
also believed that pressure should be put upon Pakistan to come to a political settlement and create 
conditions amenable to the return of the refugees; the White House, with its focus on the China 
initiative insisted that India make the first move by ceasing support for the Mukti Bahini. In a climate 
of rapidly deteriorating UK-US relations, these factors led to three key areas of policy divergence.  
The first, and most fundamental difference between UK and US policy was where to apply political 
pressure in South Asia. Despite public neutrality and support for a united Pakistan, the British 
government operated a firmer line with Yahya and a more conciliatory line with India. In an April, 
letter to Yahya, Prime Minister Heath assured the President of the UK’s opposition to an Indian 
intervention, but also stated that “there must be an end to the bloodshed and the use of force as 
soon as possible”.160 Heath implied that Yahya should re-engage in talks with Mujib, opining that the 
leaders that gained massive support in the elections must be part of any political settlement. Such 
language was clearly not in line with Nixon’s policy not to “squeeze” the Pakistani President and was, 
in fact reminiscent of the language used by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny in  his letter to Yahya a 
few days earlier. In June, Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home repeated the same sentiments with a 
more urgent tone in a letter to Yahya. Meantime Heath assured Gandhi that the UK government was 
looking to convince Islamabad of the need to come to a peaceful political solution as quickly as 
possible.161  
The second disagreement centred upon the provision of aid to Pakistan. In June the UK insisted that 
no new aid could be provided to Pakistan unless there was measurable progress toward a political 
settlement acceptable to the people of East Pakistan.162 In late July, Home re-emphasised the British 
position amid protests from Pakistan’s High Commissioner in London. The foreign secretary said that 
the British position on aid was consistent with its policy since the beginning of the crisis and that the 
need for a settlement “acceptable to the people of East Pakistan” was merely a fact. 163 The 
Americans did not focus on a political solution as a precursor to the provision of aid. The US simply 
required the situation in East Pakistan to be amenable to the effective use of aid. 164 Although in their 
meeting, Foreign Secretary Home and Undersecretary Irwin agreed that the two positions amounted 
to a similar state of affairs, the aid policies of the two allies marked a key difference between the 
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allies. The UK policy reflected its de facto apportionment of blame upon the Pakistan government in 
its requirement of a specific type of settlement, whereas the American position was deliberately 
vague and set a far lower standard of precondition for Islamabad to meet. 
Finally, there was policy divergence over the interpretation of the Indo-Soviet treaty. A despatch 
from the UK Embassy in New Delhi on August 16th on the implications of the treaty represented the 
FCO’s opinion. Although Indian non-alignment had been compromised to a certain extent and the 
Indians had moved further into the Soviet sphere of influence, they had demonstrated to audiences 
both at home and abroad that they had powerful friends in the international arena.165 Meanwhile 
the Soviets had improved their ability to prevent a conflict on the subcontinent through increased 
influence in New Delhi, whilst they simultaneously left room for a future rapprochement with 
Pakistan and improved their standing with a future government of an independent East Pakistan.166 
Consultations with the Soviet Embassy helped reinforce the British interpretation. The Soviet First 
Secretary in London told a member of the FCO’s Eastern Europe and Soviet Department that the 
Treaty was signed in an attempt to cool the increasingly worrisome situation on the subcontinent. 167 
In sharp contrast to its reception in the White House, in London the Indo-Soviet Treaty was received 
on balance as a positive development. The FCO agreed with the Embassy in New Delhi’s assessment 
that the Treaty decreased the chance of war and that in terms of counselling restraint upon India, 
the Soviet’s interests were aligned with the West. Such an understanding of the international 
context would lead to more serious clashes with the Americans as the crisis escalated in late 1971. 
Although London’s relationship with New Delhi had taken a small hit after the British openly 
insinuated that the Indo-Soviet Treaty rendered India “less” non-aligned than it was prior to August 
9th, UK-Pakistan relations had severely deteriorated by the middle of 1971. On July 29th Heath wrote 
another letter to Yahya, again calling on him to bring about a peaceful solution. This time the Prime 
Minister commented upon being “disturbed by the gap which seems to have been opening between 
our two governments”.168 However, Heath did not back down from the British position and 
maintained that the conditions for continued British aid did not constitute interference in Pakistan’s 
internal affairs, as had been alleged in a note of protest that had been handed to the British 
Ambassador in Islamabad on July 5th.169 The Prime Minister even urged sympathy for the Indian 
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government and cautioned Yahya on underestimating the efforts they had made to control hawks 
within India who were calling for more stringent action and the recognition of Bangladesh. It was 
clear by the end of July that the British government was following the FCO’s advice from earlier in 
the year to recognise the fact that the relationship with India was fundamentally more important 
than the relationship with Pakistan. It was in Britain’s interest to “tilt” in the opposite direction to 
the White House, and in favour of India.170 
That the British policy toward South Asia was in line with the State Department can be 
demonstrated by a report prepared for the Senior Review group on July 29th drafted by Senior Desk 
Officer for India at the State Department, Tony Quainton. Representative of the views of the State 
Department, the paper put forth the case that in order for the primary issue of the return of 
refugees to be solved, the US government needed to put pressure upon Yahya to restrain his military 
repression and that the basic requirement for a peaceful political settlement was an accommodation 
with the people of East Pakistan.171  
Naturally, and as discussed above, State’s recommendations did not fit with Nixon and Kissinger’s 
opinion that the priority in terms of the return of refugees was that India needed to be restrained 
from supporting the Bengali guerrillas. However, State’s approach to the crisis and subsequent 
recommendations aligned with the policy enacted by the British. The UK government and the State 
Department both regarded their respective relationships with India as the most important bilateral 
tie in South Asia. This helped them share the view of the crisis: A repressive Pakistani military regime 
that needed be told, in no uncertain terms, to recall its troops and respect the will of the Bengali 
people. Only then could conditions begin to become suitable for the return of the refugees that 
were pushing India close to the point of war. The only dissenting voices in 1971 on South Asia were 
the most important: Nixon and his small group of White House foreign policymakers.  
 
Conclusion 
In terms of broad UK-US relations, it is clear that Nixon only giving the UK government the shortest 
possible warning prior to his China announcement on July 15th sent UK-US relations on a downward 
trajectory. Top-level relations were then exacerbated when, three days after sending Heath a 
justification for his actions on July 15th, the President made another shock announcement on trade 
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on August 15th. Norms of consultation that had traditionally been so crucial to the strength of the 
UK-US relationship had been contravened. The result for the remainder of 1971 was a feeling of 
deep mistrust of the US Administration in Downing Street and a reconsideration of the UK’s 
relationship with the US (see Chapter 5). The tone of high-level communication became strained and 
infrequent as a result - a state of affairs that contrasted starkly with those in late 1970 and early 
1971. 
July 15th fully exposed the manner in which UK-US relations were being damaged downwards from 
the top. Nixon and Kissinger’s policy to protect the link to China at all costs led to an overt and public 
undermining of the US bureaucracy. Below Heath, the FCO were offended by Kissinger’s duplicity 
during a visit to London in late June and found very odd the fact that Secretary of S tate Rogers 
seemed to have very little idea as to what the international repercussions of Nixon’s announcement 
would be. The British also likely resented being forced to participate in Kissinger’s desire to keep 
information from the State Department as it presented them with a delicate problem.  Having 
always valued its close relationship with the State Department, the FCO continued its refusal to deal 
directly with the White House. The British also feared a further deterioration of relations should they 
mount a, likely ineffectual, protest to the White House at its conduct of foreign policy. This meant 
that communication with the US became very difficult for the FCO. The White House foreign policy -
making system meant the FCO could not be sure that the State Department had been fully briefed 
on any given issue. Whilst at the same time it had to be careful not to provide State with information 
from Kissinger that the White House did not want it to have. Clearly this was not the basis for a 
productive diplomatic relationship. 
Simon Smith has argued that, after a brief period of neutrality, the British government sided with the 
very likely victors in any conflict, namely India.172 Although publicly neutral until later in 1971, the 
British government was never privately neutral in South Asia.  The UK, along with the State 
Department approached the crisis from a point of view that favoured bilateral ties with India in 
preference to those with Pakistan. This viewpoint resulted in a policy that emphasised the need for 
the removal of the pretext for an Indian attack by focusing on the need for Pakistan to create 
conditions amenable to the return of refugees via a settlement with the Awami League. Although 
the FCO faced criticism from its diplomatic mission in Dacca over i ts position supporting Pakistan’s 
claim that the crisis was a domestic issue, the British always saw the need for Yahya to act first if the 
crisis were to end. Meanwhile, the White House was focused upon being seen to be a good potential 
ally to China through support of Yahya. Both governments were fundamentally pursuing their 
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national interest with little deference to one another’s preference. The major difference was that 
the basis for the White House’s policy toward South Asia was unknown to the British,  and the 
international community, until July 15th   
The policy effect of the July 15th announcement upon UK-US relations in South Asia is difficult to 
pinpoint. As the British were previously unaware of the China initiative prior to the announcement, 
it is impossible to know if the UK would have yielded to the US position in support of Yahya, had it 
been consulted. It is certainly possible the UK would have been more supportive of the US, given the 
positive trajectory of the relationship in late 1970 and early 1971. However, what is clear is that the 
UK-US policy divergence dated back, in terms of the East Pakistan crisis, to at least Heath’s April 
1971 letter to Yahya that called for an end to the bloodshed. In more general terms disagreements 
over South Asia between the Heath government and Nixon administration dated back further to the 
“one time exception” to the US arms embargo to Pakistan in the autumn of 1970. Although the 
China announcement caused an atmosphere within which the UK paid less deference to the views of 
the US, in South Asia, the fundamentals of divergent UK and US positions had begun prior to, and 
continued after July 15th.  
The varying national interests of the UK and US led the two to fundamentally different 
interpretations of the international context. The White House saw the conflict exclusively in terms of 
global geopolitics. Nixon and Kissinger’s focus on protecting the rapprochement with China led them 
to misread the intentions of the Soviet Union and see them exclusively as a malignant force pushing 
for the embarrassment of the US and China through the destruction of Pakistan. Whereas, the 
British, and the State Department, saw the crisis in East Pakistan as a regional issue in which all of 
the major global powers saw their interests lying in peace and, if possible, a united Pakistan. Both 
sides saw the Indo-Soviet treaty as confirmation of their perspective on the subcontinent, the White 
House that India and the Soviets had decided upon war and the UK that the Soviets were increasing  
their ability to counsel restraint.  
As tension between India and Pakistan began to build inexorably in late 1971, The British 
government, the State Department and the White House all looked to prevent a war in South Asia. 
However, the opposing perspectives of the UK and the White House, which had cut the State Depart 
out of the decision-making process, led to very different approaches to the prevention of an Indo-
Pakistan war on the subcontinent. Nixon’s “opening to China” had inadvertently set the UK and  US 
on course for rancorous disagreements on South Asia at the UN Security Council in December 1971.  
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Chapter 5: Taking Different Sides 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to map out the divergent interests and breakdown in communication 
that led to rancorous UK-US disagreements over the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. 
Throughout the year, the British government and the White House had aligned on different sides of 
a policy divide over South Asia, but as Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited both capitals in 
late October and early November 1971, the differences came into sharp focus. However, amid a 
desire to improve a relationship that had deteriorated in large part due to the secrecy of the White 
House’s foreign policy-making, both Heath and Nixon attempted to paper over their policy 
differences, even as tensions were rising on the subcontinent in late November. However, once the 
conflict between India and Pakistan escalated and reached the UN Security Council in Decembe r, UK 
and US disagreements could no longer be disguised and manifested themselves in a very public 
manner when the UK refused to support US resolutions that backed Pakistan and called for a 
ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistani territory. 
The first section creates the backdrop for the chapter. By mid-November 1971, the crisis on the 
subcontinent was nearing its climax. Pakistani President Yahya Khan had failed to stem the flow of 
refugees crossing the border from East Pakistan into India. However, despite many accounts’ claim 
that the war between India and Pakistan began on December 3rd, the section explains that the 
“inter-state” war within the 1971 crisis began in mid-November when Indian forces launched an 
attack inside East Pakistan. 1 The brief conflict came to an end on December 17th, when following the 
surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, India declared a unilateral ceasefire on the border with 
West Pakistan, where fighting had also been taking place. This context is necessary to understand 
the actions of the UK and the US amid the crisis. 
Section two takes the temperature of the UK-US relationship in the autumn of 1971. Chapter 4 
discussed in detail the consternation felt in London over President Nixon’s announcement that his 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had secretly visited Peking ahead of a state 
visit by himself early in 1972. By September, the White House had made another surprise 
announcement of a new economic policy, which included a 10% surcharge on imports, which further 
discomforted UK-US relations. The continued lack of willingness on the part of the Nixon 
Administration to consult with the UK before announcing major shifts in foreign policy prompted a 
reconsideration of the UK-US relationship in London. The UK continued its policy of trying to “have 
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its cake and eat it” in terms of strong relations with Europe and the US, but the section 
demonstrates UK-US relations were becoming increasingly strained as 1971 wore on. 
The third and fourth sections analyse, Indira Gandhi’s visits to London and Washington in the 
autumn of 1971. The Indian Prime Minister had very different experiences in meetings with Heath 
and Nixon. As the UK’s South Asian policy was tacitly in favour of many Indian positions, the Heath-
Gandhi meeting took place within an amicable atmosphere. Her meeting with Nixon in the Oval 
Office provided a stark contrast. The two sections analyse the two meetings as well as the 
subsequent impressions of Gandhi that Heath and Nixon shared with one another. The sections 
demonstrate that both the Prime Minister and the President were keen to see the tone of Anglo -
American relations improve in the Autumn of 1971, and that this had consequences for their 
interpretations of each other’s policy with regard to South Asia. 
Sections five and six assess the vastly different responses of the US and UK toward the war between 
India and Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger, concerned with protecting their link to China and working 
on the assumption that India was determined to destroy West Pakistan, authorised the movement 
of a Naval Task Force to the Bay of Bengal. Unsure of the rationale or meaning behind American 
actions, and viewing their interests as being best served through tacit support of the Indian position, 
the British opposed US efforts at the UN calling for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Indian troops that 
was unacceptable to New Delhi. By December 1971, the lustre that the UK-US relationship had 
acquired in late 1970 had worn off amid competing national interests and a White House foreign 
policy-making system that kept its closest ally in the dark.  
 
1. The War on the ground 
By November, tension on the border between India and East Pakistan had reached the point of no 
return. The continued flow of refugees ran at a cost to India of $200m per month, a financial burden 
that far outweighed the potential price of a war with Pakistan.2 The Indian government was also 
keen to end the destabilising effect that the refugees were having in its North-easterly states that 
bordered East Pakistan. Traditional rivalries between Hindu and Bengali communities, particularly in 
the Indian state of West Bengal, had been heightened by the ongoing war between the Pakistan 
army and the Mukti Bahini.3 It was clearly within the Indian national interest to ensure a stable and 
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moderate government in an independent Pakistan: one not likely to cause a further mass influx of 
refugees.4 By late November, the monsoon season was over, which allowed for easier passage into 
East Pakistan whilst snow was beginning to fall on the Himalayas to impede any Chinese retaliation. 
The time was opportune for an Indian attack. 
Many accounts of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war cite December 3rd, when Yahya Khan authorised 
attacks on Indian airfields along the border with West Pakistan, as the starting point for the war. 5 
However a recent study has demonstrated that the inter-state aspect of the 1971 crisis was begun 
by India. Srinath Raghavan’s research indicates that from early October, the regular Indian army had 
been supporting Mukti Bahini attacks along the border with East Pakistan, and by the second week 
in October had carried out operations up to ten miles inside of East Pakistan. 6 Indian offensives 
ramped up on November 12th when the Army made inroads into Jessore, an eastern district of East 
Pakistan which shared a border with West Bengal. The offensive provoked heavy retaliation, 
including air strikes, from the Pakistan army.7 By November 21st, the Indian forces had specific 
instructions to remain inside the East Pakistan border.8 
Despite Indira Gandhi’s speech to India’s parliament, the Lok Sabha, on November 24th in which she 
denied Pakistani claims that India was waging an “undeclared war”, reports on the ground provided 
evidence to the contrary.9 In a report on November 23rd, Times [London] correspondent, Peter 
Hazlehurst reported that Indian soldiers disguised as Mukti Bahini guerrillas attacked and 
subsequently occupied an area in north-west Jessore.10 Such incursions were part of the Indian 
strategy in late November and early December to induce an attack from Pakistan that could shift the 
blame for starting the inter-state war onto their adversary. On December 3rd, Yahya’s decision to 
pre-emptively attack Indian airfields along the border with West Pakistan provided the perfect 
opportunity. Architect of the Indo-Soviet treaty and close confident of Indira Gandhi, D.P. Dhar 
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remarked upon hearing the news that “the fool has done exactly what one had expected”.11 Gandhi 
herself is reported to have said privately “Thank God, they’ve attacked us”. 12 
The Pakistani attack in the West was designed to relieve pressure on forces in East Pakistan and to 
coax the international community into some kind of intervention. 13 In reality, the move only 
succeeded in playing into Indian hands: it allowed forces in the East to accelerate their plans to 
invade East Pakistan en-masse and allowed Indira Gandhi to claim to be the victim of direct external 
aggression.14 The Pakistani airstrike accelerated the timeframe within which Pakistan’s 300,000 
soldiers could be overrun and quickly defeated by India’s force of 1.1 million armed personnel. 15 
The ensuing war was fought on two fronts, one for control of East Pakistan and another, smal ler 
scale conflict along the border between India and West Pakistan. In the East, the Indian military’s 
advantage was overwhelming in terms of manpower, arms and reliable lines of supply. 16 By contrast, 
the Pakistani forces who had their communication and supply lines cut by the Mukti Bahini, were 
battle weary, and exhausted by their 8 month battle with the guerrillas. 17 However, Srinath 
Raghavan has challenged the conventional argument that these factors made an Indian victory in 
East Pakistan “inevitable”.18 Rather than the presumed Indian objective of an “all -out offensive” with 
the aim of capturing Dacca, Raghavan has argued that Indian objectives were less audacious. 19 The 
Indians wanted to ensure that a moderate government in Dacca was able to both prevent the flow 
of refugees across the border and provide a safe environment so that those that had fled could 
return.20  
The capture of Dacca resulted from unexpectedly rapid gains by the Indians and incompetence on 
the part of the Pakistani leadership. On December 10th, East Pakistan’s governor, Dr Abdul Malik, 
handed a note to a senior UN official in Dacca, Paul Marc Henri. Although not a formal surrender, 
the note invited the elected representatives of East Pakistan to form a government in Dacca, called 
for an immediate ceasefire and asked for the safe passage of all West Pakistani personnel with a 
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guarantee of no reprisals.21 Although Yahya had seemingly authorised his military command in Dacca 
to do all that was necessary to prevent the destruction of both civ ilians and the Pakistan armed 
forces, he quickly distanced himself from the note and accused Malik of overstepping his brief. 22 
However, Yahya could not prevent the note from being circulated through official UN channels, and 
India became quickly aware of its existence. The evident dissension within the Pakistani government 
indicated that the defences of Dacca were weaker than the Indians had previously believed, and 
efforts to take East Pakistan’s capital were speeded up.23 On December 16th, Commander of 
Pakistan’s army in East Pakistan, Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, signed an instrument of surrender 
before his opposite number, Lieutenant Jasjit Singh Aurora.  
On the western front, the two combatants were more evenly matched. 24 Unlike in East Pakistan, 
where India easily gained air superiority, West Pakistan challenged the Indian Air Force for control of 
the skies.25 On the ground, conflict on the Western border was fierce and hotly contested. Gary Bass 
describes how fighting in the Chamb sector of Kashmir was the worst of the war, a battle which the 
Pakistanis won after former governor of East Pakistan, Tikka Khan ordered a large scale attack on 
Indian lines after days of heavy artillery bombardment.26 However, for all the ferociousness of the 
fighting by the Pakistani military, the Indian government was still able to achieve its aims on the 
battlefront. Although largely a defensive war, Indira Gandhi insisted that there be two offensive 
objectives; to re-occupy small sections of Kashmir ceded back to Pakistan under Soviet pressure 
following the 1965 war, and to launch a major movement into Sindh to rupture communication lines 
and provide a deterrent against further Pakistani offensives into Indian-controlled Kashmir.27 Both 
moves were successful and India maintained control of the areas of Kashmir to form a new “line of 
control” from 1972 onwards.28 
Following Niazi’s surrender in the East, India brought the brief Indo -Pakistan conflict of 1971 to a 
close by declaring a unilateral ceasefire on the Western front on December 17th. Having had no 
desire to enter West Pakistan as an invading force or to be seen as an occupying power, the Indians 
quickly put an end to a struggle on the western border that would have expended a great deal of 
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blood and treasure on both sides.29 Yahya quickly accepted the ceasefire, to the chagrin of both the 
military establishment and to protestors in the streets of major West Pakistani cities. 30 He also 
tended his resignation as President and transferred power to PPP leader Zulfikur Ali Bhutto, to begin 
a new era for Pakistani politics. 
 
2. The UK-US relationship, Autumn 1971 
From the moment President Nixon announced on July 15th 1971 that he would visit Peking early in 
1972, without prior consultation with the British government, UK-US relations embarked upon on a 
downward spiral that would not be arrested until the end of the year. By the autumn of 1971, the 
British government had once more been slighted by a second “Nixon Shock” on August 15 th. Again 
announced without consultation or prior warning, Nixon proclaimed that the White House would be 
imposing a new trade policy that included a 10% surcharge on imports. After hearing the news, 
British prime minister Edward Heath was enraged and is reported to have said “I knew they killed 
the wrong man in Dallas” in reference to John Connally, Nixon’s treasury secretary who had been 
sitting next to Kennedy when he was assassinated in 1963.31 Connally had attracted particular ire in 
London as the architect of Nixon’s financial policy.32 
The continued lack of consultation, or even advanced notice of major alterations in US foreign policy 
led the British government to seriously consider the future of the UK-US relationship in October and 
November 1971. A major and ongoing concern was the manner in which the British should explain to 
the Americans their concern for Europe and to Europe their concern for the relationship with the US. 
Although the paramount issue at the time, the UK’s impending EEC membership was seen as only 
one, and not the most significant, cause of difficult Atlantic relations.33 In a letter to Permanent 
Under Secretary at the FCO, Denis Greenhill, UK Ambassador to the US, Lord Cromer, blamed the 
cooling of relations between Europe and the US on the new economic policy. 34 A paper produced by 
the North American Department at the FCO a week later on November 9th agreed with Cromer’s 
analysis that “US introversion” as a result of domestic economic problems caused the “Connally 
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approach” to manifest itself in the August 15th announcement.35 The paper also argued the fact that 
the US’s recent acknowledgement of parity with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear weapons 
during the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks had led to an increasing tendency for the superpowers to 
deal with each other on a bilateral basis.36 Other reasons for the fluctuation included the 
rapprochement with China, a perceived weakening of US determination to defend Western Europe 
and the rising economic strength of Japan as a threat to the US in the global marketplace.37 
The FCO paper advised that although it was inevitable that there would be problems within the 
European-US and UK-US relationships in the medium term, these problems should be kept in 
perspective. The US, UK and mainland Europe still shared a great deal of common interests and the 
US defence commitment remained vital to the protection of Western Europe. 38 The FCO believed 
that the UK should adopt a policy towards Europe and the US that looked to maintain as much 
influence in Washington as possible, whilst making clear that negotiations for entry into the EC must 
take precedence for the time being.39 In substance, these ideas did not deviate from the Heath 
government’s original plan upon winning the election in June 1970. What had changed was the 
atmosphere within which the policy was to be carried out. July 15th and August 15th had 
demonstrated that the US government no longer saw the need to consult with the UK as a fellow 
global power.40  
Trade issues were clearly the most pressing in November 1971, but they were  not the only area of 
disagreement. Although the China issue had been overshadowed somewhat by monetary issues and 
despite the burgeoning rapprochement with Peking, the White House continued to look for a 
solution that would allow for the representation of both the Nationalists and the Communists at the 
UN.41 The UK continued to be opposed to a “two Chinas” solution on the basis that neither party 
would agree to its implementation. The UK was also opposed to the US suggestion to make the 
depriving of Taiwan’s seat an “Important Question”, which meant that two thirds of the UN General 
Assembly must vote in favour in order for the motion to pass.42 The US took a different, and more 
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relaxed, approach on this occasion. Instead of insisting on UK-US unity, as they had done previously, 
the US opted instead to “chip away” at the British position.43 
Amid the evident UK-US discord, in early November, Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home was glad 
of the opportunity for Ambassador Cromer to have a full and frank discussion with Kissinger and 
instructed the Ambassador to calm American nerves over British consternation at recent White 
House announcements. Home was most anxious that Cromer make clear that a lack of consultation 
on the part of the Americans had created a great deal of difficulty for the UK government.44 The 
Foreign Secretary told Cromer that the British could only conclude that the manner in which US 
foreign policy decisions were made had changed, and it left American allies wondering what surprise 
was to come next, which had led to confidence in American policy abroad having been shaken. 
Cromer was asked to point out that in presenting the new economic policy the Americans had 
accused others of protectionism, only to bring out protectionist measures itself. The me ssage was 
prefaced with an assurance that the UK did not see the UK-US relationship as being strained, but 
Home’s tone and the letter’s content suggested otherwise.45 
During the November 12th meeting, Kissinger explained that it was difficult for the White House to 
relay information about the China strategy because the State Department had been formulating 
policy on opposing assumptions to the executive (see chapter 4). 46 Kissinger told Cromer that the 
tone, terseness and tardiness of Heath’s letter responding to the China announcement had not gone 
unnoticed in the White House. In response, the British Ambassador said that Heath’s response was 
“not altogether surprising” given the circumstances whereby the announcement was made without 
prior warning and had jeopardised Britain’s intention to exchange Ambassadors with Peking. 47 
Kissinger claimed to have had little to do with the announcement of August 15th and suggested that 
the Prime Minister and President meet to discuss things further in Bermuda at the end of December. 
In his report to the FCO, Cromer complained that the hour long meeting had been interrupted five 
times by President Nixon with various queries. The White House’s marginalisation of the State 
Department was in plain view for the Ambassador to see. Cromer described how, upon Nixon’s 
interruptions requesting Kissinger’s advice, information was relayed to him before a State 
Department official was summoned to transmit messages directly to Secretary of State Bill Rogers. 
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However, above all, both parties were glad to clear the air and the meeting took place within a 
friendly atmosphere. To close, the National Security Advisor said that he could still have talks with 
Cromer that he could not have with his European counterparts. 48 Kissinger’s warmness helped 
convince the Ambassador that Kissinger wanted to repair recent damage to the UK-US relationship 
and provided a boon to the UK policy of maintaining a friendly relations with both EC members and 
the US.  
The manner in which he had observed US foreign poli cy being made had clearly concerned the 
British Ambassador and the meeting on 12th November likely confirmed his worst suspicions. The 
same day as the meeting, Cromer wrote a despatch for London entitled “The Making of American 
Foreign Policy”.49 In the report Cromer noted that not enough was known about Kissinger’s 
relationship with the President, and that people in the Administration have the impression that the 
White House does not deal with foreign policy problems whilst Kissinger is away. 50 The Ambassador 
reported that many observers in Washington, both inside and outside of government thought the 
Nixonian foreign policymaking system to be a “mess”. The despatch ended with Cromer asking the 
FCO to bear with the Washington Embassy if, given the unpredictable nature of the current 
Administration, they hedged their bets when reporting on what could be a troublesome twelve 
months for UK-US relations.51 
Consultation remained the major issue for the British, and an objective for the upcoming Bermuda 
summit at the end of December was to secure more of it from the Americans. In a letter to Nixon on 
November 24th that focused upon EEC entry and trade relations, Heath openly called on the 
President to consult with his allies rather than make surprise announcements. Re ferring to the new 
economic policy he explained that the UK could not develop a proper response to it without first 
knowing how other governments, particularly in Europe, were likely to respond. 52 The letter from 
Heath came in the wake of an exchange of aide memoires in the autumn of 1971. On September 13th 
and October 4th, the British government pleaded with the Americans not to go through with 
implementing the 10% import surcharge designed as a “job development tax credit”. 53 On November 
26th, two days after Heath’s letter, the British Embassy was instructed to reinforce the concern amid 
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amendments to the bill before Congress that would mean even goods manufactured by US 
companies abroad would be subject to the tariff.54     
At the end of November, the British government saw problems in the UK-US relationship as being 
equally ones of interest and communication.55 Since the positivity of late 1970, the relationship had 
suffered over China, the dollar crisis and growing American ambivalence toward EEC expansion. 
Cromer’s November 12th despatch clearly had a major effect on thinking at the FCO and early draft 
briefs for the Bermuda summit in December reflected a sense of trepidation with regard to the 
direction of US foreign policy.56 The FCO believed the “old ease and closeness of Anglo-American 
inter-communication” had been lost.57 The objective for the Bermuda meeting was to get back to 
“the old kind of consultation” that had been in place before Nixon’s surprise announcements. 58 
Although there was an acknowledgement of problems on the European side in terms of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the blame was put firmly at the feet of Kissinger and Connally’s methods that had eroded 
the credibility of the State Department and misled America’s allies. 59 The British approach had 
therefore altered from that at the end of 1970 when Ambassador to the US at the time, John 
Freeman, had reported upon the manner in which the Nixon White House conducted its foreign 
policy without consultation with the bureaucracy.60 Rather than keep quiet and hope for an 
improvement, the plan was to discuss their communication issues frankly without apportioning 
blame. A high-level clearing of the air could help UK-US relations and subsequently US-European 
relations get back on track.61 
Anger and frustration at the way the White House conducted its business permeated the British 
government in the final months of 1971. In the Autumn of 1971, dismay in London over the China 
announcement took a back seat to anger over the new economic policy. 62 As the British wanted to 
ensure prosperous relations with both the US and Europe, the government looked to do this with 
UK-US relations too. They looked to vent their frustration at what they saw as an unacceptable way 
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for the White House to conduct its business whilst simultaneously focusing on areas of agreement 
and looking to create a friendlier atmosphere. It was hoped that the former would help produce the 
latter. 
Although not as high on the agenda as it was in London, there were active considerations of th e UK-
US relationship within the US government in the months leading to December 1971. A State 
Department Intelligence report reflected an ambivalent view of the Heath’s Government’s attitude 
toward the relationship. On the positive side, Heath and Home were seen as great supporters of 
NATO, very concerned about the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and were working to promote 
US-European cooperation in defending Western Europe.63 On the other hand, the report 
acknowledged British concern over the 10% import surcharge and other measures that could harm 
British exports and set back UK-US relations and impede their membership of the EC. The State 
Department saw Heath as wanting to maintain close, or “natural”, relations with the US without “the 
past aura of the “special relationship””.64 Absent from the State Department’s analysis and from the 
behaviour of the White House was any consideration of the psychological effect and emotional 
reaction that US policies had provoked in London. It is somewhat ironic that whilst attempting to 
prove its reliability and worth as an ally with erstwhile enemies, the US government was losing the 
confidence of its closest ally to an unforeseen extent.  
 
3. Indira Gandhi in the UK 
Upon his election victory in June 1970, Ted Heath inherited a relationship with India that had been 
cool for a number of years. Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s public blaming of India for the 1965 
Kashmir war had led to a severe deterioration in relations that was especially sharp due to Indian 
expectations that the Labour party, the party that had presided over independence, would be more 
favourable to them than the conservatives.65 Therefore Wilson’s successor, Edward Heath’s trip to 
India in January of 1971, the first of any significance for 13 years, was a chance for the two countries 
to build bridges.66 By all accounts Heath succeeded in developing a rapport with Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi that would help in meetings scheduled in the UK for the end of October. The 
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autumn visit formed one leg of Gandhi’s world tour that attempted to galvanise the international 
community into action to prevent the flow of refugees crossing the border from East Pakistan into 
India. 
The British position on the East Pakistan crisis continued to be one of sympathy for the Indian 
government alongside differences with it on a couple of important issues. For the British, the burden 
of responsibility for the refugees fell upon the government of Pakistan, and it was upon President 
Yahya Khan that Heath had placed political pressure throughout 1971. However, in opposition to 
Indian wishes, the British supported the stationing of a UN presence on both sides of the East 
Pakistan border, continued to recognise the fight between the Pakistan Army and the Mukti Bahini 
as an internal affair for Pakistan, and urged India not to intervene militarily in a fellow sovereign 
state.67 The British government were well aware of the Indian training that the Mukti Bahini were 
receiving and believed India should cease such activities lest they exacerbate the problem in East 
Pakistan.68 Meanwhile, Indira Gandhi’s strategy was to focus global attention upon the atrocities 
being carried out by the Pakistan army and the plight of the East Pakistani refugees. She continued 
to insist that the government in Pakistan needed to negotiate with Mujib and the Awami League if 
there was to be a solution to the refugee crisis. 
During the meeting on October 30th, after Gandhi had lied about providing only small -scale support 
to the Mukti Bahini, Heath quickly asked the Prime Minister about the possibility of India 
withdrawing its troops from the border areas.69 Gandhi’s response was that, for military reasons, the 
Indian army could not pull back just a short distance as suggested and that a large -scale withdrawal 
was not possible.70 Gandhi went on to explain to Heath the pressure she was under from hawks 
within the Indian government that wanted India to go to war after the Pakistani crackdown on 
Bengali nationalists in March 1971. Heath was keen to remain informed by the Indian government 
with regard to the matter. At the end of the meeting, Heath told Gandhi that it would be to her 
advantage if she were to explain why the Indian government had not responded to the UN measures 
that they saw as being unfairly “even-handed” in a crisis that had clearly been caused by Pakistan.71 
As part of the desire to foster communication with the White House, Heath sent a letter to Nixon 
expressing the impressions he had gained from his meeting with Gandhi. His sympathy for the Prime 
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Minister’s plight was tangible; Heath wrote that “all of her efforts” were directed toward calming 
the hawks and that there was the prospect of “irresistible pressure” from within India to act. 72 The 
Prime Minister noted that the strain and burden of up to nine mi llion refugees meant that Gandhi 
may well have little room for manoeuvre. Even where Gandhi had been clearly disingenuous in 
speaking of providing the “minimum” Indian support for the Bengali guerrillas, Heath’s emphasis 
was on her candour in not completely denying Indian support. Heath made explicit the British belief, 
formed over the course of 1971, that it was up to Pakistan to solve the refugee crisis through 
negotiations with the Awami League. The British Prime Minister urged Nixon to place pressure on  
Yahya Khan who may not pay attention to Heath’s correspondence but would “give great weight” to 
advice from President Nixon. 
Throughout the 1971 crisis, Heath continued his strained correspondence with Yahya Khan. A letter 
written a week after Gandhi’s visit, on November 7th, sided almost entirely with the Indian view of 
the situation.73 In a statement that would no doubt have angered the Pakistani President, Heath told 
of his confidence in Indira Gandhi’s desire to resist domestic pressure to go to war. 74 The Prime 
Minister focused upon the key issue of refugees and implied that the steps taken by the Pakistani 
government to both prevent the flow and create conditions amenable to their return from India had 
been insufficient. Heath called on Yahya to negotiate with Mujib and expressed doubt whether 
conditions would ever be suitable for the return of refugees unless senior Awami League figures, 
currently in exile, were allowed to return and play a prominent role in public life. 75 The letter 
expressed disapproval at the Indian refusal to participate in mutual withdrawals and with UN 
initiatives to aid the return of refugees, but made clear the British position that the crisis was 
Pakistan’s to solve.  
 
4. Indira Gandhi in the US 
President Nixon’s ties to India and the subcontinent dated back to his time as Vice President in the 
1950’s, and it is to his experience of negotiating Pakistan’s entry into CENTO and SEATO that some 
trace back his feelings toward the subcontinental powers.76 Kissinger recounts how Nixon was far 
less amenable to Indian claims of global moral leadership than many of his predecessors and 
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developed a personal dislike for Indira Gandhi.77 When visiting India in 1969, his reception in India 
was “restrained” and discussions “business like”.78 Nixon’s experience in India contrasted with that 
he had with Pakistan. Nixon had a far friendlier relationship with its leaders and was greatly 
appreciative of the warm reception he received when visiting the country whilst out of office. 79 
It is difficult to discount Nixon’s prejudices against India and in favour of Pakistan as they manifested 
themselves so regularly and seemed to have a definitive influence on his thinking. 80 In a 
conversation with Kissinger on May 26th 1971, Nixon said that what the Indians needed as 
punishment for their attitude toward East Pakistan was “a mass famine”.81 Nixon went on to lament 
the fact that there was a US food aid programme in place to prevent famine, rather Nixon 
complained about the fact that “we’re going to feed them”. On July 16th, discussing East Pakistan at 
a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), whilst complaining that world opinion was on the 
side of India, Nixon referred to Indians as “a slippery, treacherous people”. 82 At the same NSC 
meeting, Nixon acknowledged that he had a “bias” against India in asking what restraints, 
particularly in terms of aid, could be placed upon the Indian government. 83 
Nixon’s fondness for Pakistan was almost as apparent. During his 1969 meeting with Yahya Khan, in 
which he sounded out the Pakistani President as a potential link to China, he is reported to have 
reminded the Pakistani government of the sentimental attachment he had developed with the 
country over the past decade and a half.84 Nixon’s fondness for Pakistan and the usefulness of the 
government as a means to improve relations with China paved the way for a strong personal 
relationship between the two Presidents. At a Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting in 
April, and to much bewilderment, Kissinger told senior White House and State Department officials 
to keep in mind Nixon’s “special relationship” with Yahya when considering policy.85 Kissinger 
reinforced this personal relationship in May when he told Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Agha 
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Hilaly that Nixon held Yahya in high regard and had a “feeling of personal affection” toward him. 86 It 
is on this evidence that government officials such as former Pakistan Cabinet member G.W. 
Choudhury and US Under-Secretary of State for near Eastern Affairs Christopher Van Hollen, as well 
as authors such Gary Bass, Jussi Hahnhimaki and Dilip Mohite have concluded that Nixon’s policy in 
1971 was not only guided by the China policy, but also his personal prejudices with regard to India 
and Pakistan.87 
Nixon’s prejudices were in plain sight during Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s trip to 
Washington in the first week of November. Two days prior to the meeting, on November 2nd, the 
White House received a cable from Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad that shaped the White 
House’s tactics with Gandhi. Mutual Indian and Pakistani troop withdrawals from the borders had 
been suggested before, but Farland reported that Yahya had offered to withdraw troops 
“unilaterally” as long as there was an Indian commitment to do so shortly after. 88 Farland was quick 
to assure Yahya that his offer would be passed on to Washington in time for Nixon to raise the 
matter in his meeting with Gandhi. Although they had been told of Indian objections to a 
withdrawal, Nixon and Kissinger pressed the suggestion upon Gandhi and her senior advisor P.N. 
Haksar but received the same reply as the British regarding the inability of the Indian military to 
move back a short distance.89 
Kissinger has described the Nixon-Gandhi encounter as a “classic dialogue of the deaf” and the 
memorandum that he drafted at the time records a meeting where the two leaders spoke at one 
another rather than engage in conversation.90 The President reeled off a number of what Gary Bass 
has labelled “small steps” that the US had taken to bring about a change in the Pakistani position.91 
These included the aforementioned Pakistani withdrawals, the coaxing of Yahya to appoint a civilian 
governor in East Pakistan and US pressure to ensure Mujib was not executed. 92 For her part, Gandhi 
vented her frustration that the continued shipment of US arms to Pakistan throughout the crisis had 
caused her great difficulty and proved a boost to those calling for India to take military action in East 
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Pakistan (for details of the arms shipments, see chapter 4). On the issue of refugees, Nixon accused 
the Indian-supported Mukti Bahini of exacerbating the refugee problem through sabotage of supply 
lines that were carrying humanitarian aid. Gandhi did not directly respond to the point but rather 
pointed to the fact that the idea of a united Pakistan was no longer viable. Gandhi attempted to 
focus the blame for the crisis onto Yahya before Nixon made two warnings to the prime minister. 
Firstly that the US government “would not understand” if India intervened in East Pakistan. Secondly 
that despite “our long established ties of friendship and respect. It would be impossible to calculate 
with precision the steps which other great powers might take if India were to initiate hostilities”. 
Nixon had effectively told Gandhi that it was quite possible that the US would not stand in the way 
should the Chinese retaliate against an Indian invasion of East Pakistan. 93 
The meeting on November 4th, and a subsequent meeting on November 5th served to confirm Nixon 
and Kissinger’s suspicion that Indira Gandhi was set on destroying West Pakistan. In their post-
meeting debrief Kissinger said that the “Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war 
there…to them East Pakistan is no longer the issue”.94 The discussion also explicitly demonstrated 
the depth of personal animosity felt by Nixon and Kissinger toward Gandhi and her advisor P.N. 
Haksar, to whom Nixon referred to as “that clown”.95 The two repeatedly referred to the Indian 
Prime Minister as a “bitch” and an “old witch”, but both were most pleased with being able to 
thwart what they believed to be Gandhi’s objectives. Kissinger praised Nixon for his tact during the 
meeting, saying that “we got what we wanted, which was we kept her from going out of here saying 
that the United States kicked her in the teeth”.96 In Kissinger’s mind, had Nixon been harder on 
Gandhi than he had been, she would have gone back “crying to India”, and thus be even more 
determined and have even more reason to carry out her assumed aim to destroy Pakistan with 
Soviet support. 
Three weeks after his meeting with Gandhi, Nixon returned the favour in writing to Heath regarding 
his impressions of Gandhi’s visit. Despite the evident differences in the tone of the two meetings and 
the opposing stances from which the UK and US approached the crisis in East Pakistan, Nixon’s letter 
focused on areas of agreement. Nixon began his message with the statement that “My talks with 
Mrs Gandhi left me with a similar impression to yours”, and went on to describe how he told Gandhi 
that the initiation of hostilities would be unacceptable and that the tactics of the guerrillas were an 
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obstacle in the way of a peaceful resolution. Within the context of UK-US relations in November 
1971, it seems the President was attempting to paper over gaping chasms between the UK and US 
positions on the subcontinent. 
Nixon’s letter to Heath disguised the huge differences that were emerging between the two 
countries on the matter of East Pakistan; what Nixon did not say to Heath was more significant than  
what he did write. Firstly, the notion that Heath and Nixon gained “similar impressions” from their 
meetings with Gandhi is not the case. Although both believed that Gandhi was close to the point of 
attacking Pakistan, interpretations of how she had got to that point and what Indian aims would be 
should a conflict occur were markedly different. Heath’s impression was that the Indian prime 
minister was struggling to hold back the hawkish elements within her government from forcing her 
into war, whilst Nixon believed Gandhi was actively looking for an excuse for war so that India could 
dismember West Pakistan. On the issue of Indian support for the Mukti Bahini and possible troop 
withdrawals, Heath mentioned British disapproval of Indian positions without pushing the point too 
hard, whereas Nixon deliberately pushed Gandhi on both issues. Finally, Nixon was far starker in 
warning Gandhi of the possible consequences of an Indian intervention than he let on in his letter to 
Heath; there was no mention of his warning that other “great powers” could take action against 
India. 
In a telephone conversation on November 25th, Heath and Nixon discussed their differing positions 
on the crisis without fully confronting them. The two men were in clear agreement that a war should 
be avoided at all costs, although they had alternative suggestions as to how to achieve it. Nixon 
suggested that British and American efforts be focused upon counselling restraint in New Delhi, to 
which Heath partially agreed but believed that both parties needed to be persuaded that a war was 
not inevitable.97 Rather than a focus upon New Delhi, the Prime Minister suggested that the key to 
averting war was to convince Yahya to talk to Mujib, to which Nixon said that although the 
Americans had suggested this to Yahya, it was very difficult to do as long as India was supporting 
guerrillas in East Pakistan.98 On the issue of India’s likely war aims, Nixon repeatedly told Heath of his 
belief that Gandhi and India wanted “Pakistan to disintegrate”.99 Nixon was clearly referring to the 
disintegration of West Pakistan as well as the separation of the East from the West, but the phrasing 
was ambiguous and it is possible that this is a reason why Heath did not directly disagree. Rather 
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Heath tacitly agreed with Nixon in saying that even if Gandhi herself did not want Pakistan to 
disintegrate, such an attitude was “true of the *Indian+ armed forces”.100 
In terms of placing pressure on Yahya Khan, as Heath had suggested, Nixon focused in both his 
meeting with Gandhi and in his letter to Heath upon the influence that the US had in terms of urging 
restraint upon Yahya vis-à-vis India, rather than persuading him to negotiate with the Awami League. 
After receiving a letter from Yahya, two days before his telephone conversation with Heath, which 
complained of an Indian intervention in East Pakistan, on November 24th Nixon assured Yahya of 
continued American friendship throughout the conflict.101 In an opposite vein to Heath’s 
communications with the Pakistani president, Nixon thanked Yahya for his continued friendship and 
wrote of American efforts to counsel restraint upon the Indian government and emphasised the 
notion that the US “would not understand” if India were to initiate hostilities with its neighbour. 102 
Noticeably, there was no mention of possible talks with the Awami League. Alongside the note, 
Ambassador Farland was given instructions to convey to Yahya the efforts made by the US 
government to impress upon Gandhi the need for the stationing of UN observers on both side s of 
the border and the fact that Pakistan had made the first move in offering to withdraw troops from 
border areas.  
It is clear that beneath a façade of agreement on the issues, the UK and US governments were 
heading into a likely Indo-Pakistan war on distinctly different policy trajectories. The UK and US were 
supporting India and Pakistan respectively at the end of November, even if neither was willing to 
explicitly admit it to the other. As briefs were being prepared in November for the Bermuda summit 
beginning December 20th, South Asia was one of many issues that were being prepared for 
discussion. However, by the time the summit came around, South Asia was the topic that took up 
the most time in talks. Studying the archival records, it does not seem to be such a surprise that 
relations deteriorated at an alarming rate as India and Pakistan went to war in December, but 
through a determination to mend relations and focus on the positives, Heath and Nixon seemed to 
have been blind to the true nature and depth of their disagreement on the issue. 
 
5. The US response to the Indo-Pakistan war, November-December 1971 
Once India invaded East Pakistan in late November 1971, there were three dimensions to the White 
House’s response; the conduct of the war on the ground; the intentions and interests of the Soviet 
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Union; and the protection of the link to China. Naturally, the three threads overlap with one 
another, but they provide a strong basis for an analysis of US policy.  
It has been established that both Nixon and Kissinger were firm in their belief that India’s aim 
throughout the crisis had been not only to separate East from West Pakistan, but to destroy West 
Pakistan as a viable state. However, on December 7th, the White House received a CIA briefing that 
confirmed Nixon and Kissinger’s suspicions.103 The report itself, from a source that has never been 
revealed within the Indian cabinet, claimed that India would not accept advice from the UN General 
Assembly until, among other things, “Pakistani armored and air force strength are destroyed so that 
Pakistan will never again be in a position to plan another invasion of Kashmir”.104 The report also 
described how, although India had no desire to occupy West Pakistan, the plan was to incorporate 
the southern part of Azad Kashmir for strategic reasons.105 Kissinger explained his feelings at a WSAG 
meeting on December 8th, where he argued that the US should come to the aid of Pakistan in a 
situation where an American ally is being “raped” and where the other side was receivi ng Soviet 
aid.106 Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joe Sisco and Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson both raised concerns over such an analysis, but their opinions 
were pushed aside by Kissinger. 
In his memoir, Kissinger describes the information as evidence for Indira Gandhi’s determination to 
reduce West Pakistan to “impotence” whereby the state would become fragmented and unable to 
defend itself.107 The claim is rebuffed by Joe Sisco’s assistant Christopher Van Ho llen, who was 
present at the December 8th WSAG meeting. He points out that Nixon and Kissinger were alone in 
interpreting the CIA report in the manner they did. Van Hollen explains that Indian aims to take 
strategic areas of Azad Kashmir and to destroy Pakistan’s armour and air force capabilities were not 
illogical and did not indicate a definitive war aim to destroy West Pakistan. 108 Nonetheless, US policy 
moved forward on the assumptions of the President and his National Security Advisor.  
Soon after the December 8th WSAG meeting, the White House issued the courses of action that were 
to take place to protect US interests during the Indo-Pakistan war.109 Among them were measures to 
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help Pakistan, in material terms, fight the Indians. Unable to provide arms directly to Pakistan due to 
the full embargo that had eventually been imposed with Yahya’s agreement in November, Nixon and 
Kissinger looked to other means. The only way to provide Pakistan with American equipment was via 
third parties. The plan, suggested by the Shah of Iran, was for Jordan to supply planes to Pakistan, 
whilst Iran sent planes to Jordan to cover for their shortfall.110 By December 9th, Kissinger reported to 
Nixon that four Jordanian planes had already moved to Pakistan and that 22 more were on their 
way.111 The State Department and the Pentagon quickly made it clear to the White House that the 
authorisation of the transfer of US arms via third parties was illegal under the terms of the current 
embargo.112 The legality or otherwise of the matter however, did not make Nixon and Kissinger think 
twice about doing all they could to support Pakistan’s military efforts.  
Convinced that India was acting to destroy Pakistan with the full support of the Soviet Union, the 
second aspect of American policy was aimed at their fellow superpower. Throughout 1971, the 
Soviet position had slowly morphed into one of support for the Indian government in its struggle 
against an obdurate Pakistani regime (see chapter 4). Throughout November, Kissinger had made 
plain the American position to Soviet officials, including Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Washington Yuli 
Vorontsov, that India was determined to have a showdown and to destroy West Pakistan. 113 The 
response from the Soviet Union was one of scepticism toward Kissinger’s assessment of Indian war 
aims. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin assured Kissinger that the Soviet Union continued to counsel 
restraint in New Delhi and that US and Soviet interests need not be competitive in South Asia. 114 
Both Nixon and Kissinger were unconvinced by Soviet protestations of innocence. 
Within Kissinger’s conceptualisation of the crisis, a natural extension of the need to stand by 
Pakistan as an ally of the US was to prevent what he saw as aggressive adventures across sovereign 
boundaries from becoming the norm. He firmly believed that if a Soviet-backed India was allowed to 
destroy Pakistan without any repercussions from the U.S., such a model of proxy war could be 
repeated in the more strategically crucial region of the Middle East. 115 In his memoir, Kissinger 
argued that the “very structure of the international” order was at stake should a Soviet -backed India 
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be allowed to destroy West Pakistan.116 It was these assumptions that guided the White House’s 
policy toward the Soviet Union in December 1971. 
Kissinger saw the entire situation as being played for the highest stakes and advised Nixon to act 
accordingly. He was determined not to let the Indians and Soviets succeed in embarrassing the US; 
he told the President on December 5th that the way to navigate the crisis was “to become very 
threatening to the Russians” and make clear that the US realised how high the stakes were. 117 Nixon 
agreed with Kissinger’s assessment and sent a strongly worded letter to Brezhnev the following day. 
The letter acknowledged the developing atmosphere of superpower détente, but explicitly stated 
the US belief that the Soviet Union was aligned with India.118 The letter stated that if India was 
allowed to achieve its military objectives (as stated by Nixon), and the Soviet Union did not exercise 
its considerable influence in New Delhi to bring this about, that the recent improvements in US -
Soviet relations would be under threat.119 Prior to sending the letter, Kissinger met with Vorontsov, 
who was the senior Soviet diplomat in Washington during Dobrynin’s absence. In the meeting, 
Kissinger made it clear that Nixon believed South Asia to be of utmost importance that unilateral 
action such as that undertaken by India would not be tolerated.120 
Once Brezhnev’s reply to Nixon’s message affirmed the importance of a settlement with the Awami 
League, Nixon and Kissinger looked to increase the stakes further. A second aspect of the December 
8th measures was the movement of Naval Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean. 121 The Task Force was 
formidable and comprised of the nuclear aircraft carrier the USS Enterprise, a helicopter carrier, 
seven destroyers and an oiler.122 Its stated objective was to react to Indian interference with US 
vessels in international waters and more pointedly to evacuate US national s from East Pakistan. The 
real intent, however, was to demonstrate to both India and the Soviet Union that the US would not 
stand by should India invade West Pakistan.123 
Also, on December 8th, Kissinger told Nixon that he had found an agreement made between 
President Kennedy and President Ayub Khan in 1962 that pledged US support to Pakistan in the case 
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of Indian aggression.124 Keen to use anything at their disposal to not only put pressure upon the 
Soviets, but also to quell congressional dissent headed by Senator Ted Kennedy, on December 10th 
Kissinger read out the US Aide Memoire promising to come to Pakistan’s aid to Vorontsov. The 
message was accompanied by a warning to the Ambassador that the US was prepared to honour the 
pledge.125 To underscore the threat, Nixon sent another letter to Brezhnev calling on the Soviets to 
press for a ceasefire on the Western border and Kissinger instructed his assistant, General Al Haig, to 
call Vorontsov to tell him that the US would consider further movement of the US Naval  Task Force 
should the Soviets reply in an unsatisfactory manner.126 In response, Vorontsov repeated the Soviet 
line that they were doing all they could to counsel restraint in New Delhi.  
An instant Soviet reply was not forthcoming, so Nixon and Kissinger informed Vorontsov of a 
deadline of midday on December 12th for a response, else the US would take unilateral action in 
mobilising its forces.127 When no message arrived by 11:30am, Nixon used a hot line between 
Washington and Moscow to call on Brezhnev to support the immediate calling of a ceasefire in both 
East and West Pakistan and for negotiations to begin immediately afterward. Once the deadline 
passed without a response, Nixon ordered the Naval Task force to move past the Strait of Mallacca 
and into the Bay of Bengal.128 Kissinger believed such a symbolic and threatening move was 
necessary as there were only 72 hours left before West Pakistan “would be swept into the 
maelstrom”.129 Although the statement is widely disputed, 72 hours was the time -frame within 
which Kissinger claims the Indian army could have shifted its forces from the East to the West and 
destroyed Pakistan’s defensive capabilities to make it ripe for total destruct ion. In Kissinger’s 
estimation, the US needed to continue ordering the Naval Task force into the Bay of Bengal in order 
demonstrate how far out of hand the situation could get.130 In short, the Americans needed to 
demonstrate to the Soviets that they were capable of recklessness and were willing to go to war 
over West Pakistan. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Kissinger considered West 
Pakistan the Nixon Administration’s “Rhineland”.131 
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Occurring alongside help for the Pakistani war effort and sending warnings to the Soviets was the 
continued imperative to protect the link to China. Chinese support for Pakistan had fallen away over 
the course of 1971 (see chapter 4) and the Chinese were not willing to match Soviet support for 
India with their own treaty of friendship with Pakistan. Despite awareness of reports to this effect, 
Nixon and Kissinger continued to believe that the Chinese army could attack India and based policy 
upon the assumption that the Chinese could walk away from the rapprocheme nt. The Chinese had 
no intention of intervening in the South Asian conflict, barring the unlikely event that India did 
indeed mount a major offensive in West Pakistan, and there is no evidence for an assumption that 
they expected any more of an assertive position from the United States.132 
Nixon and Kissinger remained fixed in the belief that the “opening to China” was contingent upon 
their ability to demonstrate the US’s worth as a reliable ally.133 A major aspect of the decision to 
move the Naval Task Force was for the benefit of the Chinese and to attempt to chide Peking into 
moving its forces up to the frontier with Pakistan.134 In his meeting with Gandhi in November, Nixon 
warned of a possible Chinese response to an Indian invasion; by December he was trying to engineer 
the threat of such a response. In fact, when Chinese troop movements did not follow the movement 
of the Task Force, Nixon and Kissinger made their request to the Chinese explicit. On December 10 th 
the President asked Kissinger to tell China’s Ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua that “it would be 
very helpful if they move some forces or threaten to move some forces”. 135  
On the morning of December 12th, Kissinger’s frustration was boiling over. In conversation, he 
explained to Nixon his anger at the lack of Chinese troop movement, exclaiming that “We are the 
ones who have been operating against our public opinion, at the very edge of legality…if they want 
to talk they should just move some troops”.136 However, midway through the conversation 
Kissinger’s Deputy, Al Haig, interrupted the pair to bring the news that the Chinese had requested a 
meeting in New York, a move that Kissinger assumed meant that “*N+o question they’re going to 
move”.137 Having, in his mind, persuaded the Chinese into making a stand against India, Kissinger 
pushed Nixon to back Peking should the Soviets react in kind against China. 138 Kissinger discussed 
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with Nixon the possibility of calling off the Chinese movement, but reasoned that the Chinese likely 
could not be called off, and if they attempted to do so, the China initiative would be “down the 
drain”.139 Kissinger advised, to Nixon’s agreement, that if the Russians were allowed to face down 
the Chinese, and India to destroy West Pakistan, the balance of world power would shift decidedly 
against the U.S. for decades, and possibly forever.140 Kissinger believed that if the Soviets moved 
against China and did not back down in the face of American retaliation, this scenario could be the 
“final showdown”.141 Nixon and Kissinger openly considered the prospect of nuclear war over 
consequences that stemmed from the civil war in Pakistan. 
In the event, the Chinese did not want to convey a message about the moving of troops to the 
border with East Pakistan. Since Nixon and Kissinger were due to leave for the Azores to meet with 
French President Georges Pompidou on December 12th, it was Al Haig that travelled to New York to 
meet with Huang Hua. Rather, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN simply restated the Chinese call 
for a ceasefire in both wings of Pakistan to be followed by an immediate withdrawal of Indian 
troops; there was no mention of China moving its own troops to threaten India. 142 In the end, the 
only action China took against India came after Pakistani forces had surrendered in Dacca. Zhou 
made a condemnatory speech against India and the Chinese delivered a protest note to New Delhi at 
the infiltration of a handful of India troops into China over the Sikkim border. 143 The Chinese had 
reluctantly accepted the fait accompli in East Pakistan. That China did not wish to make a military 
move against India, one that could provoke a Soviet retaliation, should have been plain for Nixon 
and Kissinger to see. In reality, the Chinese were not expecting any major action on the part of the 
US, and the rapprochement was not in danger.144 However as with the other two aspects of their 
policy, it was an insistence upon the accuracy of their assumptions that guided Nixon and Kissinger 
into such a reckless, and ultimately unfounded, policy.  
Despite a lack of Chinese movement, Task Force 74 continued to steam toward the Bay of Bengal 
until the evening of December 15th before word reached the US Embassy in New Delhi that Pakistan 
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was due to surrender the following day.145 Following the surrender and India’s subsequent unilateral 
declaration of a ceasefire along the western border, Kissinger triumphantly told Nixon 
“Congratulations, Mr President you saved West Pakistan”.146 Kissinger believed that the ceasefire 
had come about as a result of the White House’s insistence upon raising the stakes with the Soviet 
Union, who had in turn insisted that India not continue to fight in the West. 147 Nixon’s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs believed that he had prevented West Pakistan from being destroyed, 
upheld the international order and balance of power, and had preserved the rapprochement with 
China. Secondary to these concerns was the increasingly troubled relationship with the UK, where 
stark disagreements came to a head during UN deliberations over the war in December 1971.  
 
6. Fall out at the UN, December 1971 
Differences between the Nixon Administration on one side, and the UK government and the State 
Department on the other with regards to South Asia dated back to the summer of 1970, when Nixon 
announced the “one-time exception” to the Johnson Administration’s arms embargo on South Asia. 
At the time, neither State, nor the FCO saw the White House’s justification, one of increasing 
influence in Islamabad, as a rational explanation (see chapter 2). Both bureaucracies leaned in 
favour of India as a function of its size and its potential for UK and US investment. An exception to 
the arms embargo in favour of Pakistan, it was thought, would only jeopardise relations with India 
and could spark an arms race on the subcontinent. Until the global dimensions of Nixon’s dealings 
with Yahya Khan became known in July 1971, both the UK government and the State Department 
saw the crisis in South Asia as a strictly regional affair. The British government and State Department 
also shared a less fatalistic view of the Indo-Soviet treaty and the wider intentions of India and the 
Soviet Union with regard to the crisis in South Asia. The FCO interpreted the treaty to mean that the 
Indians could publicly demonstrate that they had powerful international friends, whilst the Soviets 
increased their influence in New Delhi and ability to counsel restraint over East Pakistan. The UK and 
the State Department also agreed on an assessment that the Chinese government was pulling back 
from their support for Pakistan, and were not about to enter a large-scale war over East Pakistan. 
By the time India invaded East Pakistan in late November 1971, the State Department had been 
completely cut out of the White House’s decision making in South Asia. On November 23rd, Kissinger 
told UK Ambassador Lord Cromer that communication on South Asia was on an “eyes of the Prime 
                                                                 
145
 Bass p318. 
146
 FRUS 1969-73 Vol E7 Doc 191 Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger 15/12/71  
147
 Kissinger White House Years p913. 
 155 
Minister only basis” and suggested that the State Department’s communications be taken less 
seriously because the President “felt more strongly” about South Asia and that State would provide 
a “less clear opinion”.148 These requests reinforced, in stark terms, Cromer’s cable of November 12th 
that described the manner in which American foreign policy was being carried out. The State 
Department’s irrelevance in policymaking over South Asia had been affirmed, which meant that the 
UK government had to deal directly with a White House whose understanding of the South Asian 
crisis differed wildly from their own. 
In his conversation with Cromer, Kissinger explicitly set out the White House’s position on the crisis. 
He said that Nixon’s belief was that it was India’s aim to “achieve a total collapse of Pakistan with 
East Pakistan wholly under Indian influence and West Pakistan so withered as to be no more 
significant than say Afghanistan”.149 He also told Cromer of the White House’s assumption that the 
Chinese were ready to intervene, saying that “China was not prepared to stand by and watch 
Pakistan disintegrate” and that the “Chinese would certainly intervene to prevent this occurring”.150 
These calculations were at odds with a British policy that had not bought into the White House’s 
geopolitical designs and had already embarked upon a tilt toward India. 151 
As soon as war was officially declared between India and Pakistan on December 3rd, the different 
policy trajectories of the British and American governments manifested themselves in 
disagreements at the UN Security Council. UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir Colin Crowe, reported that 
his US counterpart, George Bush, was expecting instructions to call for an immediate end to 
hostilities to be followed by an immediate Indian withdrawal from East Pakistan. 152 A day later Bush 
was instructed to brand India as the “major aggressor” before introducing a motion that supported 
the Pakistani position in favour of a ceasefire and Indian withdrawals.153 The British opinion was that 
a ceasefire to be followed by Indian withdrawals would only succeed in provoking a Soviet veto on 
the grounds that it was Pakistan that was the aggressor on the subcontinent.154 The British insisted 
that only a unanimous Security Council resolution would have any impact upon the war in South 
Asia. This position allowed the British to maintain their tacit sympathy for the Indian predicament 
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whilst justifying disagreements with the Americans on the basis that Soviet vetoes made UN 
resolutions in support of Pakistan pointless.  
The US motion was put to a vote on December 4th. It attracted eleven affirmative votes, two 
abstentions from the UK and France and two negative votes from Poland and, crucially, the veto 
power of the Soviet Union. Within the continued spirit of confronting UK-US issues head on, Heath 
sent a letter to Nixon the following day in an attempt to solve what he referred to as “a very difficult 
situation in the Security Council”.155 The Prime Minister explained that, as well as having no positive 
effect on the ground, a vetoed resolution would only succeed in pushing India and the Soviet Union 
closer to one another and encourage future obstinacy.156 Heath then asked Nixon for a delay in a 
second vote planned for later that evening in New York. The British position followed advice 
received from its High Commissioner in New Delhi, Terrence Garvey. Garvey cautioned the 
government against endorsing the American position and to bear in mind the long term importance 
to the UK of favourable relations with India and Pakistan.157 He also reminded the government that 
although he did not condone Indian actions in late November, it was Pakistan that had pushed the 
refugees over the border into India, and accordingly the moral high ground remained with India. 158 
Discussions at the UNSC quickly reached a stalemate; a vote on a similar resolution on December 6 th 
produced the same result as that achieved two days earlier. The Americans, along with the Chinese, 
insisted that they would veto any resolution that did not contain provisions for a ceasefire and 
withdrawal, whilst the Soviets insisted they would veto anything that did. 159 For their part, the 
British were in a difficult position. Crowe explained to the FCO that whilst an insistence upon 
unanimity was defensible as long as there was a possibility of such an outcome, should the Soviets 
make clear that they would veto any resolution calling for a ceasefire, the British position could 
become untenable.160 The British and French worked on a possible resolution, but to no avail. The 
British resolved to balance relations with India, and what they saw as the morally correct position 
with rapidly deteriorating relations with the US.161 
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As the crisis wore on, and once Nixon had authorised the movement of Naval Task Force 74, the 
White House made one last attempt to have the UK side with them on the Security Council. On 
December 12th Kissinger held a meeting with Cromer to candidly explain major aspects of the 
American policy and to exert great pressure on the British to follow the American lead. The Assistant 
for National Security Affairs told the Ambassador for the first time about the 1962 aide memoire 
that promised US support to Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger then followed up 
by revealing that US intelligence sources had supported Nixon and his assumptions that Gandhi’s 
intention was to destroy West Pakistan’s military capabilities in order to facilitate a “definitive 
acquisition of Kashmir”.162 Kissinger said that the US policy was aimed at “scaring off” an Indian 
attack in the West and that the US must stand firm against the overt support that the Soviets were 
providing to India. He also relayed Nixon’s “distress” at the UK’s position both in the UNSC and the 
General Assembly, where the UK had also abstained and said the White House was interpreting the 
UK’s position to be a result of its “new found Europeanism”.163 Kissinger made it clear to Cromer that 
any vote either against the U.S. or in abstention at the next UNSC vote “would be regarded as 
unfriendly”.164 
Kissinger’s remarks sparked confusion in Downing Street. Heath’s private secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Peter Moon, highlighted three major British concerns with regard to  US policy. He was 
unsure of what exactly the 1962 aide memoir committed the United States to in the event of an 
Indian attack and was personally unaware of any such commitment. Moon also questioned the US 
intelligence sources that claimed India was about to annex the entirety of Kashmir, as these did not 
concur with British intelligence assessments. He was also unsure of how the US proposed to scare 
off an Indian attack in the West; it appears the British had not interpreted the movement of the 
Naval Task Force in such a way. 165 Despite knowledge of the different attitudes held in London and 
Washington, the actions of the White House still caught the British government off -guard. 
In his meeting with Kissinger, Cromer quickly refuted the accusation that Brita in’s “Europeanism” 
had led them to their current policy stance in South Asia.166 The remainder of the recriminations 
were carried out by Heath himself, on the advice of Moon, in a second letter to Nixon within a week. 
Heath stuck to the British line that any vetoed resolution would be of no value and that it was unfair 
for Kissinger to say that any abstention or vote against the U.S. would be regarded as unfriendly at a 
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point where the UK had not even seen the latest US proposal.167 Heath candidly explained the British 
tilt toward India. He argued that since India would undoubtedly be of increased relative importance 
in a subcontinent of three nations, the UK and US “should avoid actions which either antagonise the 
Indian government to no good effect or push it further into the arms of the Soviet Union”.168 In 
reference to the 1962 aide memoire, Heath made clear that he personally had no knowledge of its 
existence and had had no idea that the US was predicating its policy upon such a commitment. 169  
The letter was written in a similar tone to that sent by Heath to Nixon in November expressing grave 
concern over a lack of consultation that did not allow American allies time to properly respond. The 
December 12th letter implicitly emphasised the fact that the White House’s surprise announcements 
continued to cause great difficulty for the UK-US relationship. Disagreements over policy in South 
Asia had exacerbated British concerns over both a gap in interests and the breakdown in 
communication with the White House. The conflict in South Asia had shot to prominence within UK-
US relations and was another high-level grievance that the two parties had to add to others that 
were due to be discussed at Bermuda on December 20th and 21st. 
Once the conflict in South Asia had come to an end, Lord Cromer reflected the British view in London 
from the Embassy in Washington. On the substance of US policy he cast doubt upon the intelligence 
sources quoted by Kissinger, claiming that his Embassy’s contacts within the CIA had suggested that  
the intelligence did not match Kissinger’s conclusion.170 He also commented upon Nixon and 
Kissinger’s “emotional desire” to see the Soviets and Russians isolated at the Security Council, 
something which fed their outrage at the British position calling for unanimity.171 In terms of 
communication with the Administration, the Ambassador complained of an inability to speak with 
the State Department over South Asia. He concluded that, completely unaware of the policy or 
tactics being employed by the White House, the bureaucracy was understandably anxious not to 
expose its level of ignorance on the issue.172 Over South Asia, UK and US interests had continued to 
diverge, and communication had continued to break down. 
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Conclusion 
The UK-US relationship in the final months of 1971 was in a state of increasingly rapid deterioration. 
The secretive nature of the White House foreign policy-making system had led to the British 
government feeling neglected by its closest ally. Surprise announcements of the China initiative and  
the new economic policy in July and August respectively meant that the British had suffered at first 
hand the new style of policy-making in Washington. However, the British still chose to tread carefully 
with the Americans in November in order to maintain their hopes of being able to maintain strong 
relationships with both Europe and the US. Frank discussions were had between Ambassador 
Cromer and Henry Kissinger in November, but the atmosphere remained friendly as the British were 
keen to promote the impression that bilateral relations were not strained. Despite a realisation in 
London that the congeniality and candour that was an early feature of the Heath-Nixon relationship 
had been lost, the British were keen not to openly blame the Americans for the breakdown. 
As the Indian army entered East Pakistan in mid-November 1971, the UK government and the White 
House were on very different policy trajectories in South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
visits to London and Washington in late October and early November 1971 demonstrated the huge 
differences in approach toward the crisis on different sides of the Atlantic. Having developed a warm 
relationship with Gandhi during his trip to India in January, Heath was sympathetic toward India’s 
plight with regard to the flow of refugees from East Pakistan, and undertook to continue his strongly 
worded correspondence with Yahya Khan. In sharp contrast, Nixon and Kissinger heaped pressure 
upon Gandhi to the point of using an agreement, of which she was not aw are, from Yahya to 
withdraw troops. They insinuated that India could be the subject of a Chinese attack that the US 
would do nothing to prevent.173 
Despite evidently opposing positions, Heath-Nixon correspondence with regard to the matter was 
generally positive in tone.  Although Heath appeared to be demonstrating sympathy for Indira 
Gandhi’s domestic position, Nixon assured the prime minister that his impressions of Gandhi were 
largely in line with the Prime Minister’s. Amid a deteriorating UK-US relationship, it seems that both 
Downing Street and the White House were very keen to focus upon areas of agreement in South 
Asia. Heath and Nixon again failed to air their disagreements in a telephone conversation on 
November 25th. Prior to the escalation of conflict on the subcontinent, the issue was one of many on 
the table and secondary to the major concern of the time, namely the new US economic policy. It 
was only in December that it became the most pressing issue between the two countries.  
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It is within the context of opposing opinions on policy over the subcontinent and a breakdown in 
communication between London and Washington that disagreements over South Asia were 
exacerbated. Once the scale of the conflict increased on December 3rd, UK-US differences became 
explicit and public. Previous attempts to disguise disagreements may have contributed to the 
terseness of communication between Downing Street and the White House as both were surprised 
by the stubbornness of the other’s position. The British, tacitly at least, supported the Indian 
position and were unhappy at American insistence at pushing through UN resolutions that were 
certain to draw a Soviet veto. Meanwhile, the White House saw the British refusal to support the US 
position as an “unfriendly act”. 
As had been the case throughout 1971, the British simply did not understand the reasoning for, or 
the meaning of the White House’s policy. The significance of the power play that Nixon and Kissinger 
were making in sending Naval Task Force 74, initially at least, seemed lost on the British. Heath’s 
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Peter Moon could not “connect the dots” linking the movement 
of the Task Force and the stated American desire to ward off Indian aggression against West 
Pakistan. The major reason for this was just that such a policy made very little sense to the British. 
British Intelligence reports had indicated that India was not intent upon destroying West Pakistan, 
and Moon, along with Ambassador Cromer called into question the veracity of Nixon and Kissinger’s 
sources claiming that India wanted to annex Kashmir. The thought of making such a strong move to 
prevent a threat that likely did not exist seemed illogical. The British, at every turn, were unsure as 
to what the White House may decide to do. They were caught completely unaware by the revelation 
that the US, via a 1962 aide-memoire, was committed to the defence of Pakistan in the event of an 
attack by India. They were then subsequently unsure of the extent to which the US may act to 
honour such an agreement. White House policy had left the British government bewildered, 
uninformed and full of trepidation as to what the next US move could be.  
In December 1971, the UK and US governments thus found themselves on opposite sides of a hot 
war in South Asia. The British assessment of the reasons for the breakdown in UK -US relations as 
being ones of differing interests and poor communication were largely accurate. Unburdened by 
concerns over any China initiative and personal biases against India, the British viewed the conflict as 
a regional issue where the British national interest would be best served by a tacit tilt in favour o f 
India. In contrast, the White House was conducting policy on a global level that saw events in South 
Asia as possibly leading to a “final showdown” between the superpowers. These differences were 
compounded by the secretive White House foreign policymaking system that had ceased meaningful 
communication with the State Department with regard to the issue in August, which had in turn led 
to the State Department’s refusal to communicate with the British Embassy over South Asia in 
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December. Within a UK-US relationship that had relied upon close consultation and candour in the 
post war era, it is perhaps no surprise that relations reached a very low ebb in December 1971. 
There was much work to be done at the upcoming Bermuda summit due to commence on December 
20th, just three days after the end of the war in South Asia. 
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Chapter 6: The Bermuda Summit and Beyond 
 
Introduction 
As the South Asian crisis began to reach its climax in November 1971, the FCO identified problems in 
the UK-US relationship as being ones of interests and communication.1 The final chapter of this 
thesis assesses the impact of the South Asian crisis upon the wider UK-US relationship and the 
extent to which problems of diverging interests and poor communication remained. The chapter 
considers the period from the end of the South Asian crisis in December 1971 and subsequent 
Bermuda summit to the next UK-US summit meeting in Washington held on the first two days of 
February, 1973. The timeframe has been chosen in order to add nuance to the notion that the 
period between the end of 1971 and February 1973 was one of renewed amity within the Anglo -
American relationship.2 
The chapter has three sections. The first focuses upon top-level UK-US relations at the Bermuda 
summit and through 1972 until the Washington summit in February 1973. The section assesses the 
aims and expectations of both sides going into the talks, before providing an analysis of the 
substance of the talks and the degree of success which they were perceived to have had in terms of 
reaffirming the strength of the UK-US relationship.3 The section then moves on to consider the value 
that the summit meeting had for the UK government, as diplomats developed a deeper appreciation 
of the manner in which foreign policy was being developed and delivered in Washington. Finally, 
consideration is made of the effect that the secretive White House policymaking system continued 
to have on the relationship during a period up to February 1973 of Anglo-American amity. 
The second section provides an epilogue for the events on the ground on the subcontinent after the 
South Asian crisis. The section assesses the contrasting situations that the Indian and Pakistani 
governments found themselves in on a subcontinent of three nations following the  de facto 
independence of Bangladesh. Prime Minister  Gandhi led an India that was the unquestioned leading 
power on the subcontinent in terms of size, population, wealth and military capabilities. In contrast 
Bhutto took control of a country in turmoil and looked to China to firm up international support for a 
state that had lost more than half of its population. The section assesses the alignments of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh relative to China and the Soviet Union in particular. In order to provide 
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context for later discussion of UK-US relations with regard to them, the section provides analysis of 
the Simla Agreement signed as a peace deal between India and Pakistan in June 1972, and the issue 
of Pakistan’s delayed recognition of Bangladesh.  
Section three focuses upon the UK-US relationship in South Asia as an example of continued issues 
of interests and communication within the Anglo-American relationship. Like the first section, it 
follows events chronologically from the talks at the Bermuda summit until February 1973. The 
section looks at the manner in which the UK and US governments dealt with what they referred to as 
“tactical differences” over South Asia in discussions at Bermuda. The section assesses how, up until 
the Bermuda summit, the UK government remained unaware of the reasoning behind aspects of US 
policy in South Asia, with special reference to the movement of the Naval Task Force 74 into the Bay 
of Bengal. The recognition of Bangladesh is then presented as an example of how the post-Bermuda 
relationship between Heath and Nixon could function effectively on an issue where both sides took 
different approaches whilst keeping the other informed of their opinion. The section then assesses 
the continued differences in the UK and US’ approach to  and policy in South Asia before finally 
focusing attention on how continued White House secrecy impacted upon UK-US relations in South 
Asia. 
 
1. UK-US Relations- December 1971-February 1973 
The UK-US Bermuda summit, held December 20th-21st 1971, was one of a number of bilateral 
summit meetings held with allies by President Nixon in late 1971 and early 1972. The meetings were 
held in an effort to improve bilateral relationships that had been damaged by the two “Nixon 
Shocks” of a new policy toward communist China and the imposition of a 10% import surcharge on 
international exports to the US. The Bermuda talks occurred at a time of uncertainty within the UK-
US relationship. Alongside the unpredictable nature of White House policymaking, Britain’s global 
prestige was continuing to decline, its exact role within Europe was still to be decided, and Nixon’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, believed that the post-war “special 
relationship” between the UK and the US was weakening.4 
The aim of the White House was to recognise, and have Prime Minister Edward Heath agree that the 
evolving nature of the UK-US relationship, and the UK’s pending entry into the EEC did not mean 
that the strength of UK-US consultation needed to be compromised. Kissinger laid out four areas for 
the President to focus upon; firstly that new US relationships with Communist powers such as China 
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would continue to evolve, but not at the expense of relations with western allies; Secondly, that 
disagreements over economic policy, for example should not have an impact in other areas of the 
relationship; Thirdly to assure Heath that the US would continue its support for European unity in 
return for an understanding that such a stance created trading problems for the US; And finall y that 
the US would continue its “unique” relationship with the UK, despite the inevitability of the UK 
acquiring a more European orientation to its policy.5 Given the fiery reaction of the UK government 
to several US foreign policy decisions over the course of 1971, on paper the four points appeared to 
be a tall order to achieve agreement upon. However, it seems that Nixon and Kissinger believed that 
the cordial relationship the President had struck with the Prime Minister in late 1970 would be a 
great aid in discussing these issues frankly. Nonetheless, Kissinger reminded Nixon prior to the 
summit that Heath “will be somewhat testy about our policies”.6  
Heath, too, was prepared for his fellow head of government to be angry at the course of UK foreign 
policy over the previous six months. The Prime Minister knew that, in the wake of British abstentions 
and its refusal to support the White House over South Asia in the UN Security Council that he was 
likely to encounter an ill-tempered Richard Nixon. In a despatch on December 17th, UK Ambassador 
to the US, Lord Cromer had warned that both Nixon and Kissinger were in a despondent mood after 
the UK had refused to support their position in the manner in which they expected, namely to 
support American calls for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan.7 During the Indo-Pakistan war, 
Nixon believed that his administration’s encouragement of the UK to push forward with entry to the 
EC had contributed to the willingness of the British government to adopt a divergent policy to that of 
the US.8 Therefore, Cromer warned the Prime Minister both of the Americans’ belief that they 
interpreted UK policy as being motivated by a drive toward Europeanism, as well as their 
unsubstantiated belief that they had been more frank with the British than the British had been in 
return.9 As had been the case prior to the December war on the subcontinent, Heath’s overriding 
aim was to smooth over relations with the White House and build on the personal relations that had 
been developed with Nixon a year earlier.10 
As planned, the private discussions between Heath and Nixon covered a wide spectrum of 
concurrent foreign policy issues ranging from Rhodesia to negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation 
                                                                 
5
 NPL NSC VIP Visits Heath Bermuda 71 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon 18/12/71. 
6
 NPL NSC VIP Visits Heath Bermuda 71 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon 18 /12/71. 
7
 UKNA FCO 37/754 Cromer to FCO 17/12/71. 
8
 UKNA Files of the Prime Minister (hereafter PREM) 15/570 Cromer to FCO 12/12/71. 
9
 UKNA FCO 37/754 Cromer to FCO 17/12/71. 
10
 UKNA FCO 82/66 Steering Brief for Bermuda meetings 6/12/71. 
 165 
(SALT). The talks were informal and meandering at times. At one point, whilst discussing the 
prospect of a Soviet-proposed European Security Conference in 1972, Nixon and Heath began 
bemoaning the intellectual establishment on both sides of the Atlantic that annoyingly opposed 
their policies on Vietnam and Rhodesia respectively.11 On substance, Nixon reiterated his line of 
support for the UK’s entry into the EEC whilst emphasising the fact that this would mean the US 
would take a short term economic hit. Nixon told Heath that as the only European nation w ith a 
global outlook it was important that the UK take a leadership role in a united Europe. 12 The Prime 
Minister assured the President that the UK would work toward a greater degree of political 
cooperation within the EEC. He said that although many detail s would need to be worked out in 
trade negotiations between the EEC and the US, “the particular relationship between Britain and the 
United States need not change in any way”.13 
In a conversation on December 21st, the two leaders affirmed their friendly relationship and drew 
comparisons between their being able to discuss global affairs at Bermuda, and those held at the 
same venue between their illustrious predecessors Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 14 
Heath and Nixon wished for the return of a frankness in relations between their respective 
governments that had been lost in the run-up to and during the South Asian crisis. The Bermuda 
meeting was seen as the beginning of a new phase for the relationship between Heath and Nixon’s 
governments where candour within the UK-US relationship need not be harmed by the UK’s turn 
toward Europe as a member of the EEC. Nixon affirmed Heath’s assertion that the abiding nature of 
the Anglo-American relationship would continue, but added a more specific view of the nature of 
relations in future. The President remarked that “As Britain goes into Europe, there will be a new 
Europe”, thereby focusing attention upon what the White House saw as a rapidly changing global 
context within which a new Europe and a new America would continue to engage in constructive 
economic competition with one another. For Nixon, it was “essential” that the western allies work 
together.15 
The ongoing strength of an evolving UK-US relationship in the midst of a changing global 
environment was the theme for both leaders at speeches held at a dinner on the evening of 
December 20th aboard HMS Glamorgan.  Nixon was candid in explaining that the British move 
toward Europe and the US’ preference for bilateralism with the Soviet Union and China meant  that 
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the UK-US relationship was fundamentally different to what it had been in the past. 16 Détente with 
communist powers was welcomed by the British, but recent experience with Nixon Administration’s 
policy toward China had reminded the British that the US no longer felt the need for consultation on 
major issues of foreign policy. The President emphasised the fact that the challenges faced in 1971 
could not have been predicted a decade previous nor imagined in the wake of the Second World 
War, thus clearly making the point that the future nature and/or importance of the UK-US 
relationship could alter in the near future.17 For the present however, Nixon affirmed the idea that, 
despite what he referred to as “tactical differences”, (to be discussed below) the f act that shared 
principles such as those of freedom, economic progress and peace alongside a shared language, 
history and culture would ensure that the UK-US relationship remained strong.18 
The joint communique issued after the talks signalled Heath’s agreement that the “closest possible 
degree of understanding” was necessary between the two nations and that the UK’s entry into the 
EEC would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance during a time of fluidity in international politics. 19 Press 
reaction tended to focus upon the theme of change within the relationship, which was interpreted 
as an indication of a loosening of UK-US ties as reported by The Chicago Sun and Washington Daily 
News.20 The Wall Street Journal went even further, and downplayed Heath and Nixon’s commitment 
to friendship but interpreted the meeting as an agreement between the two leaders that the two 
nations must go their separate ways in future, the UK toward Europe and the US toward China and 
Japan.21 Meanwhile, in London, The Times focused upon Heath’s straightforwardness in having told 
the President that British entry into the EEC would change the nature of the UK-US relationship.22 
The talks were seen as a success by both governments and as the beginning of a new phase for 
relations between the Heath government and the Nixon Administration after the travails of 1971.23 
The meeting had met both sides’ expectations as it showcased the UK and US’ continued ability to 
maintain close consultation and a collaborative approach to global issues. The State Department was 
pleased that Heath demonstrated support for the President’s visits to Moscow and Peking and did 
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not believe conflicts of interests between Europe and the US to be inevitable. 24 Kissinger, too, was 
pleased with the way the talks went and by the positive atmosphere that had been created.25 
Permanent Undersecretary of State at the FCO, Sir Denis Greenhill agreed with the positive 
assessments and was particularly satisfied with the tone adopted by the two heads of government.26 
Heath and Nixon’s amiable personal relationship had survived the disagreements of 1971 and both 
sides agreed to keep relations close and cordial whatever may change within global affairs. However, 
although the issue of the inevitability of diverging interests had been confronted, the issues that had 
affected communication between the two governments in 1971 had not. As has been discussed in 
previous chapters, the secretive White House foreign policy-making system that excluded the State 
Department had severely disrupted and confused lines of communication between the UK and the 
US in the second half of 1971.  A number of cables had been sent from the British Embassy in 
Washington to the FCO with regard to the secretive machinery within the White House over the 
previous year. Most notable among these had been a despatch from then-Ambassador John 
Freeman in October 1970 that described Nixon and Kissinger’s tendency to interpret the role of the 
executive branch very literally on important foreign policy affairs, to the point of not consulting with 
the State Department.27 At that time, the FCO decided not to accept invitations from the White 
House to circumvent the US bureaucracy, due to a fear of damage to the historically advantageous 
system of having the State Department present British policy to the Executive.28 After Anglo-
American relations had deteriorated in the second half of 1971 Lord Cromer sent a despatch to 
London in November that described how foreign policy issues could not be dealt with without 
Kissinger’s presence, and that many officials in Washington were describing the Nixon 
Administration’s handling of foreign policy as a “mess”.  29 Cromer’s November cable had a 
discernible impact upon thinking in Whitehall and spurred a belief that the Bermuda summit needed 
to rekindle the “old kind of consultation” that had been lost following the “Nixon Shocks” of July and 
August 1971.30 
Despite knowledge of the White House’s secretive style of policymaking it was not until the Bermuda 
summit that the wider foreign policy establishment could deepen their understanding of the US 
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foreign policymaking at first-hand. A meeting between Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and 
Kissinger at Bermuda exemplified the major problem in US-UK communications. Around midway 
through the discussion, Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs said that the White House 
“regretted” the fact that the UK may have received information about US policy on South Asia from 
other government sources, but forcefully told Douglas-Home “*T+he fact was that policy was made in 
the White House and this lesson must be learned”.31 As Home was leaving the meeting, Kissinger 
reminded the Foreign Secretary to “not mention anything that he *Kissinger+ had said to any other 
member of the United States delegation”.32 These statements must have cast into doubt the 
substance of the meeting that Home had had with US Secretary of State Bill Rogers just hours 
earlier. In that meeting Rogers seemed to be (finally) up to speed on the reasoning behind the US 
policy in South Asia and repeated the White House’s claim that India’s war aim in December 1971 
was to destroy West Pakistan. However, Rogers also spoke with Home about the possibility of a 
“signing off” resolution at the UN to recognise an end to the crisis, and speculated that future Soviet 
support for Mujib’s new government in the newly seceded Bangladesh would further increase Soviet 
influence on the subcontinent.33 By implication, Kissinger was asking Home to disregard the 
information that he had received from the head of the US State Department. 
It was the meeting between Kissinger and Home on December 20th that Head of the North American 
Department at the FCO Hugh Overton described, in a letter to Deputy Undersecretary of State, 
Thomas Brimelow soon after the summit, as the greatest example of the White House’s secretive 
mentality.34 Overton noted that the most valuable aspect of the Bermuda summit had been the 
extent to which UK Ministers within the delegation had experienced, at first hand, the inner -
workings of the Nixon administration.35 Overton believed that further exposure to the White House’s 
manner of operating had even had an impact on the Prime Minister, who would now be more 
conscious of what Overton described as a “curious blend of pragmatism and sensitivity” that 
governed Nixon and Kissinger’s approach.36 Overton also noted that, as a result of the concentration 
of foreign policymaking power within the White House, there had been a basic ambivalence within 
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US policymaking in that over the South Asian crisis, White House and State Department explanations 
for US policy had been very different.37 
US Ambassador to the UK, Walter Annenberg provided a neat summary of relations seven weeks 
after the Bermuda summit for the State Department. The Ambassador wrote that although the 
summit had succeeded in improving relations at the top level and that the UK-US relationship 
remained close in a number of areas, 1971 had nevertheless had a negative impact upon the 
relationship.38 Annenberg cited the Opening to China, the New Economic Policy and different 
attitudes toward the December Indo-Pakistan war as having taken their toll on the relationship and 
as contributing “to a certain sense of estrangement” that had left Whitehall “stunned”. In 
Annenberg’s opinion, it was that the US felt the need to act unilaterally that was more hurtful to the 
British than the fact that they had done so.39 The Ambassador believed that divergent interests and 
breakdowns in consultation meant that there was a feeling in London that the Anglo-American 
relationship was becoming less and less unique when compared to relations with other allies, 
particularly those in Europe.40 Annenberg believed that this ongoing change in the nature of the 
Anglo-American relationship had accelerated pace over the 12 months to February 1972.  
By 1972, the British had become experienced in dealing with the unique manner in which Kissinger 
conducted his diplomacy. In June 1971, and in an operation reminiscent of his later visit to Peking 
(see Chapter 4), Kissinger had visited the UK to provide a cover story for his visit to Paris for secret 
negotiations with representatives from North Vietnam.41 The UK government agreed to tell the press 
that Kissinger was engaged in meetings outside of London on the morning of June 26 th, so that 
Kissinger could secretly fly to the French capital. Naturally, the State Department and US 
Ambassador in London, Annenberg, were not to be informed of Kissinger’s secret operation. 42 As 
details of the operation continued to alter as dictated by the White House, officials within the British 
government, including Permanent Undersecretary Denis Greenhill had privately become agitated by 
Kissinger’s continual changing of his itinerary.43 Having gained assurances from Cabinet Secretary 
Burke Trend that the UK would agree to facilitate future trips to Paris, Kissinger took up the offer in 
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September 1972.44 Again the visit, and Kissinger’s continually altering demands, provided an internal 
headache for the British government; an unsigned handwritten note spoke to his “obsession wi th 
secrecy”. 45  To facilitate Kissinger’s second secret trip to Paris, the British arranged for Kissinger to 
depart from Claridges Hotel early on the morning of September 15th and fly from RAF Northolt to 
Paris shortly after.46 D.C. Tebbit, a minister at the British Embassy in Washington, believed that 
abetting Kissinger’s penchant for elaborate ruses would help UK -US relations prosper in the long 
run.47 
Although by September 1972 the British had come to expect such behaviour from Kissinger, these 
episodes underscored the continued side-lining of the State Department. Effectively the British 
needed to be complicit in the US Executive’s deception of the State Department and of the US 
Embassy in London if they were to be able to communicate effectively and maintain a constructive 
relationship with the White House. Whilst in the UK in September 1972, Kissinger held talks with 
Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend. The discussions were 
friendly and covered a number of issues, but Kissinger was keen to remind Home that his remarks on 
South Asia (to be discussed below), in particular, were of special delicacy due to his views not being 
known to some US officials.48 The UK continued to walk on eggshells when it came to discussing US 
foreign policy with high ranking members of the Washington bureaucracy. These examples serve to 
illustrate the “sense of estrangement” that US Ambassador Walter Annenberg spoke of in his 
February 1972 despatch.49 
In December 1972 Lord Cromer sent a message of exasperation to the FCO from the British Embassy 
in Washington.50 Cromer described the period up to December 1972 as “an extremely unsatisfactory 
patch in so far as keeping you in London abreast of top-level thinking here in Washington”. Knowing 
that important foreign policy decisions were made exclusively within the White House, Cromer 
explained that in his forlorn attempts to gain information, he had gone “as far as to ask the State 
Department!” (Emphasis in original).51 The Ambassador reported that high-ranking officials at the 
State Department, including Secretary of State Bill Rogers had been extremely helpful, but given the 
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nature of the White House’s policymaking machinery, doubt had to be cast “as to the true depth of 
their knowledge”.52 For Cromer, the crux of the issue was that it continued to be the case that all 
enquiries ended up on Kissinger’s desk, and were not answered during his frequent periods of 
absence. For instance, in December 1972 Kissinger, along with his Assi stant Al Haig were in Paris 
negotiating with a delegation from North Vietnam53and the UK government continued to struggle to 
gain information on US foreign policy from the Nixon Administration.  
Alex Spelling has argued that, after the UK-US relationship was publicly reaffirmed at the Bermuda 
summit in December 1971, 1972 saw the UK-US relationship return to a period of stability that 
lasted well into 1973.54 Spelling cites in support of this conclusion success in the re-negotiation of 
the US use of UK facilities on Malta, Nixon’s backing for Heath over the troubles in Northern Ireland 
and particularly Heath’s support for the White House’s stepping up of the bombing campaign in 
North Vietnam after March 1972.55 By the end of 1972, Heath’s standing in Washington was at a 
career high as the UK and the US governments headed toward another bilateral summit in February 
1973.56 Kissinger believed the 1973 visit to be the most important of Nixon’s contacts with European 
leaders throughout 1973 as it set the tone for relations between the US and the newly expanded EC. 
Unlike for the talks at Bermuda, the briefs prepared in advance did not contain sections assessing 
the state of the UK-US relationship. In fact, the state of the relationship was not something that 
diplomats felt the need to address. Rather the briefs, and the talks themselves were focused upon 
the future of US-EEC relations, and Nixon demonstrated deep gratitude for Heath’s support on 
various issues throughout 1972.57. The Bermuda summit succeeded in drawing a line under the 
public disagreements of December 1971 but had not addressed the impact that the secretive 
formation of White House foreign policy was having upon UK-US relations.  
 
2. A New Reality in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
Following the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dacca on December 16th 1971 and the calling of a 
ceasefire on the border between India and West Pakistan a day later, India emerged as the most 
powerful state on the subcontinent. Victory demonstrated Indian strength in the face of US and 
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Chinese intimidation and reinforced its ability to defend its territorial integrity. 58 For India, the 
events of 1971 are remembered as both a famous military triumph that boosted its image as a 
defender of human rights and as a victory that allowed it to reduce the threat posed to its security 
by Pakistan.59 Indira Gandhi and her ruling faction of the Indian National Congress (which became 
known as the INC (I)), received a huge boost both at home and abroad. 60 Prior to Provincial elections 
of March 1972, Gandhi enjoyed a 93% approval rating which helped the INC (I) win 71% of the 
assembly seats in those states that held elections.61 The victory also provided an ideological boost 
for the Indian political establishment. The independence of Bangladesh dealt a great blow to 
Pakistan’s “two nation” theory that a common Islamic faith could be the sole basis for the creation 
of a nation-state.62 India had lost prestige within the non-aligned movement as major allies 
Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Egypt had all voted against its position in the UN General Assembly.63 
Although it never entered a formal alliance with the Soviet Union it became an important aspect of 
the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry.64 
After 1971, the Indo-Soviet relationship continued to strengthen.65 India had secured Soviet support 
against the prospect of hostilities with China, whilst the Soviet Union secured a bulwark against the 
emerging US-China-Pakistan axis.66 Brezhnev was also, albeit briefly, able to revive the idea of 
Collective Security for South Asia through a depiction of the Indo-Soviet and subsequent Indo-
Bangladesh friendship treaties as a step toward a wider defence agreement. 67 As Indo-Soviet ties 
strengthened, Sino-Indian relations remained cool as Chinese support for Pakistan hardened in 1972. 
The Chinese continued to view New Delhi as Moscow’s largest client and saw the potential for 
Soviet-Indian-Bangladeshi collusion to cause trouble along China’s borders.68 With Chinese forces 
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concentrated in the North of the country to ward off a possible Soviet attack, the possibility for India 
to encourage dissent in a region such as Tibet provided a plausible threat for the Chinese. 69 This 
helped justify firmer support for Pakistan in an attempt to keep Bangladesh from becoming another 
Soviet client.70 
In Pakistan, Yahya handed power over to Bhutto as soon as the war was over on December 20 th 
1971. In contrast to the situation Indira Gandhi found herself in, Bhutto took control of a depleted 
nation. As a result of East Pakistan’s de facto secession following the December War, Pakistan, as a 
sovereign state, had lost half of its territory and more than half of its population. 70,000 Pakistani 
soldiers were held as prisoners of war and the country’s levels of international credit were severely 
reduced.71 In 1972, Bhutto continued to speak publicly of a Pakistan that included East Bengal; he 
symbolically offered to step down and allow Mujib to assume the Presidency if it meant that 
Pakistan and Bangladesh would reunite.72 In the immediate aftermath of the December 1971 war, it 
took time for the West Pakistani establishment to adapt to the reality of East Pakistan’s secession. 73 
Despite the extent of support provided by the Nixon White House to West Pakistan throughout 
1971, Pakistan took a turn away from the United States.74 Bhutto and much of the citizenry in 
Pakistan resented the US for not doing enough to protect its ally against what they saw as an 
aggressive assault from India.75 As discussed in Chapter Three, US Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph 
Farland had to assure President Yahya in January 1971 that the United States was not conspiring to 
split Pakistan and these suspicions continued in Pakistan once the civil war was over. 76 The loyalty 
shown by Nixon and Kissinger in 1971 was toward Yahya and his Generals, not ordinary Pakistanis to 
whom President Bhutto was now accountable. Having promised to withdraw Pakistan from all of its 
alliances, Bhutto withdrew from SEATO and promised to pursue an “independent foreign policy”. 77 
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Although ties with fellow Islamic nations Iran and Turkey meant Pakistan remained a member of 
CENTO, Bhutto went on to establish formal diplomatic ties with North Vietnam and North Korea. 78  
On July 2nd 1972, India and Pakistan signed a peace treaty known as the Simla Agreement, named 
after the Indian city in which it was negotiated and signed. The agreement mandated for exclusively 
peaceful means of dispute settlement and encouraged trade, cooperation and the promotion of 
friendly relations between the two nations.79 On the crucial issue of Kashmir, the two parties agreed 
to alter the terminology of the “Ceasefire Line” between the two countries to a “Line of Control”. 80 
In substance the agreement seemed to provide a basis for an eventual settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute, whereby the “Line of Control” would eventually acquire the characteristics of an 
international border. Bhutto proclaimed that an “agreement *over Kashmir+ will emerge in the 
foreseeable future…Let there be a line of peace; let people come and go; let us not fight over it”. 81 
Initial reaction to the Agreement was positive in both countries, but it quickly became clear that 
neither side was completely satisfied. Despite his rhetoric in the af termath of the accords, Bhutto 
had insisted that language implying that the Line of Control be converted into a de facto border was 
not included within the text of agreement.82 Previously, Gandhi and India had advocated for small 
steps to be taken in settling the Kashmir dispute, but the Prime Minister now looked to press for an 
overall settlement, whereas Pakistan now adopted the said step-by-step approach.83 The Agreement 
called for both parties to withdraw their troops from the newly created Line of Control within thirty 
days of the Agreement coming into force. That these withdrawals did not occur until December 20 th 
1972 was symbolic of the quick return to acrimonious relations between the South Asian 
neighbours.84 
In the wake of the December war, the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan became a major 
sticking point among South Asian nations as well as China and the Soviet Union. The issue became a 
three-way stalemate. After the war, India and Bangladesh held 73,000 Pakistani prisoners of war 
(PoWs) whose repatriation was demanded by Bhutto. India insisted that it could not release the 
PoWs without the consent of Bangladesh. Bangladesh would not release the prisoners until Pakistan 
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recognised Bangladesh’s sovereignty. In turn, Pakistan would not recogn ise Bangladesh until the 
prisoners were released.85 Eventually, the PoWs were released to West Pakistan in 1973, upon a 
promise from Bhutto that those charged with war crimes in the former East Pakistan would face trial 
in Islamabad- though such trials never happened.86 Nonetheless, Pakistan officially recognised 
Bangladesh on July 9, 1973, a move which paved the way for the removal of a Chinese veto at the 
UN and the confirmation of Bangladesh as a full UN member in 1974. 
In the aftermath of the December War, the Chinese position hardened in opposition to the newly 
independent Bangladesh. Peking was deeply concerned about the implications that recognition of 
Bangladesh could have for its claims over Taiwan.87 On the surface, there were striking similarities 
between the Bengali struggle for freedom from an ethnically different West Pakistan and the cause 
of the nationalists on Taiwan.88 Combined with a renewed desire to stand by its allies in Islamabad, 
concern over its position with regards to Taiwan translated into strong support for the Islamabad 
government’s sovereign right to determine the status of East Pakistan/Bangladesh. After restricting 
support for Pakistan during 1971 to rhetoric, and refusing to move its troops for an anti -Indian 
intervention, China insisted that recognition for Bangladesh would only come once Islamabad had 
done so.89 Nonetheless, relative to the Soviet Union, China’s position in South Asia and the wider 
global context had been diminished in the aftermath of the December War.  
 
3. UK-US relations in South Asia, 1971-72 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given events at the UN Security Council in the previous two weeks, UK -US 
relations with regard to South Asia was the single most discussed topic at the UK-US summit at 
Bermuda held 20th-21st December 1971. The talks had been designed to be both informal and 
flexible, with leaders able to discuss the issues that were most pressing at that point in time. In 
private talks in which Heath and Nixon were accompanied only by British Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke 
Trend and Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, the two leaders seemed 
keen to iron out the differences they had had over South Asia. In an extended explanation of his 
actions, Nixon denied that policy had been predicated on a fondness for Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan and a dislike for Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Rather, US policy had been guided by a 
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desire to maintain influence in Islamabad once it became clear that Yahya had “bungled” the 
situation in East Pakistan.90 He then proceeded to list the small concessions that the US had 
extracted from Yahya, notably an agreement to station UN observers along the East Pakistan border 
and an agreement to pull troops back from the West Pakistan border, before wishing that he h ad 
taken a tougher line with Gandhi.91 Nixon then reiterated his belief that India’s war aim was “the 
liquidation of the West Wing *of Pakistan+”, which would create a dangerous situation for global 
stability in which a Soviet-backed nation could “cannibalise” a neighbour with impunity, thus setting 
a worrying precedent in other areas of the world.92  
In response, Heath emphasised the fact that the British, too, had attempted to coax Yahya into a 
more reasonable position and reminded the President that although Gandhi may have thought war 
inevitable, British intelligence supported the Prime Minister’s opinion that she harboured no hostile 
feelings toward Pakistan. The Prime Minister however, was keen to move on from discussions of 
disagreements over the matter and looked to quickly focus upon the importance of working 
together on present issues such as post-war aid for Pakistan.93 
Notably absent from Nixon’s explanation of his South Asian policy was the single most important 
factor in the White House’s calculations- protection of the rapprochement with China. It was Heath 
that first mentioned this issue, and in the process demonstrated that the British government had not 
understood the rationale behind the White House’s policy in South Asia. 94 The Prime Minister 
brought up, unbeknown to him, a matter of great frustration for Nixon and Kissinger in the fact that 
the crisis had made clear the fact that China would not come to the aid of West Pakistan. Heath then 
used the idea to question the President’s theory of a true balance of power in Asia. Heath also posed 
the dilemma that, had India and the Soviet Union wanted to destroy West Pakistan, it “would not be 
easy to convince the Soviet Government in a situation of this kind not only that effective action 
could be taken against them but also that there was the will to take it”.95 It was clear from the 
conversation that Heath was unaware that Nixon and Kissinger believed that, by their actions in 
authorising the movement of Naval Task Force 74, they had indeed been able to convince the Soviet 
government that the US was willing to take severe action. Possibly embarrassed by the implicit point 
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that the aims of their policy had not been interpreted as they intended by the British government, 
Nixon moved on to talk about how a similar situation might play out in the Middle East. 
The issue of India and Pakistan also came up in various other high-level meetings throughout the 
summit. Following his attendance at the meeting between Heath and Nixon, Kissinger met with UK 
Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, in which the two reviewed events in South Asia in greater 
detail. Kissinger began the discussion by rejecting the idea that UK-US differences over India and 
Pakistan were the result of differing assessments.96 To demonstrate his point, Kissinger drew upon 
the broadest possible parallels between the policies of the two governments; that both saw from 
March 1971 onwards that East Pakistan would eventually gain independence and that both wanted 
to see this come about as peacefully as possible.97 However, despite emphasising areas of 
agreement, Kissinger went on to describe a US policy rationale completely at odds with the 
assessments of the British. In the meeting, Kissinger explained the notion that Heath had seemingly 
not grasped inasmuch as the US believed Soviet assurances that India would not look to break up 
Pakistan only came after the Naval Task Force had been ordered to move into the Bay of Bengal. 98 
Kissinger’s explanation of the thought process behind the movement of the Naval  Task Force was 
enlightening for the entire UK government. Head of the FCO’s North American Department, Hugh 
Overton noted that Kissinger’s “revealing explanation” provided a new insight into the White 
House’s preoccupation with their conception of Soviet policy.99 
A keenness to move on from “tactical disagreements” over South Asia was evident at a plenary 
meeting between the entire UK and US delegations to close out the Bermuda summit. In discussing 
South Asia, Home asserted that there was “no difference in  fundamental assessment” of the recent 
events and traced the issues between India and Pakistan back to Pakistan’s alignment with China 
and subsequent estrangement from SEATO in the 1960s.100 The British Foreign Secretary’s 
assessment represented a whitewash of the clear differences in British and American interpretations 
of the South Asian crisis and hugely oversimplified the causes of the crisis, seeming to ignore the 
internal crisis in Pakistan.101 When US Secretary of State Bill Rogers brought up the US opinion that 
the UN should have been able to condemn India’s behaviour (something the UK stood against), 
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Home continued to quickly move on to looking forward. 102 An unwillingness to dwell on 
disagreements over South Asia was also practiced by Heath in his meetings with Nixon, and was a 
noticeable British tactic at the summit.103 
The term “tactical differences” was used by both the UK and the US governments to paper over the 
severe levels of disagreement over South Asia in December 1971. The rhetoric was used despite the 
British government having believed the US policy to be misguided, and the US being disappointed at 
the UK’s lack of support for their policies, at the UN in particular.104 Discussions over South Asia 
fulfilled the aims of both sides for the talks, to maintain candour and frankness of exchanges whilst 
focusing on areas of agreement and the overall strength of the UK-US relationship. The two parties 
were willing to focus on agreements, however small, in the name of future cooperation.  
Such candour and frankness over differences in South Asia were soon put to the test in early 1972 
over the issue of Bangladesh’s recognition as a sovereign state. The US position was such that, amid 
China’s increase in support for the Pakistani government after the December war, the White House 
wanted to wait until after Nixon had consulted with the Chinese with regard to the issue during his 
upcoming visit to Peking. For the British, financial interests lay more with Pakistan’s erstwhile 
Eastern Wing than they did with the West. Of particular note were the British-owned Tea Gardens 
that were now in Bangladesh. 105 The issue came up briefly in discussions between Nixon and Heath 
at Bermuda, in which Nixon told the Prime Minister that the US would not recognise Bangladesh 
prior to his scheduled visit to China in the third week of February 1972. 106 In a similarly brief 
comment, Secretary of State Bill Rogers told Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home that the US 
government assumed that the British would want to recognise Bangladesh before the Americans.107  
The issue of recognition for Bangladesh was not discussed at length, however, until an exchange of 
letters between the Prime Minister and the President in January and February 1972. In a letter to 
Nixon on January 13th, Heath made the positive case for the recognition of Bangladesh, not only by 
the UK and the US, but the Western alliance as a whole. Heath reasoned that it was in the best 
interests of the West to recognise Bangladesh in the near future as it would confer upon Mujib’s 
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new government a legitimacy that would help it establish itself and keep left wing extremists from 
gaining power.108 Nixon’s response on February 2nd agreed with Heath’s sentiment with regard to 
the desire to keep Bangladesh out of the hands of leftists who had provided Mujib with support 
prior to the events of 1971, but was much more cautious on the question of recognition. 109 The 
President explained that a decision on recognition must take into consideration the situation on the 
ground in South Asia and relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. He argued that an early 
recognition could reverse what he saw as Pakistani President Zulfikur Ali Bhutto’s trend toward a 
more “realistic” position in terms of accepting the reality of East Pakistan’s secession. 110 Naturally 
such a position conformed with the US desire to continue its tacit support for Pakistan in order to 
safeguard Nixon’s upcoming jn  visit to Peking. 
Janice Musson has argued that Heath’s attempt to persuade Nixon that an early recognition was in 
the best interests of the West was sent more in hope than expectation, and that Nixon’s response 
suggested an indifference toward the opinion of the British.111 The issue of recognition for 
Bangladesh was carried out within the spirit of Nixon and Heath’s conversation at Bermuda in which 
the President told Heath that, just as with regard to Europe, the UK and US “need not try to have 
exactly the same positions” on South Asia, but must ensure that there were no 
misunderstandings.112 Although both sides were aware prior to January 1972 of the likely 
disagreement over extending recognition to Bangladesh, substantial efforts were made to keep one 
another aware of their respective policies toward the issue. Therefore, when the British recognised 
Bangladesh on February 4th 1972, three weeks before Nixon’s visit to China, it did not catch the 
Americans by surprise. In fact, the communications went as far as to allow CIA director Richard 
Helms to see some advantage in the British and French, who had come to a similar conclusion, 
recognising Bangladesh early so that the US could observe the reaction of the South Asian nations, 
the Chinese and the wider international community.113 Once consultation with the Chinese revealed 
no great barrier to US recognition of Bangladesh, the Administration did so on April 8th 1972. 
Throughout 1972, US policymaking for the South Asian region remained the exclusive preserve of 
the White House. Kissinger had relayed this information to the FCO during his brief visit to London 
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en-route to Paris in September 1972 (discussed above).114 This information meant that the FCO went 
into upcoming talks with the State Department on South Asia knowing that their counterparts 
continued to be excluded from the policymaking process. The talks between the FCO and State 
Department revealed a gap in optimism between the respective foreign services with regard to the 
likely success of the Simla agreement, with US Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Joe 
Sisco agreeing with the British delegation that the agreement should be welcomed but warning that 
it could easily fall apart.115 However, the main theme of the talks was a reaffirmation of Anglo-
American commitment to stability in South Asia as the major concern for the pursuit of Western 
interests.116 
The desire for stability was also espoused by Kissinger in his September 1972 meeting with Home. 
Kissinger reassured the Foreign Secretary that US interests in South Asia lay in the stability of the 
subcontinent. However, UK and US interests in the region continued to diverge. Kissinger reminded 
Home that US policy toward the region remained contingent upon US relations with China and that 
consequently, US policy remained one that tilted toward Pakistan.  117  Kissinger reiterated the US 
contention that protection of Pakistan was crucial if the Soviets were to be deterred from making 
advances in the Middle East (see Chapter 5) and speculated that Indira Gandhi  wanted to bring 
about “an end of Pakistan, once and for all” .118 All of this contrasted with the British policy in 1972 
of continuing to favour India as a result of greater British material and political interests in the 
country when compared to Pakistan.119 Both the US and the UK shared an interest in stability on the 
subcontinent, but differed on which party, India or Pakistan, to tacitly favour.  
Although there was a shared desire for stability, the UK and the US remained, at least tacitly, aligned 
with India and Pakistan respectively.120 In the September meeting between FCO and State 
Department officials, the British admitted that in Pakistan the British were seen as pro-Indian whilst 
the American delegation spoke of poor relations with the Indian government that showed little sign 
of improvement.121 These sentiments were repeated during Heath and Nixon’s summit meeting in 
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February 1973.122 In the thirteen months between the UK-US summit meetings at Bermuda at the 
end of December 1971 and in Washington in early February 1973, UK and US relations with regard to 
South Asia continued upon divergent trajectories. However, in contrast to the situation prior to the 
Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971, both governments now had a much clearer understanding of 
the other’s position.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The Anglo-American summit meeting in Bermuda on 20th-21st December 1971 succeeded in clearing 
the air after a turbulent final six months of the year. It was agreed that a strong UK-US relationship 
continued to be advantageous for both parties as well as for the wider western alliance. To this end, 
the serious policy disagreements over the South Asian crisis that had erupted at the UN Security 
Council just a week earlier were referred to by both parties as “tactical differences”. Such a 
characterisation of events in which Nixon warned Heath that the UK would be committing an 
“unfriendly act” should it not vote in favour of a US resolution demonstrated a shared desire to 
smoothly move on from recent discord. 
The Bermuda summit was also successful in increasing the British government’s understanding of US 
foreign policy under the Nixon Administration. The UK government learned a great deal about the 
rationale behind US policy toward South Asia in December 1971. Prior to Heath’s meeting with 
Nixon, the UK was unaware that the White House had authorised the movement of Naval Task Force 
74 to the Bay of Bengal in order to ward of an Indian attack on West Pakistan, and that Nixon and 
Kissinger believed this to have been a major consideration for India in calling a unilateral ceasefire 
on December 17th.123 Furthermore, FCO diplomats had the opportunity to see for themselves the 
secretive manner in which the White House conducted its business. 124 This exposure allowed the 
FCO to better understand and subsequently handle Kissinger’s insistence upon a secretive diplomatic 
style. However, as the matter of Kissinger’s trip to Paris in September and Ambassador Cromer’s 
frustration at a lack of communication with the Nixon Administration November 1972 have shown, a 
knowledge or understanding of the White House’s foreign policymaking style did not prevent British 
frustration at the manner in which the White House conducted itself.  
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At Bermuda, Heath and Nixon also agreed on the need for a return to frankness in communication 
between the two allies.125 They agreed that candour was necessary if misunderstandings were to be 
avoided, and looked forward to 1972 marking a new start for the relationship between the ir two 
governments. A signal of this was the issue of recognition for Bangladesh. After the groundwork had 
been laid at Bermuda, the two leaders exchanged letters on the matter that established a mutual 
understanding that the British government would recognise Bangladesh before Nixon’s trip to 
Peking in late February 1972.126 However, US Ambassador to the UK, Walter Annenberg noted that 
the UK government had been “stunned” by the Nixon Administration’s actions over China, the New 
Economic Policy and the South Asian crisis, and despite the fact that the Bermuda summit had 
helped mend fences, there continued to be a “certain sense of estrangement” from the US 
Administration.127  
Relations with regards to South Asia in the year following the Bermuda summit highligh ted 
continued divergent interests and problems in communication. On the Subcontinent, the UK and US 
governments perceived their interests to be served through tacit favour for India and Pakistan 
respectively, as they had throughout 1971. Unlike throughout 1971, the British knew, in explicit 
terms, that US policy toward South Asia was governed by the White House’s focus on protecting its 
burgeoning relationship with China.128 Conversely the American government was now more aware 
of the fact that in South Asia the UK would favour India and Bangladesh over Pakistan in order to 
protect its economic interests. In terms of communication, policy over South Asia remained heavily 
impacted by the secrecy of the White House foreign policymaking style. As had been the cas e in 
1971, the FCO still could not be sure that State Department officials’ statements were a true 
reflection of the White House’s policy. 
Ahead of the February 1973 UK-US summit in Washington, the Anglo-American relationship had 
seen what has been described as a “year of virtually unbroken friendliness”.129 Unlike those 
prepared for the Bermuda summit 13 months earlier, policy briefs did not consider, at length, the 
state of the Anglo-American relationship.130 At the summit, Nixon thanked Heath for his support 
over the US decision to increase the intensity of the bombing campaign in Vietnam and his 
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helpfulness negotiating US use of British facilities on Malta. In return Heath appreciated Nixon’s 
support for his position on Northern Ireland.131  
At Bermuda in December 1971, the British found out that not only had they not been consulted on 
the direction of US policy, but that they did not understand major aspects of it. For the British, their 
experience over South Asia was perhaps the most painful example of the di fficulty in working with 
the unique foreign policymaking style of the Nixon Administration. Meanwhile a lack of support from 
the British over a matter as important as South Asia, and by extension the China initiative, was 
interpreted by the White House as a signal of things to come as the UK moved closer to Europe. The 
Bermuda summit succeeded in drawing a line under the disagreements of late 1971 and helped the 
UK and US governments develop a deeper understanding of one another’s position. But in the 
secretive nature of White House foreign policymaking, it did not confront the problem that 
exacerbated them. The UK continued to find it difficult to ascertain a clear and detailed picture of 
the direction of US foreign policy and could not be sure if the State  Department was involved in 
policymaking or fully briefed on a particular topic 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a detailed analysis of UK-US relations with regard to the South Asian crisis of 
1971. The conclusion to the thesis looks to take a step back from the detail and assesses three broad 
questions; (1) Was the relationship between Prime Minister Edward Heath and President Richard 
Nixon as problematic and frosty as previously suggested?; (2) Were disagreements over South Asia 
simply “tactical”, as suggested at the December 1971 Bermuda Summit?; (3) Did the public 
disagreement at the UN have any lasting effect on the UK-US relationship? Finally, this thesis ends 
with a summary of the contribution made to the study of Anglo-American relations.  
 
1. A frosty relationship between Heath and Nixon? 
The notion of a frosty relationship between Heath and Nixon has been most notably propounded by 
Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.  Until archival material was available 
on both sides of the Atlantic in the early 2000s, much literature on the period relied upon Kissinger’s 
claims as evidence for arguments that it was Heath’s fervent pro-Europeanism that led him to shun a 
close relationship with the US President.1 In the first volume of his memoir White House Years, 
Kissinger claims that “Heath and Nixon never managed to establ ish the personal rapport for which 
Nixon, at least, longed in the beginning”.2 He goes on to state that, for Heath, “the “special 
relationship” was an obstacle to the British vocation in Europe. Heath was content to enjoy no 
higher status in Washington than any other European leader”.3 Kissinger’s accusations are therefore 
twofold; not only did the Heath-Nixon relationship never flourish, but Heath was out to foil Nixon’s 
desire for a “special” relationship from the outset.  
Upon their first meeting as Prime Minister and President at Chequers in October 1970, Heath and 
Nixon succeeded in establishing a friendly personal relationship. Contrary to Kissinger’s accusations, 
Heath was looking to establish a cordial relationship with the President and to ensure that the UK 
concerns were factored into US foreign policymaking.4 Heath succeeded in his aims and successfully 
reaffirmed an Anglo-American relationship that had suffered a difficult period in the late 1960s. 
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Meanwhile Nixon succeeded in ensuring that the two agreed to candour within consultations.5 The 
meetings were brief, but the two leaders laid out their agreements on US policy in Vietnam and UK 
policy toward South Africa.6 Kissinger alleges that the presence of the Queen, something that limited 
the scope of discussions, annoyed Nixon, but always a fan of pomp and ceremony, conflicting 
reports have suggested that Nixon was suitably impressed by the presence of Royalty. 7 
Heath’s speech prior to the Washington summit meetings on December 17th 1970 has been marked 
as a milestone in Heath’s unilateral downgrading of the importance of the Anglo -American 
relationship.8 In it, he referred to a “natural relationship” rather than the “special relationship” that 
Nixon had been speaking of since his inauguration in 1969.9 Analysis of the subsequent talks 
however, suggests that this was not as significant an alteration in UK-US relations as has been 
previously argued. Nixon consciously acquiesced and used the term “natural relationship” during the 
Washington talks and in correspondence thereafter.10 The thesis has provided support for the notion 
that there was an acceptance of the UK’s reasoning in changing the rhetorical categorisation of the 
Anglo-American relationship at a critical stage in the UK’s EC negotiations.11 Negotiations which the 
US did not want to fail as a result of the resurfacing of accusations that the UK may act as an 
American “Trojan Horse” in Europe. The Washington talks were interpreted by most observers, with 
the notable exception of Kissinger, to have been a successful and amiable meeting the President and 
the Prime Minister.12 
Ructions in the Heath-Nixon relationship did not begin until Nixon announced on July 15th 1971, that 
the US had been secretly working on a rapprochement with China that would see him become the 
first President to visit Peking early in 1972. The announcement triggered a sense of betrayal in 
London. In negotiations with the Chinese over an exchange of Ambassadors, the UK government had 
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kept the White House informed at every turn. They had acquiesced to US requests to delay a 
decision to withdraw opposition to the seating of Communist China at the expense of the 
Nationalists on Taiwan, a move that was a prerequisite for improved diplomatic representation. The 
US claimed it was still considering a new policy toward Peking, and that as a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, any UK decision on Chinese representation would have a considerable 
impact upon US policymaking. On July 10th, just days before Nixon’s announcement, the British 
received a message from Peking which explained that the Chinese now wanted the UK to recognise 
Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic, something the British were unwilling to do. Only on 
July 15th did Heath and the rest of the UK government learn of the reason for this – for China, the 
rapprochement with the US meant that an exchange of Ambassadors with the UK was less valuable, 
and so they could afford to request further concessions.  
Heath felt slighted not only by the deceptiveness of the Wh ite House but also the fact that the US’ 
opening to China, by secretly undermining the British negotiations on upgrading diplomatic 
relations, had damaged the British national interest. The UK publicly welcomed the move, as it 
coincided with post-war British policy to bring China into the international community, but in 
private, Heath was seething. He refused to send a letter of congratulations to the President and felt 
it signalled a worrying trend toward a lack of consultation on the part of the US with i ts closest 
allies.13 Such feelings of betrayal were once again aroused in London on August 15th, when Downing 
Street was only given a few hours’ notice of the second “Nixon Shock”: A New Economic policy that 
included a reduction in the liquidity of the dollar and a 10% import surcharge on imports into the 
US.14  
In the summer of 1971, it was not so much the policy decisions themselves that sparked anger in 
London, but the lack of consultation that the US afforded the UK. It was on this subject that Heath 
complained to Nixon in a letter on November 24th, calling for an end to surprise announcements that 
made it very difficult for allies of the US to respond.15 Heath’s letter was the culmination of much 
soul-searching within the British government in the Autumn of 1971 with regard to the Anglo-
American relationship. In briefs prepared for the Bermuda summit of 21st-22nd December, the FCO 
concluded that the “old ease and closeness of Anglo-American communications had been lost” and 
the objective for the summit was to return to “the old kind of consultation” that had been enjoyed 
for the majority of the period since 1945.  
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Given the disagreements at the UN Security Council (see Chapter 5 and below), a return to amiable 
relations between Heath and Nixon may have seemed unlikely. Both leaders were expected to find 
the other in a tempestuous mood, Heath over US policy in South Asia and Nixon over the UK’s 
refusal to support it.16 However, the two leaders succeeded in reaffirming a friendly relationship 
both on a personal level and between the two governments, indeed one of Heath’s explicit aims was 
to fall back upon the amiable relationship that he had built with Nixon in late 1970 to ensure that 
close relations continued into the future.17 Indeed, both governments considered the talks to have 
marked the beginning of a new phase in relations between the Heath government and the Nixon 
Administration after a torrid second half to 1971.18 
To say that Heath and Nixon had a frosty relationship within the period covered by this  thesis would 
be a gross oversimplification. This thesis supports Alex Spelling’s argument that the Anglo -American 
relationship, and that between Heath and Nixon, saw peaks and troughs from June 1970 to February 
1973.19 The difficulties in the second half of 1971 were bookended by periods of friendly, positive 
relations. Contrary to Kissinger’s claim, this thesis argues that Heath and Nixon did, indeed, lay 
strong foundations for their personal relationship in late 1970, that helped rebuild the relationship 
at Bermuda in December 1971 following a torrid six months. Spelling argues that had Heath lost 
office following the Washington summit of February 1973, nobody would have thought the Heath-
Nixon relationship as “anything but a continuation of the post-war norm”.20 On this point, the thesis 
agrees in the sense that if occasional crises in Anglo-American relations are considered the “norm”, 
the disagreements of late 1971 can easily sit alongside, and were perhaps not as severe as, the 
passing of the McMahon Act in 1947, the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the cancellation of the Skybolt 
missile system in 1962. 
This thesis argues that Heath’s attitude to the Anglo-American relationship was more nuanced than 
the description of a “Europe obsessed” leader that had no intere st in the “special relationship”.21 
British entry into the EC was Heath’s top foreign policy priority, however he was conscious to make 
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clear that his being pro-European did not make him anti-American. This thesis has presented 
evidence that, in the period in question between June 1970 and February 1973, Nixon and the US 
government believed that the UK’s entry into the EC was in the long-term interests of the US. The 
Administration understood the British desire to mollify European concerns at Britain’s close ness to 
the US and agreed to refer to a “natural” rather than “special” relationship.22 At Chequers in October 
1970, Washington in December 1970 and Bermuda in December 1971, this thesis has demonstrated 
that Heath’s priorities were to ensure the continuation of a strong and healthy UK-US relationship. 
The relationship broke down in late 1971, but it was a result of the secretive manner in which US 
foreign policy was being conducted and the lack of consultation afforded to the British government, 
not because of Heath’s push for the UK’s entry into the EC. 
2. “Tactical Differences” over South Asia? 
The second question to be assessed is whether the disagreements between the UK and US over the 
South Asian Crisis of 1971 were simply tactical, or whether the differences were more fundamental. 
At the Bermuda summit meetings held December 21st-22nd 1971, the UK and US delegations agreed 
to move on from their “tactical differences” over South Asia and focus upon improving the state of 
the Anglo-American relationship. This thesis has demonstrated that disagreements over the South 
Asian crisis were over more than simply tactics. Rather, trouble in the Anglo-American relationship 
with regard to the issue encapsulated the two wider problems for the bilateral relationship 
identified by the FCO in November; those of communication and of interest.  
The problem of communication stemmed from the White House’s perceived need for secrecy in 
foreign policymaking. When the Pakistani military government enacted a crackdown on Bengali 
nationalists in Dacca on the night of March 25th/26th 1971, it presented a problem for President 
Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. Yahya Khan was the go -
between in their still-secret rapprochement with China and was set to help organise Kissinger’s 
secret trip to Peking in July 1971. The “opening to China” was designed to be the flagship diplomatic 
achievement of Nixon’s first term – a move that would not only win him re-election but cement his 
place in history. Nixon and Kissinger believed that in order for the initiative to succeed, leaks of the 
plan needed to be avoided at all costs, as they could lead to a derailment of the entire process by 
Congress and/or a reluctance on the part of the Chinese to pursue the rapprochement. To guard 
against such an occurrence, the State Department, an organisation not trusted by Nixon since his 
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days as Vice President, was excluded from the policymaking process with regard to China, and 
necessarily therefore, the subcontinent.  
Such a breakdown in communication within the US government had consequences for the UK -US 
relationship, both in general and with regard to South Asia. After Nixon publicly announced the 
China initiative on July 15th, Foreign Office Minister Geoffrey Rippon noted that Pakistan’s role in the 
China initiative was the reason for the White House’s reluctance to criticise Yahya for his actions in 
East Pakistan.23 By mid-August, the FCO had received confirmation from the India Desk Officer at the 
State Department, Tony Quainton, that the bureaucracy had been cut off from decision-making with 
regard to South Asia.24 On 23rd November, Kissinger told UK Ambassador Lord Cromer that the State 
Department had been totally excluded from decision making on South Asia and that any 
communication on the subject was for the “eyes of the Prime Minister” only. He advised that any 
information provided by the bureaucracy would provide a “less clear opinion” than that from the 
White House.25 Indeed, as the Indo-Pakistan war erupted in December 1971, Cromer reported to the 
FCO that the Embassy had been unable to speak to the State Department at all with regard to the 
matter, which he believed was understandable lest they expose their ignorance of US policy. 26 
As well as problems in communication, the secrecy surrounding the White House’s China initiative 
meant that the British government had a different perspective to that of the White House. Both the 
State Department and the British government considered that their own national inte rest would be 
served by a policy that tacitly favoured the Indian position. Once the crackdown occurred however, 
three significant differences of opinion between the British government and the White House 
emerged. Firstly, although in support of a united Pakistan, Heath’s communications with Yahya were 
significantly more condemnatory in tone than Nixon’s. Heath’s message of April 7th in which he told 
the Pakistani President that “there must be an end to the bloodshed…as soon as possible” can be 
contrasted with Nixon’s assurance to Yahya on May 7th that the US had “stressed the need for 
restraint in New Delhi”.27 The second disagreement centred on the issue of aid to Pakistan, which 
the British argued should have been contingent upon there being a political so lution “acceptable to 
the people of East Pakistan”.  This policy can be contrasted with the softer line taken by the US in 
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insisting only that conditions in East Pakistan be amenable to the distribution of aid. 28 Thirdly, the UK 
and the US had different interpretations of the August 9th Indo-Soviet Treaty. The British saw the 
agreement as the Indian government demonstrating to domestic critics its ability to gain 
international support, whilst the Soviet Union gained further leverage with which to urge restraint in 
New Delhi. The White House, however, saw the treaty as a de facto affirmation of Soviet support for 
India’s intention to destroy East and West Pakistan.29 
Despite disagreements between the UK government and the White House, both Downing Street and 
the FCO remained in agreement with the State Department beyond Nixon’s China announcement on 
July 15th. On July 29th, the State Department put forward the idea that the US should put pressure 
upon Yahya to end the military repression and work toward a peaceful solution amenable to the 
people of East Pakistan, as this would provide suitable conditions for the return of refugees. 30 This 
attitude continued a pattern of agreement between the British government and the State 
Department that could be traced back to late 1970 when the bureaucracies agreed upon the lack of 
necessity for a “one-time exception” on arms supply to Pakistan and the identification of relations 
with India as more important for UK and US interests than Pakistan.31 Differences of opinion that the 
UK government had with the US over South Asia in 1971 were strictly with the White House, not the 
State Department. 
These problems in both communication and interests between the Heath government and the Nixon 
Administration manifested themselves in the weeks following Indira Gandhi’s respective visits to 
London and Washington in late October and early November. UK-Indian relations had been on an 
upswing under Heath and the meeting with Gandhi on October 30th occurred under a cordial 
atmosphere.32 Although there was no agreement on issues such as Heath’s suggestion that India 
cease its training of Mukti Bahini forces, or the issue of a UN presence on both sides of the Indian 
border with East Pakistan, Heath was clearly sympathetic to Gandhi’s situation.33 Days later, Gandhi 
met an American President that had long held prejudices against India and had a “special 
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relationship” with the President of Pakistan.34 Having received an offer from Yahya to withdraw 
troops from the borders with India, Nixon put pressure on the Indian Prime Minister to do the same, 
even though he was aware that she had previously rejected such a suggestion. 35 The meeting both 
reinforced Nixon’s personal dislike for the Indian Prime Minister as well as his and Kissinger’s 
suspicion that India was intent upon destroying West Pakistan. 
However, despite evidently different approaches and experiences in meetings with Gandhi, Heath 
and Nixon’s communications on the matter gave the appearance of a shared opinion. Heath’s report 
of his meeting demonstrated his sympathy for Gandhi’s domestic position. He told Nixon that all of 
Gandhi’s efforts were being poured into quelling calls from hawks within the Indian government for 
decisive military action.36 Heath also made clear the British belief that the onus was upon Yahya to 
bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis and urged Nixon to put pressure on him to do so. 
Despite the fact that these statements were clearly at odds with his opinion, the President’s 
response focused upon areas of agreement with the British Prime Minister. Despite the stark tonal 
differences between the two meetings in his reply to Heath, Nixon asserted that the two men had a 
“similar impression” of the Indian Prime Minister. Nixon’s letter ignored the fact that the UK and US 
had embarked upon divergent policies toward South Asia throughout 1971. A telephone 
conversation between the two leaders on November 25th reinforced the idea that there were 
fundamental agreements in policy.37 In attempting to mend a relationship that had deteriorated as a 
result of a lack of communication and consultation, Heath and Nixon’s determination to focus on the 
areas of agreement obscured the extent to which UK and US policy diverged over South Asia. The 
thesis has argued that this lack of understanding for one another’s position helped foster 
misunderstandings that exacerbated the subsequent disagreements at the UN Security Council in 
December. 
Once War was officially declared between India and Pakistan on December 3rd 1971, disagreements 
that the UK and US governments had failed to confront in November erupted in public at the UN 
Security Council. The US wanted to follow through on their assertion that India was the aggressor in 
South Asia and maintain their tacit support for the Pakistani government. They wanted a resolution 
that would condemn India and call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Indian troops 
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from East Pakistan. The British position, tacitly in favour of India, was that only a unanimous UN 
Security Council Resolution would have any impact upon the conflict in South Asia. They insisted that 
any resolution along the lines desired by the US would only trigger a veto from the Soviet Union. The 
British also believed that a vetoed resolution would end up pushing India into a closer relationship 
with the Soviet Union.38 
When the UK abstained on a US motion that condemned India and called for a ceasefire between 
India and Pakistan on December 4th, Heath sent Nixon a letter regarding what he saw as “a very 
difficult situation” and asked for a delay before a second vote could be taken.39 A second vote on 
December 6th produced the same result whereby the anti-Indian resolution received eleven positive 
votes, two abstentions from the UK and France and two negative votes from Poland and the Soviet 
Union. The Security Council quickly reached a deadlock, whereby a Soviet veto against a ceasefire 
was met by a veto from both the US, and the newly-seated Chinese communists in the opposite 
direction. As the conflict continued in South Asia, the UN Security Council continued its stalemate.  
Having grown increasingly frustrated with the British stance, Kissinger applied pressure on 
December 12th in telling Ambassador Cromer that the White House was distressed by the British 
position and had no other choice but to infer that British policy was the result of its “new found 
Europeanism”.40 Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs made it clear that further British 
abstentions against US-supported motions would be regarded as an “unfriendly” act.41 The British, 
however, stuck to their position. Heath sent a letter to Nixon explaining that both the UK and the US 
should maintain good relations with India, as it would undoubtedly end up as the dominant force on 
a subcontinent of three nations.42 The tone of communication between the two nations had quickly 
become terse as Heath reminded Nixon that his decision not to consult on major issues was causing 
great problems for the British government.43 
Although the British government was aware that the rapprochement with China greatly influenced 
the US’ support for Pakistan, it was unaware of the specifics of US policy toward South Asia and the 
lengths that the White House was willing to go to protect West Pakistan. Ambassador Cromer cast 
doubt upon the veracity of Kissinger’s claim that a December 7th CIA report indicated an Indian 
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desire to break up West Pakistan, and believed that US policy was being driven by Nixon and 
Kissinger’s “emotional desire” to isolate what they saw as the Indo -Soviet axis on the Security 
Council.44 The British, however, did not understand the intended significance of the policy moves 
being made by the White House. Heath’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Peter Moon, did not 
know the reasoning behind the American decision to authorise the movement of Task Force 74.45 
The thought that the movement was designed to ward off an Indian annexation of Kashmir and 
invasion of West Pakistan did not seem to cross the mind of the British foreign policymaking 
establishment. Although there were suspicions that Nixon and Kissinger’s interpretation of Indian 
intentions was based upon faulty or non-existent intelligence, the idea that such a strong move 
would be made to guard against India destroying West Pakistan, may have seemed illogical. It w as 
not until Kissinger spelled out the reason for the movement of the Naval Task Force to Alec Douglas -
Home at the Bermuda summit meetings on December 20th that the British gained a full 
understanding of US policy during the Indo-Pakistan war.46 
South Asia was discussed at length and grievances were aired at the Bermuda summit. However, as 
had been the prevailing attitude prior to the crisis, discussion focused upon areas of agreement. At a 
plenary meeting between the two delegations to close the summit, Douglas-Home asserted that 
their “was no difference in fundamental assessment” of the crisis in South Asia. 47 The thesis, 
therefore, provides support for Andrew Scott’s claim that the disagreements over South Asia were 
more than the “tactical differences” that both parties referred to at Bermuda.48 Nixon and 
Kissinger’s focus upon the “opening to China” had caused US policy to diverge from the traditional 
UK-US desire for stability above all else on the subcontinent. These policy divisions were then 
exacerbated by the secretive nature in which US policy was administered and the desire of both 
governments to focus on areas of agreement in order to repair the relationship in November 1971. 
The result was a lack of understanding of one another’s position and public disunity at the Security 
Council. 
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3. Long-term effects on the UK-US relationship 
The third question to be assessed is whether the heated Anglo-American exchanges at the UN 
Security Council in December 1971 had any consequences for the relationship between the Heath 
government and the Nixon Administration. As discussed above, disagreements with regard to UN 
Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan were the culmination 
of six months of poor communication, a lack of understanding, and frustration. These tense 
discussions did, however, provide an impetus for the two governments to focus upon reaffirming the 
significance of the Anglo-American relationship. The Bermuda summit meetings held between 
delegations from the UK and the US between December 20th-21st 1971 succeeded in their goal of 
drawing a line under the disagreements that had marked the previous six months. Chapter Six 
explained how the summit was seen by both delegations to mark a new phase for the relationship 
between the Heath government and the Nixon Administration, after 1971 had ended in a public 
disunity over South Asia at the UN Security Council. Nixon and Heath agreed that a full 
understanding of one another’s positions was important given the shifting geopoli tical context. The 
UK was on the verge of entry into the EC and the US was moving toward bilateralism with China and 
the Soviet Union. These developments meant that interests may have diverged  to a greater extent 
than they had in the post-war period to that point.49 
The Bermuda summit also succeeded in increasing levels of understanding of each another’s policies 
in for the US and the UK. Although the Heath government was aware from at least October 1970 of 
the Nixon Administration’s secretive and peculiar foreign policymaking operation.50 It was not until 
the Bermuda summit, however, at the end of 1971, that many Downing Street and FCO officials 
experienced it first hand. A particular example of this insistence upon secrecy was Kissinger’s 
reminder to Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home not to mention any of the substance of their 
conversation to State Department officials.51 In fact it was cited by head of the FCO’s North 
American Department, Hugh Overton, as the starkest example of the White House system in 
action.52 Meetings at Bermuda also made the British aware in no uncertain terms that US policy 
toward South Asia was both predicated upon the wider policy toward China and was decided upon 
exclusively within the White House- Kissinger had told Home that such a “lesson must be learned”.53 
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In kind, the US government learned that greater financial interests in India and the nascent 
Bangladesh dictated British support for those countries over the government in Islamabad.  
The White House’s imperative in protecting the link to China continued into the early 1970s. The 
Chinese government’s toughening up of its stance toward New Delhi prompted the White House to 
assume that any small move in favour of the Indian position could scupper three years’ work in 
facilitating Nixon’s trip to Peking in February 1972.54 As a result, the US government delayed its 
formal recognition of Bangladesh until April 1972. At the UK-US summit in February 1973, in 
response to British criticism of the White House’s decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan, 
Nixon confirmed that US policy in South Asia remained predicated upon the improving relationship 
between the US and China.55 The “Opening to China” dictated US policy in South Asia throughout 
Nixon’s first term as President. 
The disagreements of December 1971 had two identifiable effects on the UK-US relationship. Firstly, 
in relation to South Asia, both governments renewed their commitments to stability on the 
subcontinent. This followed a brief period in which Nixon and Kissinger had tacitly abandoned this 
policy in order to secure the “opening to China”. This renewal did not mean, however, that the US 
and UK shared a common perspective on South Asia. At the Washington summit meeting in February 
1973, the two governments confirmed their intentions to continue their favour for India and 
Pakistan respectively. Secondly, and more generally, the effect of these disagreements was to bring 
into focus for the UK government the style of US foreign policymaking, and for the US government to 
appreciate the British response to this. Friendliness returned to the Anglo-American relationship 
following the Bermuda summit meetings, but issues of communication and differences of opinion 
remained. Although by 1972, the UK government had become more accustomed to Kissinger’s 
insistence upon secretive negotiations and had experience in arranging his clandestine trips, such as 
those to Paris for negotiations with the North Vietnamese, there remained a great deal of 
frustration. In December 1972, Ambassador Cromer sent a cable to the FCO venting his annoyance 
at the centralised nature of the US foreign policymaking system. He complained that he could not 
get any answers to policy questions from the US government unless Kissinger was sat behind his 
desk. By late 1972 Cromer’s references to asking the State Department for information were relayed 
in sardonic terms due to the bureaucracy’s exclusion from the policymaking process. 56 Although 
differences of interest and breakdowns in communication led to rancorous publi c disagreements at 
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the UN Security council with regard to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, the six months prior proved to 
be a learning curve for both governments in how to deal with one another, paving the way for a 
greater understanding of one another that allowed for an amiable relationship into 1973. 
 
4. Contribution to the study of Anglo-American relations 
This thesis has been unique in adopting a detailed policy-tracing approach toward Anglo-American 
relations and the South Asian crisis of 1971. In terms of the Anglo-American relationship in South 
Asia, this thesis has supported to an extent the argument of Simon Smith, that disagreements over 
the South Asian crisis fit a pattern dating back to the partition of British India in 1947. 57 The US 
government demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice friendly relations with India for stronger ties 
with Pakistan that would be of greater benefit in the fight against the communist powers. Similarly, 
the British favouring of relations with India as a function of its size , population and strategic 
significance also fit a post-partition pattern. There was, however a major departure from the Anglo-
American orthodoxy of fostering stability on the subcontinent as the most effective method of 
combatting communist influence. Through its staunch support for the Pakistani regime, Nixon and 
Kissinger tacitly endangered stability in South Asia in the name of strengthening its geopolitical 
position with regard to China and the Soviet Union.  
In considering US and UK policies toward China and South Asia concurrently, this thesis has provided 
a thorough analysis of the disagreements evident within the Anglo-American relationship in late 
1971. In 1971, dissent over policy on the subcontinent was a consequence of poor communication 
between the two governments. The secretive foreign policymaking style of President Richard Nixon 
and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had an impact upon the quality of 
information that the British government received with regard to the direction of US foreign policy. 
Prior to Nixon’s announcement of his Administration’s new policy toward China on July 15th, the FCO 
was unaware of the extent to which the State Department was being excluded from the 
policymaking process. By the end of 1971 and into 1972, the FCO could never be sure of the extent 
to which the State Department had been briefed on any particular issue. Although it had assurances 
from Kissinger that South Asia was the special preserve of the White House, such an arrangement 
caused difficulties for British officials when forming policy that required either communication with 
the US or consultation on the US policy position. This arrangement compromised the ease of 
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diplomatic consultation that has been often cited as one of the three “pillars” of the Anglo-American 
relationship alongside nuclear and intelligence cooperation. 
This thesis has plugged an important gap within a growing revisionist assessment of the Heath-Nixon 
era in Anglo-American relations. This thesis has demonstrated that disagreements with regard to the 
South Asian crisis support claims by authors including Andrew Scott, Alex Spelling and Niklas 
Rossbach who have argued that the secretive White House foreign policymaking style was a greater 
cause of discord within the Anglo-American relationship than Heath’s desire to have the UK accede 
to EC.58 Heath and Nixon laid strong foundations for their relationship in late 1970 that survived the 
travails of the second half of 1971.  The strong and heated public disagreements at the UN Security 
Council, during the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971, led to both governments gaining a greater 
understanding of one another’s style and priorities in foreign policy at the subsequent Bermuda 
summit. Despite greater amity in relations post-1971, problems of communication and interest in 
the Anglo-American relationship, remained into the early 1970s.  
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